Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6

31 files changed, 801 insertions, 801 deletions

diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 43874c1e6e2..558795b237d 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -828,6 +828,11 @@ static inline void dummy_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 {
 }
 
+static inline void dummy_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
+			struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+}
+
 static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 			struct flowi *fl)
 {
@@ -836,7 +841,7 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct sock *sk)
+		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -856,7 +861,7 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
 }
 
 static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x,
-	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
+	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -881,12 +886,6 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-				struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
-	return 1;
-}
-
 static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1108,6 +1107,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sock_graft);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef  CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1120,7 +1120,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
-	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 80de8c3e9cc..ac9326c5f1d 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
-static kmem_cache_t	*key_jar;
+static struct kmem_cache	*key_jar;
 struct rb_root		key_serial_tree; /* tree of keys indexed by serial */
 DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_serial_lock);
 
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_user_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(key_types_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(key_types_sem);
 
-static void key_cleanup(void *data);
-static DECLARE_WORK(key_cleanup_task, key_cleanup, NULL);
+static void key_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
+static DECLARE_WORK(key_cleanup_task, key_cleanup);
 
 /* we serialise key instantiation and link */
 DECLARE_RWSEM(key_construction_sem);
@@ -285,16 +285,14 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	}
 
 	/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
-	key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, SLAB_KERNEL);
+	key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!key)
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
 	if (desc) {
-		key->description = kmalloc(desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		key->description = kmemdup(desc, desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!key->description)
 			goto no_memory_3;
-
-		memcpy(key->description, desc, desclen);
 	}
 
 	atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
@@ -552,7 +550,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link);
  * do cleaning up in process context so that we don't have to disable
  * interrupts all over the place
  */
-static void key_cleanup(void *data)
+static void key_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct rb_node *_n;
 	struct key *key;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index e8d02acc51e..ad45ce73964 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -706,12 +706,10 @@ int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 				BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE);
 
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
-				nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+				nklist = kmemdup(klist, size, GFP_KERNEL);
 				if (!nklist)
 					goto error2;
 
-				memcpy(nklist, klist, size);
-
 				/* replace matched key */
 				atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 				nklist->keys[loop] = key;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 32150cf7c37..b6f86808475 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
 struct key_user root_key_user = {
 	.usage		= ATOMIC_INIT(3),
 	.consq		= LIST_HEAD_INIT(root_key_user.consq),
-	.lock		= SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED,
+	.lock		= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
 	.nkeys		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
 	.nikeys		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
 	.uid		= 0,
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index a300702da52..e7c0b5e2066 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -32,12 +32,7 @@
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
-static const struct av_perm_to_string
-{
-  u16 tclass;
-  u32 value;
-  const char *name;
-} av_perm_to_string[] = {
+static const struct av_perm_to_string av_perm_to_string[] = {
 #define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s },
 #include "av_perm_to_string.h"
 #undef S_
@@ -57,17 +52,21 @@ static const char *class_to_string[] = {
 #undef TE_
 #undef S_
 
-static const struct av_inherit
-{
-    u16 tclass;
-    const char **common_pts;
-    u32 common_base;
-} av_inherit[] = {
+static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
 #define S_(c, i, b) { c, common_##i##_perm_to_string, b },
 #include "av_inherit.h"
 #undef S_
 };
 
+const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
+	av_perm_to_string,
+	ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
+	class_to_string,
+	ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
+	av_inherit,
+	ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
+};
+
 #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS			512
 #define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD		512
 #define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM		16
@@ -125,7 +124,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
 
 static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
 static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
-static kmem_cache_t *avc_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
 
 static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
@@ -333,7 +332,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
-	node = kmem_cache_alloc(avc_node_cachep, SLAB_ATOMIC);
+	node = kmem_cache_alloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!node)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -497,7 +496,7 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 addr,
+static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
 				       __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
 {
 	if (addr)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 28ee187ed22..65fb5e8ea94 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
 #include <linux/quota.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
 #include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 
-static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 
 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context 
    length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-	isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
+	isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!isec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -751,6 +752,8 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 				return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
 			else
 				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DCCP:
+			return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
 		default:
 			return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 		}
@@ -1117,8 +1120,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-	struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
-	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+	struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	int rc;
@@ -1578,7 +1581,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
 	u32 newsid;
@@ -1618,10 +1621,10 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
-	ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
+	ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
 
-	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
 		newsid = tsec->sid;
 
         if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
@@ -1692,9 +1695,10 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	struct fdtable *fdt;
 	long j = -1;
+	int drop_tty = 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
-	tty = current->signal->tty;
+	tty = get_current_tty();
 	if (tty) {
 		file_list_lock();
 		file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
@@ -1704,15 +1708,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 			   than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
 			   file may belong to another process and we are only
 			   interested in the inode-based check here. */
-			struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+			struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 			if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
 					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
-				/* Reset controlling tty. */
-				current->signal->tty = NULL;
-				current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+				drop_tty = 1;
 			}
 		}
 		file_list_unlock();
+
+		/* Reset controlling tty. */
+		if (drop_tty)
+			proc_set_tty(current, NULL);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
 
@@ -1728,7 +1734,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 		j++;
 		i = j * __NFDBITS;
 		fdt = files_fdtable(files);
-		if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
+		if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
 			break;
 		set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
 		if (!set)
@@ -2414,7 +2420,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
 	if (!mask) {
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
@@ -2591,7 +2597,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	        case F_SETFL:
-			if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
+			if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -2617,7 +2623,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 		case F_SETLK64:
 	        case F_SETLKW64:
 #endif
-			if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
+			if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -2889,7 +2895,8 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 }
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
-static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
 	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
 	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -2907,6 +2914,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
 	ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
 	ret = 0;
 
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = ih->protocol;
+
 	switch (ih->protocol) {
         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
         	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
@@ -2940,6 +2950,22 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
         	break;
         }
 
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+        }
+
         default:
         	break;
         }
@@ -2950,7 +2976,8 @@ out:
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
-static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
 	u8 nexthdr;
 	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -2971,6 +2998,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
 	if (offset < 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = nexthdr;
+
 	switch (nexthdr) {
 	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
         	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
@@ -2996,6 +3026,18 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
 		break;
 	}
 
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+        }
+
 	/* includes fragments */
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -3007,13 +3049,13 @@ out:
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-			     char **addrp, int *len, int src)
+			     char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	switch (ad->u.net.family) {
 	case PF_INET:
-		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
 		if (ret || !addrp)
 			break;
 		*len = 4;
@@ -3023,7 +3065,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 	case PF_INET6:
-		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
 		if (ret || !addrp)
 			break;
 		*len = 16;
@@ -3101,9 +3143,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	if (sock->sk) {
 		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		sksec->sid = isec->sid;
-		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock,
-							family,
-							isec->sid);
+		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
 	}
 
 	return err;
@@ -3180,7 +3220,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 			node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
-			
+
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
@@ -3218,16 +3262,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		return err;
 
 	/*
-	 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
 	 */
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
 		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 		struct avc_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
-		u32 sid;
+		u32 sid, perm;
 
 		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
@@ -3246,11 +3291,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
+		perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
+		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+
 		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
 		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
-		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
-				   TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -3438,7 +3485,13 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
 		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
 		break;
-	
+
+	case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
+		node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
+		recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
 		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
@@ -3487,14 +3540,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
-	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
 		family = PF_INET;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3524,25 +3577,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	u32 scontext_len;
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	u32 peer_sid = 0;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 
-	/* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
-	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
 		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 	}
-	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
-		peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
-		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
-			peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
-		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
-	else {
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -3574,13 +3618,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
+	if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
-	else if (skb) {
-		peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
-		if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
-			peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
-	}
+	else if (skb)
+		security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb,
+					SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+					&peer_secid);
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3607,7 +3650,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 	newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
 	newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
@@ -3641,17 +3684,10 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
-	if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = newsid;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
-	BUG_ON(err);
-
+	security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
 	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		req->secid = sksec->sid;
+		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -3660,6 +3696,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return err;
 
 	req->secid = newsid;
+	req->peer_secid = peersid;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3669,12 +3706,23 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
 
 	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
 	/* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
 	   new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
 	   So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
 	   time it will have been created and available. */
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
+	/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
+	 * thread with access to newsksec */
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
+				struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -3757,7 +3805,13 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *
 		node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
 		send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
 		break;
-	
+
+	case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
+		node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
+		send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
 		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
@@ -3808,6 +3862,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	u8 proto;
 
 	sk = skb->sk;
 	if (!sk)
@@ -3819,7 +3874,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3833,7 +3888,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
 out:
 	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
 }
@@ -4739,6 +4794,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.sock_graft =			selinux_sock_graft,
 	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
+	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -4751,7 +4807,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.xfrm_state_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
 	.xfrm_policy_lookup = 		selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
 	.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =	selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
-	.xfrm_flow_state_match =	selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
 	.xfrm_decode_session =		selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
 #endif
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index a68fdd55597..8377a4ba3b9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 09fc8a2345e..ad9fb2d69b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -35,12 +35,16 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv")
    S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send")
    S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__ENFORCE_DEST, "enforce_dest")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_SEND, "udp_send")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send")
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom")
@@ -252,3 +256,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__LINK, "link")
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__SETATTR, "setattr")
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CONTEXT, CONTEXT__TRANSLATE, "translate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CONTEXT, CONTEXT__CONTAINS, "contains")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 81f4f526c8b..2de4b5fe3aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -312,6 +312,8 @@
 #define NODE__RAWIP_RECV                          0x00000010UL
 #define NODE__RAWIP_SEND                          0x00000020UL
 #define NODE__ENFORCE_DEST                        0x00000040UL
+#define NODE__DCCP_RECV                           0x00000080UL
+#define NODE__DCCP_SEND                           0x00000100UL
 
 #define NETIF__TCP_RECV                           0x00000001UL
 #define NETIF__TCP_SEND                           0x00000002UL
@@ -319,6 +321,8 @@
 #define NETIF__UDP_SEND                           0x00000008UL
 #define NETIF__RAWIP_RECV                         0x00000010UL
 #define NETIF__RAWIP_SEND                         0x00000020UL
+#define NETIF__DCCP_RECV                          0x00000040UL
+#define NETIF__DCCP_SEND                          0x00000080UL
 
 #define NETLINK_SOCKET__IOCTL                     0x00000001UL
 #define NETLINK_SOCKET__READ                      0x00000002UL
@@ -970,3 +974,31 @@
 #define KEY__LINK                                 0x00000010UL
 #define KEY__SETATTR                              0x00000020UL
 #define KEY__CREATE                               0x00000040UL
+
+#define CONTEXT__TRANSLATE                        0x00000001UL
+#define CONTEXT__CONTAINS                         0x00000002UL
+
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__IOCTL                        0x00000001UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__READ                         0x00000002UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__WRITE                        0x00000004UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__CREATE                       0x00000008UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__GETATTR                      0x00000010UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__SETATTR                      0x00000020UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__LOCK                         0x00000040UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                  0x00000080UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                    0x00000100UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__APPEND                       0x00000200UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__BIND                         0x00000400UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__CONNECT                      0x00000800UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__LISTEN                       0x00001000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                       0x00002000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__GETOPT                       0x00004000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__SETOPT                       0x00008000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                     0x00010000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                     0x00020000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__SENDTO                       0x00040000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                     0x00080000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                     0x00100000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                    0x00200000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                    0x00400000UL
+#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                 0x00800000UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 960ef18ddc4..6ed10c3d333 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
 			char *netif;
 			struct sock *sk;
 			u16 family;
-			u16 dport;
-			u16 sport;
+			__be16 dport;
+			__be16 sport;
 			union {
 				struct {
-					u32 daddr;
-					u32 saddr;
+					__be32 daddr;
+					__be32 saddr;
 				} v4;
 				struct {
 					struct in6_addr daddr;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index 450a2831e2e..ff869e8b6f4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -10,5 +10,29 @@
 
 int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
 
+struct av_perm_to_string
+{
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 value;
+	const char *name;
+};
+
+struct av_inherit
+{
+	u16 tclass;
+	const char **common_pts;
+	u32 common_base;
+};
+
+struct selinux_class_perm
+{
+	const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string;
+	u32 av_pts_len;
+	const char **class_to_string;
+	u32 cts_len;
+	const struct av_inherit *av_inherit;
+	u32 av_inherit_len;
+};
+
 #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 24303b61309..9f3ebb1bfae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -61,3 +61,5 @@
     S_("appletalk_socket")
     S_("packet")
     S_("key")
+    S_("context")
+    S_("dccp_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 95887aed2a6..67cef371ee0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@
 #define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET                        56
 #define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  57
 #define SECCLASS_KEY                                     58
+#define SECCLASS_CONTEXT                                 59
+#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             60
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index ef2267fea8b..91b88f0ba20 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 #include "avc.h"
 
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 		NLBL_REQUIRE,
 		NLBL_LABELED,
 	} nlbl_state;
+	spinlock_t nlbl_lock;		/* protects nlbl_state */
 #endif
 };
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 1ef79172cc8..210eec77e7f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS
 #endif
 
+struct sk_buff;
+
 extern int selinux_enabled;
 extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
 
@@ -80,6 +82,8 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid,
 int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
 	u32 *out_sid);
 
+void security_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid);
+
 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
                                  u16 tclass);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
index 9de10cc2cef..2a732c9033e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
@@ -38,19 +38,17 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock,
-				      int sock_family,
-				      u32 sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock);
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
+				      int family);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				     int family);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec);
 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
@@ -62,23 +60,23 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock,
-						    int sock_family,
-						    u32 sid)
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					       u32 base_sid,
+					       u32 *sid)
 {
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk,
-					     struct socket *sock)
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return;
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb,
-						   u32 sock_sid)
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk,
+					     struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return SECSID_NULL;
+	return;
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
@@ -88,14 +86,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
+					       struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
+					       int family)
 {
-	return SECSID_NULL;
+	return;
 }
 
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(
@@ -105,7 +100,7 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(
 	                                   struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 					   struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 526b28019ac..161eb571c82 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -8,20 +8,17 @@
 #define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
 
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct sock *sk);
+		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
-	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid);
+	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid);
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-			struct xfrm_policy *xp);
-
 
 /*
  * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
@@ -38,9 +35,7 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
+			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -50,20 +45,11 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 {
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -71,4 +57,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int
 }
 #endif
 
+static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
+	BUG_ON(err);
+}
+
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index b8f4d25cf33..ccfe8755735 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
 	{ RTM_DELACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
 	{ RTM_GETACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 	{ RTM_NEWPREFIX,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
-	{ RTM_GETPREFIX,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 	{ RTM_GETMULTICAST,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 	{ RTM_GETANYCAST,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 	{ RTM_GETNEIGHTBL,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index cd244419c98..c8bf6e172f6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
 
 static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	ino_t ino =  file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	ino_t ino =  file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
 	char *data;
 	ssize_t rv;
 
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	inode = filep->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET);
 	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
 		ret = cur_enforcing;
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 	if (new_value)
 		new_value = 1;
 
-	inode = filep->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	bool_pending_values[inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET] = new_value;
 	length = count;
 
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static void sel_remove_bools(struct dentry *de)
 	file_list_lock();
 	list_for_each(p, &sb->s_files) {
 		struct file * filp = list_entry(p, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
-		struct dentry * dentry = filp->f_dentry;
+		struct dentry * dentry = filp->f_path.dentry;
 
 		if (dentry->d_parent != de) {
 			continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index d049c7acbc8..ebb993c5c24 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  (keyp->source_type << 9)) & \
  AVTAB_HASH_MASK)
 
-static kmem_cache_t *avtab_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
 
 static struct avtab_node*
 avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
 		  struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
 	struct avtab_node * newnode;
-	newnode = kmem_cache_alloc(avtab_node_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
+	newnode = kmem_cache_alloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (newnode == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 	memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_node));
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 0562bacb7b9..2eee0dab524 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -55,6 +55,29 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 {
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index d539346ab3a..ce492a6b38e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 /*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
- *      Added ebitmap_export() and ebitmap_import()
+ *      Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
  *
  * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
  */
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include "ebitmap.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
@@ -67,141 +68,120 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 /**
- * ebitmap_export - Export an ebitmap to a unsigned char bitmap string
- * @src: the ebitmap to export
- * @dst: the resulting bitmap string
- * @dst_len: length of dst in bytes
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
  *
  * Description:
- * Allocate a buffer at least src->highbit bits long and export the extensible
- * bitmap into the buffer.  The bitmap string will be in little endian format,
- * i.e. LSB first.  The value returned in dst_len may not the true size of the
- * buffer as the length of the buffer is rounded up to a multiple of MAPTYPE.
- * The caller must free the buffer when finished. Returns zero on success,
- * negative values on failure.
+ * Export a SELinux extensibile bitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
  *
  */
-int ebitmap_export(const struct ebitmap *src,
-		   unsigned char **dst,
-		   size_t *dst_len)
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap **catmap)
 {
-	size_t bitmap_len;
-	unsigned char *bitmap;
-	struct ebitmap_node *iter_node;
-	MAPTYPE node_val;
-	size_t bitmap_byte;
-	unsigned char bitmask;
-
-	if (src->highbit == 0) {
-		*dst = NULL;
-		*dst_len = 0;
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *c_iter;
+	u32 cmap_idx;
+
+	/* This function is a much simpler because SELinux's MAPTYPE happens
+	 * to be the same as NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE, if MAPTYPE is
+	 * changed from a u64 this function will most likely need to be changed
+	 * as well.  It's not ideal but I think the tradeoff in terms of
+	 * neatness and speed is worth it. */
+
+	if (e_iter == NULL) {
+		*catmap = NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	bitmap_len = src->highbit / 8;
-	if (src->highbit % 7)
-		bitmap_len += 1;
-
-	bitmap = kzalloc((bitmap_len & ~(sizeof(MAPTYPE) - 1)) +
-			 sizeof(MAPTYPE),
-			 GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (bitmap == NULL)
+	c_iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (c_iter == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	*catmap = c_iter;
+	c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
+
+	while (e_iter != NULL) {
+		if (e_iter->startbit >=
+		    (c_iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE)) {
+			c_iter->next = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (c_iter->next == NULL)
+				goto netlbl_export_failure;
+			c_iter = c_iter->next;
+			c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit &
+				           ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
+		}
+		cmap_idx = (e_iter->startbit - c_iter->startbit) /
+			   NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+		c_iter->bitmap[cmap_idx] = e_iter->map;
+		e_iter = e_iter->next;
+	}
 
-	iter_node = src->node;
-	do {
-		bitmap_byte = iter_node->startbit / 8;
-		bitmask = 0x80;
-		node_val = iter_node->map;
-		do {
-			if (bitmask == 0) {
-				bitmap_byte++;
-				bitmask = 0x80;
-			}
-			if (node_val & (MAPTYPE)0x01)
-				bitmap[bitmap_byte] |= bitmask;
-			node_val >>= 1;
-			bitmask >>= 1;
-		} while (node_val > 0);
-		iter_node = iter_node->next;
-	} while (iter_node);
-
-	*dst = bitmap;
-	*dst_len = bitmap_len;
 	return 0;
+
+netlbl_export_failure:
+	netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(*catmap);
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 /**
- * ebitmap_import - Import an unsigned char bitmap string into an ebitmap
- * @src: the bitmap string
- * @src_len: the bitmap length in bytes
- * @dst: the empty ebitmap
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_import - Import a NetLabel category bitmap into an ebitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
  *
  * Description:
- * This function takes a little endian bitmap string in src and imports it into
- * the ebitmap pointed to by dst.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
- * failure.
+ * Import a NetLabel category bitmap into a SELinux extensibile bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
  *
  */
-int ebitmap_import(const unsigned char *src,
-		   size_t src_len,
-		   struct ebitmap *dst)
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap)
 {
-	size_t src_off = 0;
-	size_t node_limit;
-	struct ebitmap_node *node_new;
-	struct ebitmap_node *node_last = NULL;
-	u32 i_byte;
-	u32 i_bit;
-	unsigned char src_byte;
-
-	while (src_off < src_len) {
-		if (src_len - src_off >= sizeof(MAPTYPE)) {
-			if (*(MAPTYPE *)&src[src_off] == 0) {
-				src_off += sizeof(MAPTYPE);
-				continue;
-			}
-			node_limit = sizeof(MAPTYPE);
-		} else {
-			for (src_byte = 0, i_byte = src_off;
-			     i_byte < src_len && src_byte == 0;
-			     i_byte++)
-				src_byte |= src[i_byte];
-			if (src_byte == 0)
-				break;
-			node_limit = src_len - src_off;
-		}
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
+	struct ebitmap_node *emap_prev = NULL;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *c_iter = catmap;
+	u32 c_idx;
 
-		node_new = kzalloc(sizeof(*node_new), GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (unlikely(node_new == NULL)) {
-			ebitmap_destroy(dst);
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
-		node_new->startbit = src_off * 8;
-		for (i_byte = 0; i_byte < node_limit; i_byte++) {
-			src_byte = src[src_off++];
-			for (i_bit = i_byte * 8; src_byte != 0; i_bit++) {
-				if (src_byte & 0x80)
-					node_new->map |= MAPBIT << i_bit;
-				src_byte <<= 1;
-			}
-		}
+	/* This function is a much simpler because SELinux's MAPTYPE happens
+	 * to be the same as NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE, if MAPTYPE is
+	 * changed from a u64 this function will most likely need to be changed
+	 * as well.  It's not ideal but I think the tradeoff in terms of
+	 * neatness and speed is worth it. */
 
-		if (node_last != NULL)
-			node_last->next = node_new;
-		else
-			dst->node = node_new;
-		node_last = node_new;
-	}
+	do {
+		for (c_idx = 0; c_idx < NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT; c_idx++) {
+			if (c_iter->bitmap[c_idx] == 0)
+				continue;
+
+			e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (e_iter == NULL)
+				goto netlbl_import_failure;
+			if (emap_prev == NULL)
+				ebmap->node = e_iter;
+			else
+				emap_prev->next = e_iter;
+			emap_prev = e_iter;
 
-	if (likely(node_last != NULL))
-		dst->highbit = node_last->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+			e_iter->startbit = c_iter->startbit +
+				           NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * c_idx;
+			e_iter->map = c_iter->bitmap[c_idx];
+		}
+		c_iter = c_iter->next;
+	} while (c_iter != NULL);
+	if (e_iter != NULL)
+		ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + MAPSIZE;
 	else
-		ebitmap_init(dst);
+		ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
 
 	return 0;
+
+netlbl_import_failure:
+	ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index da2d4651b10..1270e34b61c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
 #define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
 
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
 #define MAPTYPE u64			/* portion of bitmap in each node */
 #define MAPSIZE (sizeof(MAPTYPE) * 8)	/* number of bits in node bitmap */
 #define MAPBIT  1ULL			/* a bit in the node bitmap */
@@ -69,16 +71,28 @@ static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node * n,
 
 int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
-int ebitmap_export(const struct ebitmap *src,
-		   unsigned char **dst,
-		   size_t *dst_len);
-int ebitmap_import(const unsigned char *src,
-		   size_t src_len,
-		   struct ebitmap *dst);
 int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
 void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
 int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap **catmap);
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap);
+#else
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+				struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap **catmap)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+				struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif	/* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 24e5ec95763..77b530c3bbc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include "hashtab.h"
 
-struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
-                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
+                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
                                u32 size)
 {
 	struct hashtab *p;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
 {
 	u32 hvalue;
 	struct hashtab_node *cur;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 4cc85816a71..7e2ff3e3c6d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ struct hashtab {
 	struct hashtab_node **htable;	/* hash table */
 	u32 size;			/* number of slots in hash table */
 	u32 nel;			/* number of elements in hash table */
-	u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key);
+	u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key);
 					/* hash function */
-	int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2);
+	int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2);
 					/* key comparison function */
 };
 
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ struct hashtab_info {
  * Returns NULL if insufficent space is available or
  * the new hash table otherwise.
  */
-struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
-                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
+                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
                                u32 size);
 
 /*
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *k, void *d);
  * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
  * the datum of the entry otherwise.
  */
-void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *k);
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *k);
 
 /*
  * Destroys the specified hash table.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 2cca8e25162..4a8bab2f3c7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 /*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
- *      Added support to import/export the MLS label
+ *      Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
  *
  * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
  */
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include "sidtab.h"
 #include "mls.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
 		if (!defcon)
 			goto out;
 
-		rc = mls_copy_context(context, defcon);
+		rc = mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -400,26 +401,6 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 }
 
 /*
- * Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
- */
-static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst,
-                                    struct context *src)
-{
-	int l, rc = 0;
-
-	/* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
-	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
-		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
-				 &src->range.level[0].cat);
-		if (rc)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/*
  * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
  */
 static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
@@ -551,19 +532,19 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
 		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
-			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
 			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
-			return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
 	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
 		/* Only polyinstantiate the MLS attributes if
 		   the type is being polyinstantiated */
 		if (newcontext->type != tcontext->type) {
 			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
-			return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
 		} else {
 			/* Use the related object MLS attributes. */
-			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, tcontext);
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
 		}
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -571,163 +552,108 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 /**
- * mls_export_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels
+ * mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
  * @context: the security context
- * @low: the low sensitivity level
- * @high: the high sensitivity level
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
  *
  * Description:
- * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into lvl_low
- * and the high sensitivity level in lvl_high.  The MLS levels are only
- * exported if the pointers are not NULL, if they are NULL then that level is
- * not exported.
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
  *
  */
-void mls_export_lvl(const struct context *context, u32 *low, u32 *high)
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	if (low != NULL)
-		*low = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
-	if (high != NULL)
-		*high = context->range.level[1].sens - 1;
+	secattr->mls_lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 }
 
 /**
- * mls_import_lvl - Import the MLS sensitivity levels
+ * mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
  * @context: the security context
- * @low: the low sensitivity level
- * @high: the high sensitivity level
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
  *
  * Description:
- * Given the security context and the two sensitivty levels, set the MLS levels
- * in the context according the two given as parameters.  Returns zero on
- * success, negative values on failure.
+ * Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
  *
  */
-void mls_import_lvl(struct context *context, u32 low, u32 high)
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	context->range.level[0].sens = low + 1;
-	context->range.level[1].sens = high + 1;
+	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->mls_lvl + 1;
+	context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
 }
 
 /**
- * mls_export_cat - Export the MLS categories
+ * mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
  * @context: the security context
- * @low: the low category
- * @low_len: length of the cat_low bitmap in bytes
- * @high: the high category
- * @high_len: length of the cat_high bitmap in bytes
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
  *
  * Description:
- * Given the security context export the low MLS category bitmap into cat_low
- * and the high category bitmap into cat_high.  The MLS categories are only
- * exported if the pointers are not NULL, if they are NULL then that level is
- * not exported.  The caller is responsibile for freeing the memory when
- * finished.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
+ * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_export_cat(const struct context *context,
-		   unsigned char **low,
-		   size_t *low_len,
-		   unsigned char **high,
-		   size_t *high_len)
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	int rc = -EPERM;
+	int rc;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
-		*low = NULL;
-		*low_len = 0;
-		*high = NULL;
-		*high_len = 0;
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
-	}
 
-	if (low != NULL) {
-		rc = ebitmap_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
-				    low,
-				    low_len);
-		if (rc != 0)
-			goto export_cat_failure;
-	}
-	if (high != NULL) {
-		rc = ebitmap_export(&context->range.level[1].cat,
-				    high,
-				    high_len);
-		if (rc != 0)
-			goto export_cat_failure;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
+	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+				   &secattr->mls_cat);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr->mls_cat != NULL)
+		secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
 
-export_cat_failure:
-	if (low != NULL) {
-		kfree(*low);
-		*low = NULL;
-		*low_len = 0;
-	}
-	if (high != NULL) {
-		kfree(*high);
-		*high = NULL;
-		*high_len = 0;
-	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
- * mls_import_cat - Import the MLS categories
+ * mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
  * @context: the security context
- * @low: the low category
- * @low_len: length of the cat_low bitmap in bytes
- * @high: the high category
- * @high_len: length of the cat_high bitmap in bytes
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
  *
  * Description:
- * Given the security context and the two category bitmap strings import the
- * categories into the security context.  The MLS categories are only imported
- * if the pointers are not NULL, if they are NULL they are skipped.  Returns
- * zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ * Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
+ * NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
+ * both the low and high categories of the context.  Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_import_cat(struct context *context,
-		   const unsigned char *low,
-		   size_t low_len,
-		   const unsigned char *high,
-		   size_t high_len)
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	int rc = -EPERM;
+	int rc;
 
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (low != NULL) {
-		rc = ebitmap_import(low,
-				    low_len,
-				    &context->range.level[0].cat);
-		if (rc != 0)
-			goto import_cat_failure;
-	}
-	if (high != NULL) {
-		if (high == low)
-			rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
-					 &context->range.level[0].cat);
-		else
-			rc = ebitmap_import(high,
-					    high_len,
-					    &context->range.level[1].cat);
-		if (rc != 0)
-			goto import_cat_failure;
-	}
+	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+				   secattr->mls_cat);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+			 &context->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
 
 	return 0;
 
-import_cat_failure:
+import_netlbl_cat_failure:
 	ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[1].cat);
 	return rc;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index df6032c6d49..096d1b4ef7f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 /*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
- *      Added support to import/export the MLS label
+ *      Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
  *
  * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
  */
@@ -24,26 +24,6 @@
 #include "context.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
-/*
- * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
- */
-static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst,
-				   struct context *src)
-{
-	int l, rc = 0;
-
-	/* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
-	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
-		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
-				 &src->range.level[l].cat);
-		if (rc)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
 int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
 void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
 int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
@@ -69,19 +49,37 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
                          struct context *usercon);
 
-void mls_export_lvl(const struct context *context, u32 *low, u32 *high);
-void mls_import_lvl(struct context *context, u32 low, u32 high);
-
-int mls_export_cat(const struct context *context,
-		   unsigned char **low,
-		   size_t *low_len,
-		   unsigned char **high,
-		   size_t *high_len);
-int mls_import_cat(struct context *context,
-		   const unsigned char *low,
-		   size_t low_len,
-		   const unsigned char *high,
-		   size_t high_len);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
 
 #endif	/* _SS_MLS_H */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index ba48961f9d0..cd79c6338aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int class_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 {
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
 {
 	common_destroy,
-	class_destroy,
+	cls_destroy,
 	role_destroy,
 	type_destroy,
 	user_destroy,
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
 out:
 	return rc;
 bad:
-	class_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+	cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
 	goto out;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index bfe122764c9..3eb1fa9f0de 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -17,9 +17,13 @@
  *
  *      Added support for NetLabel
  *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
  * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -29,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -49,10 +54,17 @@
 #include "mls.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
 
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
+/*
+ * This is declared in avc.c
+ */
+extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
+
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 #define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
 #define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
@@ -1019,86 +1031,112 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
 }
 
 /*
- * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
- * existing policy is still defined with the same value
- * in the new policy.
+ * Verify that each kernel class that is defined in the
+ * policy is correct
  */
-static int validate_perm(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 {
-	struct hashtab *h;
-	struct perm_datum *perdatum, *perdatum2;
-	int rc = 0;
-
-
-	h = p;
-	perdatum = datum;
-
-	perdatum2 = hashtab_search(h, key);
-	if (!perdatum2) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  permission %s disappeared",
-		       (char *)key);
-		rc = -ENOENT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (perdatum->value != perdatum2->value) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the value of permission %s changed",
-		       (char *)key);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-	}
-out:
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify that each class that is defined under the
- * existing policy is still defined with the same
- * attributes in the new policy.
- */
-static int validate_class(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
-	struct policydb *newp;
-	struct class_datum *cladatum, *cladatum2;
-	int rc;
-
-	newp = p;
-	cladatum = datum;
-
-	cladatum2 = hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
-	if (!cladatum2) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  class %s disappeared\n",
-		       (char *)key);
-		rc = -ENOENT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (cladatum->value != cladatum2->value) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the value of class %s changed\n",
-		       (char *)key);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+	int i, j;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+	u32 nprim, tmp, common_pts_len, perm_val, pol_val;
+	u16 class_val;
+	const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
+	const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
+	struct symtab *perms;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++) {
+		def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i];
+		if (i > p->p_classes.nprim) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO
+			       "security:  class %s not defined in policy\n",
+			       def_class);
+			continue;
+		}
+		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
+		if (strcmp(pol_class, def_class)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR
+			       "security:  class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n",
+			       i, pol_class, def_class);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 	}
-	if ((cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
-	    (!cladatum->comdatum && cladatum2->comdatum)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the inherits clause for the access "
-		       "vector definition for class %s changed\n", (char *)key);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_pts_len; i++) {
+		class_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].tclass;
+		perm_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].value;
+		def_perm = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].name;
+		if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
+			continue;
+		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
+		cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
+		BUG_ON(!cladatum);
+		perms = &cladatum->permissions;
+		nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1);
+		if (perm_val > nprim) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO
+			       "security:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
+			       def_perm, pol_class);
+			continue;
+		}
+		perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
+		if (perdatum == NULL) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR
+			       "security:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
+			       def_perm, pol_class);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1);
+		if (pol_val != perm_val) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR
+			       "security:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
+			       def_perm, pol_class);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 	}
-	if (cladatum->comdatum) {
-		rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
-		                 cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table);
-		if (rc) {
-			printk(" in the access vector definition for class "
-			       "%s\n", (char *)key);
-			goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_inherit_len; i++) {
+		class_val = kdefs->av_inherit[i].tclass;
+		if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
+			continue;
+		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
+		cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
+		BUG_ON(!cladatum);
+		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR
+			       "security:  class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n",
+			       pol_class);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		tmp = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_base;
+		common_pts_len = 0;
+		while (!(tmp & 0x01)) {
+			common_pts_len++;
+			tmp >>= 1;
+		}
+		perms = &cladatum->comdatum->permissions;
+		for (j = 0; j < common_pts_len; j++) {
+			def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j];
+			if (j >= perms->nprim) {
+				printk(KERN_INFO
+				       "security:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
+				       def_perm, pol_class);
+				continue;
+			}
+			perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
+			if (perdatum == NULL) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR
+				       "security:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
+				       def_perm, pol_class);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			if (perdatum->value != j + 1) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR
+				       "security:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
+				       def_perm, pol_class);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
 		}
 	}
-	rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
-	                 cladatum2->permissions.table);
-	if (rc)
-		printk(" in access vector definition for class %s\n",
-		       (char *)key);
-out:
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
@@ -1243,6 +1281,16 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
+		if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR
+			       "security:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
+			LOAD_UNLOCK;
+			sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
+			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 		ss_initialized = 1;
 		seqno = ++latest_granting;
@@ -1265,10 +1313,10 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
 	sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
 
-	/* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
-	if (hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, validate_class, &newpolicydb)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the definition of an existing "
-		       "class changed\n");
+	/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
+	if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR
+		       "security:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto err;
 	}
@@ -1868,11 +1916,10 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 	newcon.user = context1->user;
 	newcon.role = context1->role;
 	newcon.type = context1->type;
-	rc = mls_copy_context(&newcon, context2);
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
 	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
 		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
@@ -2145,6 +2192,32 @@ void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
 	aurule_callback = callback;
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
+ * @sid: the packet's SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
+ * the external SID for the packet.
+ *
+ */
+void security_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+
+	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+					 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
+					  base_sid : xfrm_sid),
+					 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
+		nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	*sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 /*
  * This is the structure we store inside the NetLabel cache block.
@@ -2209,8 +2282,6 @@ static void selinux_netlbl_cache_add(struct sk_buff *skb, struct context *ctx)
 	cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache),	GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (cache == NULL)
 		goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
-	secattr.cache->free = selinux_netlbl_cache_free;
-	secattr.cache->data = (void *)cache;
 
 	cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS;
 	if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat,
@@ -2223,6 +2294,10 @@ static void selinux_netlbl_cache_add(struct sk_buff *skb, struct context *ctx)
 	cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
 	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
 
+	secattr.cache->free = selinux_netlbl_cache_free;
+	secattr.cache->data = (void *)cache;
+	secattr.flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+
 	netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
 
 netlbl_cache_add_return:
@@ -2268,7 +2343,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	POLICY_RDLOCK;
 
-	if (secattr->cache) {
+	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
 		cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache->data);
 		switch (cache->type) {
 		case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID:
@@ -2301,7 +2376,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		default:
 			goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
 		}
-	} else if (secattr->mls_lvl_vld) {
+	} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
 		if (ctx == NULL)
 			goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
@@ -2309,13 +2384,10 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
 		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
 		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
-		mls_import_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr->mls_lvl, secattr->mls_lvl);
-		if (secattr->mls_cat) {
-			if (mls_import_cat(&ctx_new,
-					   secattr->mls_cat,
-					   secattr->mls_cat_len,
-					   NULL,
-					   0) != 0)
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
+		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+			if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
+						  secattr->mls_cat) != 0)
 				goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
 			ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
 				ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit;
@@ -2360,20 +2432,20 @@ netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
  * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-static int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
-					u32 base_sid,
-					u32 *sid)
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0)
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
 		rc = selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(skb,
 						   &secattr,
 						   base_sid,
 						   sid);
+	else
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -2386,7 +2458,9 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
  *
  * Description:
  * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
- * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.  The
+ * caller is responsibile for calling rcu_read_lock() before calling this
+ * this function and rcu_read_unlock() after this function returns.
  *
  */
 static int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(struct socket *sock, u32 sid)
@@ -2409,19 +2483,18 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(struct socket *sock, u32 sid)
 
 	secattr.domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
 				 GFP_ATOMIC);
-	mls_export_lvl(ctx, &secattr.mls_lvl, NULL);
-	secattr.mls_lvl_vld = 1;
-	rc = mls_export_cat(ctx,
-			    &secattr.mls_cat,
-			    &secattr.mls_cat_len,
-			    NULL,
-			    NULL);
+	secattr.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, &secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, &secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto netlbl_socket_setsid_return;
 
 	rc = netlbl_socket_setattr(sock, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0)
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		spin_lock_bh(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
+	}
 
 netlbl_socket_setsid_return:
 	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
@@ -2430,6 +2503,25 @@ netlbl_socket_setsid_return:
 }
 
 /**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
+ * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
+ * @family: the socket family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
+ * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
+				      int family)
+{
+        if (family == PF_INET)
+		ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
+	else
+		ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
  * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init - Setup the NetLabel fields
  * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
  * @family: the socket family
@@ -2442,14 +2534,13 @@ netlbl_socket_setsid_return:
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				     int family)
 {
-        if (family == PF_INET)
-		ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
-	else
-		ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+	/* No locking needed, we are the only one who has access to ssec */
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
+	spin_lock_init(&ssec->nlbl_lock);
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security - Copy the NetLabel fields
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone - Copy the NetLabel fields
  * @ssec: the original sk_security_struct
  * @newssec: the cloned sk_security_struct
  *
@@ -2458,41 +2549,41 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
  * @newssec.
  *
  */
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
 {
+	/* We don't need to take newssec->nlbl_lock because we are the only
+	 * thread with access to newssec, but we do need to take the RCU read
+	 * lock as other threads could have access to ssec */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, ssec->sk->sk_family);
 	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
-	if (ssec->nlbl_state != NLBL_UNSET)
-		newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
-	else
-		newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
  * @sock: the socket to label
- * @sock_family: the socket family
- * @sid: the SID to use
  *
  * Description:
  * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
  * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock,
-				      int sock_family,
-				      u32 sid)
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
 {
+	int rc = 0;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
 	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 
-	if (sock_family != PF_INET)
-		return 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
-	return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sid);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2514,11 +2605,16 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 
 	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 
-	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return;
+	}
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
+	    secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
 	    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
 					  &secattr,
 					  SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
@@ -2526,35 +2622,12 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
-	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
-
 	/* Try to set the NetLabel on the socket to save time later, if we fail
 	 * here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to
 	 * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */
 	selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
-}
-
-/**
- * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Handle a new connection request
- * @skb: the packet
- * @sock_sid: the SID of the parent socket
- *
- * Description:
- * If present, use the security attributes of the packet in @skb and the
- * parent sock's SID to arrive at a SID for the new child sock.  Returns the
- * SID of the connection or SECSID_NULL on failure.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	int rc;
-	u32 peer_sid;
-
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, sock_sid, &peer_sid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
 
-	return peer_sid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2572,25 +2645,26 @@ u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid)
 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	struct socket *sock;
 
-	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) ||
+	    ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)) == 0))
 		return 0;
-
 	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
-	isec = inode->i_security;
 	sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
-	if (unlikely(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE &&
-		     (mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))) {
-		lock_sock(sock->sk);
-		rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
-		release_sock(sock->sk);
-	} else
-		rc = 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sock->sk);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
+	bh_unlock_sock(sock->sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -2648,42 +2722,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream - Return the connected peer's SID
- * @sock: the socket
- *
- * Description:
- * Examine @sock to find the connected peer's SID.  Returns the SID on success
- * or SECSID_NULL on error.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	return sksec->peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram - Return the SID of a NetLabel packet
- * @skb: the packet
- *
- * Description:
- * Examine @skb to find the SID assigned to it by NetLabel.  Returns the SID on
- * success, SECSID_NULL on error.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	int peer_sid;
-
-	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
-					 SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
-					 &peer_sid) != 0)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
  * @sock: the socket
  * @level: the socket level or protocol
@@ -2701,21 +2739,19 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int optname)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
-	struct inode *inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
-	mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
+	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
 	    sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED) {
 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 		rc = netlbl_socket_getattr(sock, &secattr);
-		if (rc == 0 && (secattr.cache || secattr.mls_lvl_vld))
+		if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
 			rc = -EACCES;
 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index 24a10d36d3b..837658a98a5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include "symtab.h"
 
-static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
 {
-	char *p, *keyp;
+	const char *p, *keyp;
 	unsigned int size;
 	unsigned int val;
 
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
 	return val & (h->size - 1);
 }
 
-static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2)
+static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2)
 {
-	char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+	const char *keyp1, *keyp2;
 
 	keyp1 = key1;
 	keyp2 = key2;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 675b995a67c..bd8d1ef40a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -115,76 +115,46 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
 			struct flowi *fl)
 {
 	u32 state_sid;
-	u32 pol_sid;
-	int err;
+	int rc;
 
-	if (xp->security) {
-		if (!x->security)
-			/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
-			return 0;
-		else
-			state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
-		pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
-	} else
+	if (!xp->security)
 		if (x->security)
 			/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
 			return 0;
 		else
 			/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
 			return 1;
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-			  NULL);
-
-	if (err)
-		return 0;
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-			  NULL)? 0:1;
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
- * can use a given security association.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-				  struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-	u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
-
-	if (!xp->security)
-		if (!xfrm->security)
-			return 1;
-		else
-			return 0;
 	else
-		if (!xfrm->security)
+		if (!x->security)
+			/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
 			return 0;
+		else
+			if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				/* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+				return 0;
 
-	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-	if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
-		if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-			return 0;
+	state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 
-		sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-	}
+	if (fl->secid != state_sid)
+		return 0;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
 			  NULL)? 0:1;
 
+	/*
+	 * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
+	 * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
+	 * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
+	 * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
+	 */
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
  */
 
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
@@ -226,16 +196,15 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
  * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
  */
 static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
+	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
 	char *ctx_str = NULL;
 	u32 str_len;
-	u32 ctx_sid;
 
-	BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
+	BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
 
 	if (!uctx)
 		goto not_from_user;
@@ -279,15 +248,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	return rc;
 
 not_from_user:
-	if (pol) {
-		rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
-		if (rc)
-			goto out;
-	}
-	else
-		ctx_sid = sid;
-
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -302,7 +263,7 @@ not_from_user:
 
 	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
 	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
-	ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
+	ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
 	       ctx_str,
@@ -323,22 +284,14 @@ out2:
  * xfrm_policy.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct sock *sk)
+		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
 	int err;
-	u32 sid;
 
 	BUG_ON(!xp);
-	BUG_ON(uctx && sk);
-
-	if (sk) {
-		struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
-		sid = ssec->sid;
-	}
-	else
-		sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	BUG_ON(!uctx);
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, sid);
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, 0);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -399,13 +352,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
  * xfrm_state.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
-		struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
+		u32 secid)
 {
 	int err;
 
 	BUG_ON(!x);
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -419,74 +372,6 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 		kfree(ctx);
 }
 
-/*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
- * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
- * association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
-	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
-		goto out;
-
-	dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
-	if (!dst)
-		goto out;
-
- 	for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
-      	     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
-		struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
- 		if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
-	 	 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-			peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	dst_release(dst);
-
-out:
-	return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
- * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
- * type SCM_SECURITY.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	struct sec_path *sp;
-
-	if (skb == NULL)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	sp = skb->sp;
-	if (sp) {
-		int i;
-
-		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
-			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
-			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
-				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-				return ctx->ctx_sid;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
  /*
   * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
   */
@@ -532,6 +417,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * This check even when there's no association involved is
+	 * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+	 * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+	 * explicitly allowed by policy.
+	 */
+
 	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 			  ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 
@@ -543,10 +435,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
  * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-					struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+					struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -565,6 +457,27 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 	}
 
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	case IPPROTO_COMP:
+		/*
+		 * We should have already seen this packet once before
+		 * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
+		 * unlabeled check.
+		 */
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check even when there's no association involved is
+	 * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+	 * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+	 * explicitly allowed by policy.
+	 */
+
 	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 out: