From 9188499cdb117d86a1ea6b04374095b098d56936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 09:44:57 -0400 Subject: security: introducing security_request_module Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- kernel/kmod.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 385c31a1bdb..5a7ae57f983 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */ static int kmod_loop_msg; + ret = security_kernel_module_request(); + if (ret) + return ret; + va_start(args, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args); va_end(args); -- cgit v1.2.3