From c6e50f93db5bd0895ec7c7d1b6f3886c6e1f11b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 12:29:19 +0900 Subject: x86: cleanup stack protector Impact: cleanup Make the following cleanups. * remove duplicate comment from boot_init_stack_canary() which fits better in the other place - cpu_idle(). * move stack_canary offset check from __switch_to() to boot_init_stack_canary(). Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo --- arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h index c7f0d10bae7..2383e5bb475 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -16,13 +16,12 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) u64 tsc; /* - * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack - * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have - * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating - * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the - * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever - * trigger). - * + * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at + * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct x8664_pda, stack_canary) != 40); + + /* * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later -- cgit v1.2.3