From cc0f21bbc12dc9f05b2e7f2469128f8717b2f4d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arjan van de Ven Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2008 16:48:05 +0100 Subject: x86: teach the static_protection function about high mappings Right now, enforcing that the high mapping of the kernel text doesn't get the NX bit is done deep in the guts of CPA, rather than in the static_protection() function that enforces all other per-arch sanity checks. This patch moves this sanity check into the central static_protection() function instead, and makes it apply ONLY to the kernel text, not to all other areas in the high mapping. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/mm') diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index 877b5cca2cb..bf5e33f6a32 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -106,6 +106,22 @@ static void cpa_flush_range(unsigned long start, int numpages) } } +#define HIGH_MAP_START __START_KERNEL_map +#define HIGH_MAP_END (__START_KERNEL_map + KERNEL_TEXT_SIZE) + + +/* + * Converts a virtual address to a X86-64 highmap address + */ +static unsigned long virt_to_highmap(void *address) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + return __pa((unsigned long)address) + HIGH_MAP_START - phys_base; +#else + return (unsigned long)address; +#endif +} + /* * Certain areas of memory on x86 require very specific protection flags, * for example the BIOS area or kernel text. Callers don't always get this @@ -129,12 +145,24 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address) */ if (within(address, (unsigned long)_text, (unsigned long)_etext)) pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_NX; + /* + * Do the same for the x86-64 high kernel mapping + */ + if (within(address, virt_to_highmap(_text), virt_to_highmap(_etext))) + pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_NX; + #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA /* The .rodata section needs to be read-only */ if (within(address, (unsigned long)__start_rodata, (unsigned long)__end_rodata)) pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW; + /* + * Do the same for the x86-64 high kernel mapping + */ + if (within(address, virt_to_highmap(__start_rodata), + virt_to_highmap(__end_rodata))) + pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW; #endif prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~pgprot_val(forbidden)); @@ -304,8 +332,6 @@ repeat: * Modules and drivers should use the set_memory_* APIs instead. */ -#define HIGH_MAP_START __START_KERNEL_map -#define HIGH_MAP_END (__START_KERNEL_map + KERNEL_TEXT_SIZE) static int change_page_attr_addr(unsigned long address, pgprot_t mask_set, @@ -338,10 +364,11 @@ change_page_attr_addr(unsigned long address, pgprot_t mask_set, /* * Calc the high mapping address. See __phys_addr() * for the non obvious details. + * + * Note that NX and other required permissions are + * checked in static_protections(). */ address = phys_addr + HIGH_MAP_START - phys_base; - /* Make sure the kernel mappings stay executable */ - pgprot_val(mask_clr) |= _PAGE_NX; /* * Our high aliases are imprecise, because we check -- cgit v1.2.3