diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-04-18 18:02:35 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-04-18 18:02:35 -0700 |
commit | 334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321 (patch) | |
tree | d3c0f68e4b9f8e3d2ccc39e7dfe5de0534a5fad9 /security/selinux | |
parent | d1a4be630fb068f251d64b62919f143c49ca8057 (diff) | |
parent | d1643d24c61b725bef399cc1cf2944b4c9c23177 (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits)
[NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices
[IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add().
[NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found
[PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init().
[INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call.
[INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call.
SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked.
[netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal
phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device
PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver
cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg.
tc35815: Statistics cleanup
natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms
[TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code
[TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table
[TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines
e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
sb1000.c: make const arrays static
sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/netif.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 39 |
4 files changed, 25 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 36b0510efa7..289e24b39e3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -7,16 +7,17 @@ #ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ #define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); -int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new); -void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp); -int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp); +void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid); void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); -int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl); diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index 013d3117a86..9c8a82aa8ba 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this, { struct net_device *dev = ptr; - if (dev->nd_net != &init_net) + if (dev_net(dev) != &init_net) return NOTIFY_DONE; if (event == NETDEV_DOWN) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index d75050819b0..33425b1ac8d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2674,7 +2674,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure; secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1], GFP_ATOMIC); - secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN; + secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY; mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr); rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr); if (rc != 0) diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 7e158205d08..874d17c83c6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -77,20 +77,18 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use * a xfrm policy rule. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) { int rc; u32 sel_sid; - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ - if ((ctx = xp->security)) { + if (ctx) { if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) return -EINVAL; sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; - } - else + } else /* * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This @@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) NULL); if (rc == -EACCES) - rc = -ESRCH; + return -ESRCH; return rc; } @@ -287,15 +285,14 @@ out2: * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to * xfrm_policy. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) { int err; - BUG_ON(!xp); BUG_ON(!uctx); - err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, 0); + err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0); if (err == 0) atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); @@ -307,32 +304,29 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to * new for policy cloning. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) +int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) { - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx; - - old_ctx = old->security; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx; if (old_ctx) { - new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) + - old_ctx->ctx_len, - GFP_KERNEL); - + new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_ctx) return -ENOMEM; memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx)); memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len); + *new_ctxp = new_ctx; } return 0; } /* - * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information. + * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information. */ -void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security; if (ctx) kfree(ctx); } @@ -340,10 +334,9 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp) /* * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security; int rc = 0; if (ctx) { |