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authorDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>2006-10-30 15:12:55 -0800
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>2006-10-30 15:24:44 -0800
commit590bdf7fd2292b47c428111cb1360e312eff207e (patch)
treec44b60a5e40b5e16e3478aecb839825b4a602ced /net/ipv6
parent844dc7c88046ecd2e52596730d7cc400d6c3ad67 (diff)
[NETFILTER]: Missed and reordered checks in {arp,ip,ip6}_tables
There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by passing special-crafted table to the *_tables. The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which is called later, than mark_source_chains(). The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure. And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Acked-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c24
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index 53bf977cca6..167c2ea88f6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -586,12 +586,19 @@ check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry_target) >
+ e->next_offset)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
j = 0;
ret = IP6T_MATCH_ITERATE(e, check_match, name, &e->ipv6, e->comefrom, &j);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup_matches;
t = ip6t_get_target(e);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+ goto cleanup_matches;
target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(AF_INET6,
t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision),
@@ -751,19 +758,17 @@ translate_table(const char *name,
}
}
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0))
- return -ELOOP;
-
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
ret = IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
check_entry, name, size, &i);
- if (ret != 0) {
- IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
- cleanup_entry, &i);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ret = -ELOOP;
+ if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0))
+ goto cleanup;
/* And one copy for every other CPU */
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
@@ -771,6 +776,9 @@ translate_table(const char *name,
memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size);
}
+ return 0;
+cleanup:
+ IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i);
return ret;
}