diff options
| author | Lorenzo Hernandez García-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> | 2005-06-25 14:54:34 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org> | 2005-06-25 16:24:26 -0700 |
| commit | 6b9921976f0861e04828b3aff66696c1f3fd900d (patch) | |
| tree | be372b9dc81e393c909c7fecf8778e8864ba3a0d /security/selinux | |
| parent | 2d15cab85b85a56cc886037cab43cc292923ff22 (diff) | |
[PATCH] selinux: add executable stack check
This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code
generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.
The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)
The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch
policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.
kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 1 |
3 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 87302a49067..ad725213f56 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2488,6 +2488,16 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (rc) return rc; } + if (!vma->vm_file && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && + vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && + vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { + /* Attempt to make the process stack executable. + * This has an additional execstack check. + */ + rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); + if (rc) + return rc; + } #endif return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h index 8928bb4d3c5..e81f0226c37 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, "dyntransition") S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, "setcurrent") S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, "execmem") + S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, "execstack") S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue") S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send") S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index bdfce4ca8f8..38ce18b3328 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ #define PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION 0x00800000UL #define PROCESS__SETCURRENT 0x01000000UL #define PROCESS__EXECMEM 0x02000000UL +#define PROCESS__EXECSTACK 0x04000000UL #define IPC__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define IPC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL |