diff options
author | Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> | 2006-10-30 15:12:55 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net> | 2006-10-30 15:24:44 -0800 |
commit | 590bdf7fd2292b47c428111cb1360e312eff207e (patch) | |
tree | c44b60a5e40b5e16e3478aecb839825b4a602ced /net/ipv6 | |
parent | 844dc7c88046ecd2e52596730d7cc400d6c3ad67 (diff) |
[NETFILTER]: Missed and reordered checks in {arp,ip,ip6}_tables
There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in
translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by
passing special-crafted table to the *_tables.
The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry
content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function
uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that
this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which
is called later, than mark_source_chains().
The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside
entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry
ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure.
And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely
inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 53bf977cca6..167c2ea88f6 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -586,12 +586,19 @@ check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size, return -EINVAL; } + if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry_target) > + e->next_offset) + return -EINVAL; + j = 0; ret = IP6T_MATCH_ITERATE(e, check_match, name, &e->ipv6, e->comefrom, &j); if (ret != 0) goto cleanup_matches; t = ip6t_get_target(e); + ret = -EINVAL; + if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset) + goto cleanup_matches; target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(AF_INET6, t->u.user.name, t->u.user.revision), @@ -751,19 +758,17 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } } - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) - return -ELOOP; - /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) { - IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, - cleanup_entry, &i); - return ret; - } + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + ret = -ELOOP; + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) + goto cleanup; /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) { @@ -771,6 +776,9 @@ translate_table(const char *name, memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size); } + return 0; +cleanup: + IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); return ret; } |