Merge commit 'origin/master' into next

Manual merge of:
	arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
	drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c

50 files changed, 8619 insertions, 991 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 9438535d7fd..bb244774e9d 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ config SECURITYFS
 	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
 	help
 	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
-	  the TPM bios character driver.  It is not used by SELinux or SMACK.
+	  the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider.  It is
+	  not used by SELinux or SMACK.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
@@ -134,6 +135,9 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
+source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+
+source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
 
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index c05c127fff9..fa77021d977 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y		+= commoncap.o
@@ -15,5 +16,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
+
+# Object integrity file lists
+subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= integrity/ima
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= integrity/ima/built-in.o
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index c545bd1300b..21b6cead6a8 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -620,10 +620,6 @@ static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void cap_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-{
-}
-
 static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1014,7 +1010,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 007ef252dde..f3b91bfbe4c 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -202,12 +202,11 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode,
  * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds.  This
  * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
  * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
- * you are responsible here).  If an error occurs, %NULL is returned.
+ * you are responsible here).  If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the erorr value (via ERR_PTR).
  *
  * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
- * returned.  It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for
- * %NULL or !%NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling
- * code.
+ * returned.
  */
 struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
 				   struct dentry *parent, void *data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..53d9764e8f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
+#
+config IMA
+	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
+	depends on ACPI
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_MD5
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select TCG_TPM
+	select TCG_TIS
+	help
+	  The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
+	  Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
+	  values of executables and other sensitive system files,
+	  as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
+	  to change the contents of an important system file
+	  being measured, we can tell.
+
+	  If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains
+	  an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the
+	  TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party
+	  whether or not critical system files have been modified.
+	  Read <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html>
+	  to learn more about IMA.
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
+	int
+	depends on IMA
+	range 8 14
+	default 10
+	help
+	  IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index
+	  that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
+	  measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
+
+config IMA_AUDIT
+	bool
+	depends on IMA
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
+	  allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
+	  at boot.  If this option is selected, informational integrity
+	  auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
+	  the kernel command line.
+
+config IMA_LSM_RULES
+	bool
+	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
+	default y
+	help
+	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..787c4cb916c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity
+# Measurement Architecture(IMA).
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+
+ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
+	 ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..165eb5397ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima.h
+ *	internal Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) definitions
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_H
+#define __LINUX_IMA_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
+
+/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
+#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE		20
+#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX	255
+
+#define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
+#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
+
+/* set during initialization */
+extern int ima_initialized;
+extern int ima_used_chip;
+extern char *ima_hash;
+
+/* IMA inode template definition */
+struct ima_template_data {
+	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1/md5 measurement hash */
+	char file_name[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1];	/* name + \0 */
+};
+
+struct ima_template_entry {
+	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
+	const char *template_name;
+	int template_len;
+	struct ima_template_data template;
+};
+
+struct ima_queue_entry {
+	struct hlist_node hnext;	/* place in hash collision list */
+	struct list_head later;		/* place in ima_measurements list */
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+};
+extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
+
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
+
+/* Internal IMA function definitions */
+void ima_iintcache_init(void);
+int ima_init(void);
+void ima_cleanup(void);
+int ima_fs_init(void);
+void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode);
+int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
+void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       const char *op, const char *cause);
+
+/*
+ * used to protect h_table and sha_table
+ */
+extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
+
+struct ima_h_table {
+	atomic_long_t len;	/* number of stored measurements in the list */
+	atomic_long_t violations;
+	struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
+};
+extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
+
+static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
+{
+	return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
+}
+
+/* iint cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURED		1
+#define IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK	512
+
+/* integrity data associated with an inode */
+struct ima_iint_cache {
+	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
+	long readcount;		/* measured files readcount */
+	long writecount;	/* measured files writecount */
+	long opencount;		/* opens reference count */
+	struct kref refcount;	/* ima_iint_cache reference count */
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* LIM API function definitions */
+int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
+		     int mask, int function);
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+		       struct inode *inode);
+void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e,
+		       enum ima_show_type show);
+
+/* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
+ * integrity data associated with an inode.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_insert_get(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode);
+void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
+void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
+
+/* IMA policy related functions */
+enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+void ima_init_policy(void);
+void ima_update_policy(void);
+int ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
+void ima_delete_rules(void);
+
+/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+
+#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
+
+#else
+
+static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+					    void **lsmrule)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+					     void *lsmrule,
+					     struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3cd58b60afd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_api.c
+ *	Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
+ *	and store_template.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
+
+/*
+ * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
+ *
+ * Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
+ * to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
+ * and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
+ * configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
+ * entries.
+ *
+ * Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
+ * the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
+ * TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
+ * and is used to validate the measurement list.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+		       int violation, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
+	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+	int result;
+
+	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
+	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
+	entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
+
+	if (!violation) {
+		result = ima_calc_template_hash(entry->template_len,
+						&entry->template,
+						entry->digest);
+		if (result < 0) {
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
+					    entry->template_name, op,
+					    audit_cause, result, 0);
+			return result;
+		}
+	}
+	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
+ *
+ * Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
+ * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
+ * value is invalidated.
+ */
+void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       const char *op, const char *cause)
+{
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	int violation = 1;
+	int result;
+
+	/* can overflow, only indicator */
+	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
+
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
+	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+	if (result < 0)
+		kfree(entry);
+err_out:
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+			    op, cause, result, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
+ * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
+ * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ *
+ * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
+ * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
+ *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
+ * 	func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * 	mask: contains the permission mask
+ *	fsmagic: hex value
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ *
+ * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured.
+ * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other
+ * error, return an error code.
+*/
+int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
+		     int mask, int function)
+{
+	int must_measure;
+
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+		return 1;
+
+	must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
+	return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
+ *
+ * Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
+ * storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+{
+	int result = -EEXIST;
+
+	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
+		u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
+
+		memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
+		if (!result)
+			iint->version = i_version;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
+ *
+ * Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
+ * ima_store_template.
+ *
+ * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
+ * but the measurement could already exist:
+ * 	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
+ *	  different filesystems.
+ *	- the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
+ *	  containing the hashing info.
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ */
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	int result = -ENOMEM;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	int violation = 0;
+
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
+	memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+	if (!result)
+		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
+	else
+		kfree(entry);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1e082bb987b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: integrity_audit.c
+ * 	Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int ima_audit;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
+
+/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
+static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long audit;
+	int rc, result = 0;
+	char *op = "ima_audit";
+	char *cause;
+
+	rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
+	if (rc || audit > 1)
+		result = 1;
+	else
+		ima_audit = audit;
+	cause = ima_audit ? "enabled" : "not_enabled";
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+			    op, cause, result, 0);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+#endif
+
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
+			 current->pid, current->cred->uid,
+			 audit_get_loginuid(current),
+			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
+	switch (audit_msgno) {
+	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA:
+	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA:
+	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR:
+	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause);
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause);
+		break;
+	default:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op);
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	if (fname) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
+	}
+	if (inode)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+				 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..50d572b74ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_crypto.c
+ * 	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+		pr_info("failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
+			ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
+		rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	desc->flags = 0;
+	rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+	if (rc)
+		crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
+ */
+int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
+{
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	loff_t i_size;
+	char *rbuf;
+	int rc, offset = 0;
+
+	rc = init_desc(&desc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rbuf) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+	while (offset < i_size) {
+		int rbuf_len;
+
+		rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (rbuf_len < 0) {
+			rc = rbuf_len;
+			break;
+		}
+		offset += rbuf_len;
+		sg_init_one(sg, rbuf, rbuf_len);
+
+		rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, rbuf_len);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+	kfree(rbuf);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+out:
+	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the hash of a given template
+ */
+int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
+{
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = init_desc(&desc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	sg_init_one(sg, template, template_len);
+	rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, template_len);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
+{
+	if (!ima_used_chip)
+		return;
+
+	if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
+ */
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+{
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int rc, i;
+
+	rc = init_desc(&desc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
+	for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
+		ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
+		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
+		sg_init_one(&sg, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	}
+	if (!rc)
+		crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ffbe259700b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_fs.c
+ *	implemenents security file system for reporting
+ *	current measurement list and IMA statistics
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int valid_policy = 1;
+#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
+				     loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp,
+					  char __user *buf,
+					  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = {
+	.read = ima_show_htable_violations
+};
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
+					   char __user *buf,
+					   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len);
+
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
+	.read = ima_show_measurements_count
+};
+
+/* returns pointer to hlist_node */
+static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	loff_t l = *pos;
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+
+	/* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+		if (!l--) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return qe;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+
+	/* lock protects when reading beyond last element
+	 * against concurrent list-extension
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	qe = list_entry(rcu_dereference(qe->later.next),
+			struct ima_queue_entry, later);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	(*pos)++;
+
+	return (&qe->later == &ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe;
+}
+
+static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
+{
+	while (datalen--)
+		seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
+}
+
+/* print format:
+ *       32bit-le=pcr#
+ *       char[20]=template digest
+ *       32bit-le=template name size
+ *       char[n]=template name
+ *       eventdata[n]=template specific data
+ */
+static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	int namelen;
+	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+
+	/* get entry */
+	e = qe->entry;
+	if (e == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * 1st: PCRIndex
+	 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
+	 * little-endian format
+	 */
+	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
+
+	/* 2nd: template digest */
+	ima_putc(m, e->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	/* 3rd: template name size */
+	namelen = strlen(e->template_name);
+	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+
+	/* 4th:  template name */
+	ima_putc(m, (void *)e->template_name, namelen);
+
+	/* 5th:  template specific data */
+	ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
+			  IMA_SHOW_BINARY);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
+	.start = ima_measurements_start,
+	.next = ima_measurements_next,
+	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+	.show = ima_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &ima_measurments_seqops);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
+	.open = ima_measurements_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = seq_release,
+};
+
+static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
+}
+
+void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show)
+{
+	struct ima_template_data *entry = e;
+	int namelen;
+
+	switch (show) {
+	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
+		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest);
+		seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name);
+		break;
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
+		ima_putc(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+		namelen = strlen(entry->file_name);
+		ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+		ima_putc(m, entry->file_name, namelen);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/* print in ascii */
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+
+	/* get entry */
+	e = qe->entry;
+	if (e == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
+	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+
+	/* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
+	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest);
+
+	/* 3th:  template name */
+	seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name);
+
+	/* 4th:  template specific data */
+	ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
+			  IMA_SHOW_ASCII);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
+	.start = ima_measurements_start,
+	.next = ima_measurements_next,
+	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+	.show = ima_ascii_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
+	.open = ima_ascii_measurements_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = seq_release,
+};
+
+static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) {
+		kfree(data);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+	*(data + datalen) = '\0';
+	rc = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		datalen = -EINVAL;
+		valid_policy = 0;
+	}
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return datalen;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *ima_dir;
+static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements;
+static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
+static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
+static struct dentry *violations;
+static struct dentry *ima_policy;
+
+static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+/*
+ * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
+ */
+int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+{
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
+		return 0;
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules.
+ *
+ * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now
+ * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file,
+ * assuming a valid policy.
+ */
+static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	if (!valid_policy) {
+		ima_delete_rules();
+		valid_policy = 1;
+		atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	ima_update_policy();
+	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+	ima_policy = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
+	.open = ima_open_policy,
+	.write = ima_write_policy,
+	.release = ima_release_policy
+};
+
+int ima_fs_init(void)
+{
+	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
+		return -1;
+
+	binary_runtime_measurements =
+	    securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+				   &ima_measurements_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
+		goto out;
+
+	ascii_runtime_measurements =
+	    securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+				   &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
+		goto out;
+
+	runtime_measurements_count =
+	    securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
+				   S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+				   &ima_measurements_count_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
+		goto out;
+
+	violations =
+	    securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+				   ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(violations))
+		goto out;
+
+	ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy",
+					    S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR,
+					    ima_dir, NULL,
+					    &ima_measure_policy_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
+	securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
+	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
+	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void)
+{
+	securityfs_remove(violations);
+	securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
+	securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
+	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
+	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ec79f1ee992
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_iint.c
+ * 	- implements the IMA hooks: ima_inode_alloc, ima_inode_free
+ *	- cache integrity information associated with an inode
+ *	  using a radix tree.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#define ima_iint_delete ima_inode_free
+
+RADIX_TREE(ima_iint_store, GFP_ATOMIC);
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_iint_lock);
+
+static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
+
+/* ima_iint_find_get - return the iint associated with an inode
+ *
+ * ima_iint_find_get gets a reference to the iint. Caller must
+ * remember to put the iint reference.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	iint = radix_tree_lookup(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		goto out;
+	kref_get(&iint->refcount);
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return iint;
+}
+
+/* Allocate memory for the iint associated with the inode
+ * from the iint_cache slab, initialize the iint, and
+ * insert it into the radix tree.
+ *
+ * On success return a pointer to the iint; on failure return NULL.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized)
+		return iint;
+	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!iint)
+		return iint;
+
+	rc = radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
+	rc = radix_tree_insert(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode, iint);
+	spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
+out:
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
+		if (rc == -EEXIST) {
+			spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
+			iint = radix_tree_lookup(&ima_iint_store,
+						 (unsigned long)inode);
+			spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
+		} else
+			iint = NULL;
+	}
+	radix_tree_preload_end();
+	return iint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, 1 on failure.
+ */
+int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_insert(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ima_iint_find_insert_get - get the iint associated with an inode
+ *
+ * Most insertions are done at inode_alloc, except those allocated
+ * before late_initcall. When the iint does not exist, allocate it,
+ * initialize and insert it, and increment the iint refcount.
+ *
+ * (Can't initialize at security_initcall before any inodes are
+ * allocated, got to wait at least until proc_init.)
+ *
+ *  Return the iint.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_insert_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		return iint;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_insert(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		kref_get(&iint->refcount);
+
+	return iint;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_iint_find_insert_get);
+
+/* iint_free - called when the iint refcount goes to zero */
+void iint_free(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = container_of(kref, struct ima_iint_cache,
+						   refcount);
+	iint->version = 0;
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	if (iint->readcount != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+		       iint->readcount);
+		iint->readcount = 0;
+	}
+	if (iint->writecount != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+		       iint->writecount);
+		iint->writecount = 0;
+	}
+	if (iint->opencount != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+		       iint->opencount);
+		iint->opencount = 0;
+	}
+	kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
+	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
+}
+
+void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = container_of(rcu_head,
+						   struct ima_iint_cache, rcu);
+	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_iint_delete - called on integrity_inode_free
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
+ */
+void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized)
+		return;
+	spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
+	iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
+	spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
+	if (iint)
+		call_rcu(&iint->rcu, iint_rcu_free);
+}
+
+static void init_once(void *foo)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = foo;
+
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
+	iint->version = 0;
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	iint->readcount = 0;
+	iint->writecount = 0;
+	iint->opencount = 0;
+	kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
+}
+
+void ima_iintcache_init(void)
+{
+	iint_cache =
+	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
+			      SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0b0bb8c978c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer      <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar         <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_init.c
+ *             initialization and cleanup functions
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* name for boot aggregate entry */
+static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
+int ima_used_chip;
+
+/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
+ * the PCR register.
+ *
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate, a SHA1 over tpm registers 0-7,
+ * assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not
+ * exist.  Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement
+ * list and extend the PCR register.
+ *
+ * If a tpm chip does not exist, indicate the core root of trust is
+ * not hardware based by invalidating the aggregate PCR value.
+ * (The aggregate PCR value is invalidated by adding one value to
+ * the measurement list and extending the aggregate PCR value with
+ * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
+ * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
+ */
+static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+{
+	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	int result = -ENOMEM;
+	int violation = 1;
+
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
+	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, boot_aggregate_name,
+		IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+	if (ima_used_chip) {
+		violation = 0;
+		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(entry->template.digest);
+		if (result < 0) {
+			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+			kfree(entry);
+			goto err_out;
+		}
+	}
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL);
+	if (result < 0)
+		kfree(entry);
+	return;
+err_out:
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
+			    audit_cause, result, 0);
+}
+
+int ima_init(void)
+{
+	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int rc;
+
+	ima_used_chip = 0;
+	rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		ima_used_chip = 1;
+
+	if (!ima_used_chip)
+		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+
+	ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+	ima_init_policy();
+
+	return ima_fs_init();
+}
+
+void __exit ima_cleanup(void)
+{
+	ima_fs_cleanup();
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f4e7266f5ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_main.c
+ *             implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
+ *             and ima_path_check.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_initialized;
+
+char *ima_hash = "sha1";
+static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
+{
+	const char *op = "hash_setup";
+	const char *hash = "sha1";
+	int result = 0;
+	int audit_info = 0;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
+		hash = "md5";
+		ima_hash = str;
+	} else if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) != 0) {
+		hash = "invalid_hash_type";
+		result = 1;
+	}
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH, NULL, NULL, op, hash,
+			    result, audit_info);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
+ * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
+ *
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
+ * and decrement the iint readcount/writecount.
+ */
+void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	if (iint->opencount <= 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO
+		       "%s: %s open/free imbalance (r:%ld w:%ld o:%ld f:%ld)\n",
+		       __FUNCTION__, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+		       iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
+		       iint->opencount, atomic_long_read(&file->f_count));
+		if (!(iint->flags & IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK)) {
+			dump_stack();
+			iint->flags |= IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK;
+		}
+	}
+	iint->opencount--;
+
+	if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+		iint->readcount--;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		iint->writecount--;
+		if (iint->writecount == 0) {
+			if (iint->version != inode->i_version)
+				iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
+ *
+ * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
+ * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
+ * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *
+ * In either case invalidate the PCR.
+ */
+enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
+static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
+				 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 struct inode *inode,
+				 const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	switch (error) {
+	case TOMTOU:
+		if (iint->readcount > 0)
+			ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+					  "ToMToU");
+		break;
+	case OPEN_WRITERS:
+		if (iint->writecount > 0)
+			ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+					  "open_writers");
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+				const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+		pr_info("%s dentry_open failed\n", filename);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	iint->opencount++;
+	iint->readcount++;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	if (!rc)
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
+ * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
+ * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ */
+int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct file *file = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+	iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	iint->opencount++;
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+		iint->writecount++;
+	else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
+		iint->readcount++;
+
+	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+		ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
+				     path->dentry->d_name.name);
+
+	if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
+		goto out;
+
+	ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
+			     path->dentry->d_name.name);
+	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
+		struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
+		struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
+
+		file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY, current->cred);
+		rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+	if (file)
+		fput(file);
+	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			       int mask, int function)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+	iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	if (!rc)
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+	iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	iint->opencount++;
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
+ * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ *
+ * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
+ * policy decision.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ */
+int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return 0;
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+		rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+					 MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
+ *
+ * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
+ * imbalance messages.
+ */
+void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
+{
+	opencount_get(file);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
+ * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
+ * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
+ * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
+ * what is being executed.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ */
+int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
+				 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init init_ima(void)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ima_iintcache_init();
+	error = ima_init();
+	ima_initialized = 1;
+	return error;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
+{
+	ima_cleanup();
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b5291ad5ef5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * ima_policy.c
+ * 	- initialize default measure policy rules
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* flags definitions */
+#define IMA_FUNC 	0x0001
+#define IMA_MASK 	0x0002
+#define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
+#define IMA_UID		0x0008
+
+enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
+
+#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
+enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
+	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
+};
+
+struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	enum ima_action action;
+	unsigned int flags;
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+	int mask;
+	unsigned long fsmagic;
+	uid_t uid;
+	struct {
+		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
+		int type;	/* audit type */
+	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
+};
+
+/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+ * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
+ */
+static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
+static struct list_head *ima_measure;
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
+ * @rule: a pointer to a rule
+ * @inode: a pointer to an inode
+ * @func: LIM hook identifier
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ *
+ * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
+ */
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
+			    struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	int i;
+
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
+	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
+		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
+		return false;
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		int rc;
+		u32 osid, sid;
+
+		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
+			continue;
+
+		switch (i) {
+		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
+		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
+		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
+			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+							rule->lsm[i].type,
+							AUDIT_EQUAL,
+							rule->lsm[i].rule,
+							NULL);
+			break;
+		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
+		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
+			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
+							rule->lsm[i].type,
+							AUDIT_EQUAL,
+							rule->lsm[i].rule,
+							NULL);
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!rc)
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
+ * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
+ * @func: IMA hook identifier
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ *
+ * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
+ * conditions.
+ *
+ * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
+ * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
+ * change.)
+ */
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
+		bool rc;
+
+		rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
+		if (rc)
+			return entry->action;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
+ *
+ * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
+ * the new measure_policy_rules.
+ */
+void ima_init_policy(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
+		list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
+	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
+ *
+ * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
+ * policy.  Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
+ * added to the policy.
+ */
+void ima_update_policy(void)
+{
+	const char *op = "policy_update";
+	const char *cause = "already exists";
+	int result = 1;
+	int audit_info = 0;
+
+	if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
+		ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
+		cause = "complete";
+		result = 0;
+	}
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+			    NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err = -1,
+	Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
+	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
+	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
+};
+
+static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
+	{Opt_measure, "measure"},
+	{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
+	{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
+	{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
+	{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
+	{Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
+	{Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
+	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
+	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
+	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
+			     char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
+	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
+					   AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
+					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *p;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+
+	entry->action = -1;
+	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
+		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+		int token;
+		unsigned long lnum;
+
+		if (result < 0)
+			break;
+		if (!*p)
+			continue;
+		token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_measure:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
+			entry->action = MEASURE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_measure:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
+			entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_func:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
+			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
+			break;
+		case Opt_mask:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
+			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_READ;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+				entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
+			break;
+		case Opt_fsmagic:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
+						&entry->fsmagic);
+			if (!result)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
+			break;
+		case Opt_uid:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
+				if (entry->uid != lnum)
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_obj_user:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+						   LSM_OBJ_USER,
+						   AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
+			break;
+		case Opt_obj_role:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+						   LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
+						   AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_obj_type:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+						   LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
+						   AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_subj_user:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+						   LSM_SUBJ_USER,
+						   AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
+			break;
+		case Opt_subj_role:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+						   LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
+						   AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_subj_type:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+						   LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
+						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
+			break;
+		case Opt_err:
+			audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+		result = -EINVAL;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
+ * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
+ *
+ * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ */
+int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+{
+	const char *op = "update_policy";
+	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+	int result = 0;
+	int audit_info = 0;
+
+	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
+	if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+				    NULL, op, "already exists",
+				    -EACCES, audit_info);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+				    NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+
+	result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
+	if (!result) {
+		mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+		list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
+		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	} else {
+		kfree(entry);
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+				    NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
+				    audit_info);
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
+void ima_delete_rules(void)
+{
+	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
+		list_del(&entry->list);
+		kfree(entry);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7ec94314ac0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_queue.c
+ *       Implements queues that store template measurements and
+ *       maintains aggregate over the stored measurements
+ *       in the pre-configured TPM PCR (if available).
+ *       The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
+ *       ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements);	/* list of all measurements */
+
+/* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */
+struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
+	.len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
+	.violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
+	.queue[0 ... IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE - 1] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT
+};
+
+/* mutex protects atomicity of extending measurement list
+ * and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take
+ * long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
+static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL;
+	unsigned int key;
+	struct hlist_node *pos;
+	int rc;
+
+	key = ima_hash_key(digest_value);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, pos, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
+		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			ret = qe;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* ima_add_template_entry helper function:
+ * - Add template entry to measurement list and hash table.
+ *
+ * (Called with ima_extend_list_mutex held.)
+ */
+static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+	unsigned int key;
+
+	qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (qe == NULL) {
+		pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	qe->entry = entry;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later);
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
+
+	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len);
+	key = ima_hash_key(entry->digest);
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+
+	if (!ima_used_chip)
+		return result;
+
+	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
+	if (result != 0)
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* Add template entry to the measurement list and hash table,
+ * and extend the pcr.
+ */
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
+	int audit_info = 1;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	if (!violation) {
+		memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
+		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
+			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry);
+	if (result < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+		audit_info = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (violation)		/* invalidate pcr */
+		memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
+
+	result = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
+	if (result != 0) {
+		audit_cause = "TPM error";
+		audit_info = 0;
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, entry->template_name,
+			    op, audit_cause, result, audit_info);
+	return result;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 81932abefe7..9fb679c66b8 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct key_user {
 	atomic_t		nkeys;		/* number of keys */
 	atomic_t		nikeys;		/* number of instantiated keys */
 	uid_t			uid;
+	struct user_namespace	*user_ns;
 	int			qnkeys;		/* number of keys allocated to this user */
 	int			qnbytes;	/* number of bytes allocated to this user */
 };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern struct rb_root	key_user_tree;
 extern spinlock_t	key_user_lock;
 extern struct key_user	root_key_user;
 
-extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid);
+extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid,
+					struct user_namespace *user_ns);
 extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user);
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index f76c8a546fd..4a1297d1ada 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static struct kmem_cache	*key_jar;
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ void __key_check(const struct key *key)
  * get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't
  * already exist
  */
-struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid)
+struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
 {
 	struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
 	struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
@@ -79,6 +80,10 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid)
 			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
 		else if (uid > user->uid)
 			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+		else if (user_ns < user->user_ns)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+		else if (user_ns > user->user_ns)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
 		else
 			goto found;
 	}
@@ -106,6 +111,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid)
 	atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
 	atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
 	candidate->uid = uid;
+	candidate->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
 	candidate->qnkeys = 0;
 	candidate->qnbytes = 0;
 	spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
@@ -136,6 +142,7 @@ void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
 	if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
 		rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
 		spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+		put_user_ns(user->user_ns);
 
 		kfree(user);
 	}
@@ -234,7 +241,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
 
 	/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
-	user = key_user_lookup(uid);
+	user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns);
 	if (!user)
 		goto no_memory_1;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index b1ec3b4ee17..7f09fb897d2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 	/* change the UID */
 	if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
+		newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns());
 		if (!newowner)
 			goto error_put;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index ed851574d07..3dba81c2eba 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -539,6 +539,9 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
 				    &keyring_name_hash[bucket],
 				    type_data.link
 				    ) {
+			if (keyring->user->user_ns != current_user_ns())
+				continue;
+
 			if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
 				continue;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 5d9fc7b93f2..0ed802c9e69 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
+	if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user->user_ns)
+		goto use_other_perms;
+
 	/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
 	if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) {
 		kperm = key->perm >> 16;
@@ -56,6 +59,8 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 		}
 	}
 
+use_other_perms:
+
 	/* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */
 	kperm = key->perm;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 7f508def50e..769f9bdfd2b 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -91,6 +91,28 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
 
+static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	while (n) {
+		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+			break;
+		n = rb_next(n);
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n));
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r)
+{
+	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
+	return __key_serial_next(n);
+}
+
 static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
@@ -104,10 +126,10 @@ static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 
 	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
 
-	_p = rb_first(&key_serial_tree);
+	_p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree);
 	while (pos > 0 && _p) {
 		pos--;
-		_p = rb_next(_p);
+		_p = key_serial_next(_p);
 	}
 
 	return _p;
@@ -117,7 +139,7 @@ static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
 	(*_pos)++;
-	return rb_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+	return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v);
 
 }
 
@@ -203,6 +225,27 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
 
+static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	while (n) {
+		struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);
+		if (user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+			break;
+		n = rb_next(n);
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	return __key_user_next(rb_next(n));
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
+{
+	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
+	return __key_user_next(n);
+}
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users
@@ -220,10 +263,10 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 
 	spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
 
-	_p = rb_first(&key_user_tree);
+	_p = key_user_first(&key_user_tree);
 	while (pos > 0 && _p) {
 		pos--;
-		_p = rb_next(_p);
+		_p = key_user_next(_p);
 	}
 
 	return _p;
@@ -233,7 +276,7 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
 	(*_pos)++;
-	return rb_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+	return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
 
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 2f5d89e92b8..276d27882ce 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
 	.nkeys		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
 	.nikeys		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
 	.uid		= 0,
+	.user_ns	= &init_user_ns,
 };
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 0e04f72ef2d..22a31582bfa 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 
 	kenter("");
 
-	user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
+	user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid(), current_user_ns());
 	if (!user)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c3586c0d97e..206e53844d2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1007,11 +1007,6 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 	return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
 }
 
-void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-{
-	security_ops->socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
-}
-
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
 	return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index eb41f43e277..7f9b5fac877 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -88,17 +88,16 @@ struct avc_entry {
 	u32			tsid;
 	u16			tclass;
 	struct av_decision	avd;
-	atomic_t		used;	/* used recently */
 };
 
 struct avc_node {
 	struct avc_entry	ae;
-	struct list_head	list;
+	struct hlist_node	list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
 	struct rcu_head		rhead;
 };
 
 struct avc_cache {
-	struct list_head	slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS];
+	struct hlist_head	slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
 	spinlock_t		slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
 	atomic_t		lru_hint;	/* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
 	atomic_t		active_nodes;
@@ -234,7 +233,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
 		spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
 	}
 	atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
@@ -250,16 +249,20 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 {
 	int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
 	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	slots_used = 0;
 	max_chain_len = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		if (!list_empty(&avc_cache.slots[i])) {
+		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+		if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
+			struct hlist_node *next;
+
 			slots_used++;
 			chain_len = 0;
-			list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+			hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
 				chain_len++;
 			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
 				max_chain_len = chain_len;
@@ -283,7 +286,7 @@ static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
 
 static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
 {
-	list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+	hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
 	call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
 	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
@@ -297,7 +300,7 @@ static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
 
 static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
 {
-	list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+	hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
 	call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
 	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
@@ -307,29 +310,31 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	int hvalue, try, ecx;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct hlist_node *next;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
 
 	for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
 		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
-		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags))
+		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
 			continue;
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
-			if (atomic_dec_and_test(&node->ae.used)) {
-				/* Recently Unused */
-				avc_node_delete(node);
-				avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
-				ecx++;
-				if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
-					rcu_read_unlock();
-					spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
-					goto out;
-				}
+		hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) {
+			avc_node_delete(node);
+			avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+			ecx++;
+			if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+				rcu_read_unlock();
+				spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+				goto out;
 			}
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
 	}
 out:
 	return ecx;
@@ -344,8 +349,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 		goto out;
 
 	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->list);
-	atomic_set(&node->ae.used, 1);
+	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
 
 	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
@@ -355,21 +359,24 @@ out:
 	return node;
 }
 
-static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	node->ae.ssid = ssid;
 	node->ae.tsid = tsid;
 	node->ae.tclass = tclass;
-	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
 }
 
 static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct hlist_node *next;
 
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+	head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) {
 		if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
 		    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
 		    tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
@@ -378,15 +385,6 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (ret == NULL) {
-		/* cache miss */
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* cache hit */
-	if (atomic_read(&ret->ae.used) != 1)
-		atomic_set(&ret->ae.used, 1);
-out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -395,30 +393,25 @@ out:
  * @ssid: source security identifier
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
  *
  * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
- * @requested permissions between the SID pair
  * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
  * based on @tclass.  If a valid AVC entry exists,
  * then this function return the avc_node.
  * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested)
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
 	node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 
-	if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) {
+	if (node)
 		avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
-		goto out;
-	}
+	else
+		avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
 
-	node = NULL;
-	avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
-out:
 	return node;
 }
 
@@ -449,34 +442,41 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * @ssid: source security identifier
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
- * @ae: AVC entry
+ * @avd: resulting av decision
  *
  * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
  * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
  * The access vectors and the sequence number are
  * normally provided by the security server in
  * response to a security_compute_av() call.  If the
- * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest
+ * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
  * revocation notification, then the function copies
  * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
  * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
 	unsigned long flag;
 
-	if (avc_latest_notif_update(ae->avd.seqno, 1))
+	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
 		goto out;
 
 	node = avc_alloc_node();
 	if (node) {
+		struct hlist_head *head;
+		struct hlist_node *next;
+		spinlock_t *lock;
+
 		hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, ae);
+		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+
+		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
-		list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+		hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
 			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
 			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
 			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
@@ -484,9 +484,9 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_en
 				goto found;
 			}
 		}
-		list_add_rcu(&node->list, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]);
+		hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
 found:
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	}
 out:
 	return node;
@@ -742,17 +742,22 @@ static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
  * @event : Updating event
  * @perms : Permission mask bits
  * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
  *
  * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
  * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
  * otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
  * will release later by RCU.
  */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			   u32 seqno)
 {
 	int hvalue, rc = 0;
 	unsigned long flag;
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct hlist_node *next;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
 
 	node = avc_alloc_node();
 	if (!node) {
@@ -762,12 +767,17 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 
 	/* Lock the target slot */
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+	head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
 		if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
 		    tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
-		    tclass == pos->ae.tclass){
+		    tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+		    seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
 			orig = pos;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -783,7 +793,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 	 * Copy and replace original node.
 	 */
 
-	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae);
+	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
 
 	switch (event) {
 	case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
@@ -808,7 +818,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 	}
 	avc_node_replace(node, orig);
 out_unlock:
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -823,18 +833,24 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 	int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
 	unsigned long flag;
 	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct hlist_node *next;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		/*
 		 * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
 		 * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+		hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
 			avc_node_delete(node);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	}
 
 	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
@@ -875,10 +891,10 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			 unsigned flags,
-			 struct av_decision *avd)
+			 struct av_decision *in_avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
-	struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
+	struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 denied;
 
@@ -886,29 +902,34 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
-	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
+	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (!node) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &entry.avd);
+
+		if (in_avd)
+			avd = in_avd;
+		else
+			avd = &avd_entry;
+
+		rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry);
+		node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+	} else {
+		if (in_avd)
+			memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd));
+		avd = &node->ae.avd;
 	}
 
-	p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry;
-
-	if (avd)
-		memcpy(avd, &p_ae->avd, sizeof(*avd));
-
-	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
+	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
 
 	if (denied) {
 		if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 			rc = -EACCES;
 		else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
 			avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
-					tsid, tclass);
+					tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
 		else
 			rc = -EACCES;
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 00815973d41..ba808ef6bab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,11 +89,10 @@
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
-extern int selinux_compat_net;
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
 /* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 	ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sk->sk_security = ssec;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -353,6 +352,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_fscontext = 2,
 	Opt_defcontext = 3,
 	Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+	Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 };
 
 static const match_table_t tokens = {
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
 	{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 	{Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 	{Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 	{Opt_error, NULL},
 };
 
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		}
 	}
 
-	sbsec->initialized = 1;
+	sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 
 	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
@@ -441,6 +442,12 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 		       labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
+	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
+	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
+	    sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
+		sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
 	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -487,23 +494,22 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 
 	security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 
-	if (!sbsec->initialized)
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/*
-	 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
-	 * settings this is going to need a mask
-	 */
-	tmp = sbsec->flags;
+	tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 	/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
 		if (tmp & 0x01)
 			opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 		tmp >>= 1;
 	}
+	/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+		opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
 	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
@@ -549,6 +555,10 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+	}
 
 	BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 
@@ -562,8 +572,10 @@ out_free:
 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 		      u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 {
+	char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
 	/* check if the old mount command had the same options */
-	if (sbsec->initialized)
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 		if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 		    (old_sid != new_sid))
 			return 1;
@@ -571,8 +583,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 	/* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 	 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 	 */
-	if (!sbsec->initialized)
-		if (sbsec->flags & flag)
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		if (mnt_flags & flag)
 			return 1;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -626,7 +638,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	 * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 	 * will be used for both mounts)
 	 */
-	if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 	    && (num_opts == 0))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -637,6 +649,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 		u32 sid;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+			continue;
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 		if (rc) {
@@ -690,19 +705,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (sbsec->initialized) {
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 		/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
-		if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 			goto out_double_mount;
 		rc = 0;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
-		sbsec->proc = 1;
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 
 	/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-	rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+	rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 		       __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
@@ -806,10 +821,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	}
 
 	/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
-	BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
+	BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 
 	/* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
-	if (newsbsec->initialized)
+	if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 		return;
 
 	mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
@@ -917,7 +932,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 				goto out_err;
 			}
 			break;
-
+		case Opt_labelsupport:
+			break;
 		default:
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
@@ -999,7 +1015,12 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 	char *prefix;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
-		char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+		char *has_comma;
+
+		if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+			has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+		else
+			has_comma = NULL;
 
 		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
 		case CONTEXT_MNT:
@@ -1014,6 +1035,10 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 			prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
 			break;
+		case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+			seq_putc(m, ',');
+			seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+			continue;
 		default:
 			BUG();
 		};
@@ -1209,7 +1234,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-	if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
 		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 		   server is ready to handle calls. */
@@ -1237,19 +1262,26 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
 		}
 		if (!dentry) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
-			       "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
-			       inode->i_ino);
+			/*
+			 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
+			 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+			 * be used again by userspace.
+			 */
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 
 		len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
-		context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+		context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!context) {
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 			dput(dentry);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
+		context[len] = '\0';
 		rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 					   context, len);
 		if (rc == -ERANGE) {
@@ -1262,12 +1294,13 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			}
 			kfree(context);
 			len = rc;
-			context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+			context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
 			if (!context) {
 				rc = -ENOMEM;
 				dput(dentry);
 				goto out_unlock;
 			}
+			context[len] = '\0';
 			rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
 						   XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 						   context, len);
@@ -1289,10 +1322,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-				       __func__, context, -rc,
-				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+					if (printk_ratelimit())
+						printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+				} else {
+					printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+				}
 				kfree(context);
 				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 				rc = 0;
@@ -1326,7 +1368,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
-		if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
 			struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
 			if (proci->pde) {
 				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
@@ -1587,7 +1629,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
@@ -1801,6 +1843,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 			av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
 		else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
 			av |= DIR__OPEN;
+		else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
+			av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
 		else
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
 				"unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
@@ -1815,7 +1859,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1832,7 +1876,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1848,7 +1892,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1858,7 +1902,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+	error = cap_capset(new, old,
 				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -1866,12 +1910,22 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 	return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 			   int cap, int audit)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1997,7 +2051,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2028,10 +2082,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2058,7 +2108,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2156,11 +2206,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
-}
-
 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2180,7 +2225,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
 	}
 
-	return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -2290,8 +2335,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
 	int rc, i;
 
-	secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
 	new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
 	if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
 		return;
@@ -2337,8 +2380,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	int rc, i;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
-
 	osid = tsec->osid;
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 
@@ -2400,7 +2441,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
 	return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
 		match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
 		match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
-		match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
+		match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
 }
 
 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
@@ -2513,11 +2555,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
 			 void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 		return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
@@ -2530,11 +2567,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
 				   FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
@@ -2570,7 +2602,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
 					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
 					     &newsid);
@@ -2585,14 +2617,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
-	if (sbsec->initialized) {
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 		isec->sid = newsid;
 		isec->initialized = 1;
 	}
 
-	if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (name) {
@@ -2622,21 +2654,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int ma
 
 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
 }
 
@@ -2657,12 +2679,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 
 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
 }
 
@@ -2682,22 +2698,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	if (!mask) {
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
@@ -2711,11 +2718,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
 		return 0;
@@ -2769,7 +2771,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
@@ -2931,16 +2933,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
 	return len;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
-static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -2952,7 +2944,6 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
 	if (!mask) {
@@ -2964,29 +2955,15 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
 		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
 
-	rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
-			   file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+			     file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
-	u32 sid = current_sid();
-
-	if (!mask) {
+	if (!mask)
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
 		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
-	    && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
-		return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
 
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
@@ -3078,18 +3055,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				 unsigned long prot)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
 	if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
-		rc = 0;
+		int rc = 0;
 		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
 		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
 			rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
@@ -3239,12 +3211,6 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 
 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
@@ -3278,14 +3244,6 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
- * commit new credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-	secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
-/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3329,29 +3287,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-	/* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
-	   since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
-	   identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
-	   this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
-	   of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
-	   capable hook. */
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
-				   int flags)
-{
-	return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-	/* See the comment for setuid above. */
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3372,17 +3307,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = task_sid(p);
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
-	/* See the comment for setuid above. */
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3393,7 +3322,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3408,11 +3337,6 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
 	struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
 	   lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
@@ -3428,7 +3352,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3451,10 +3375,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	u32 perm;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	if (!sig)
 		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
 	else
@@ -3467,18 +3387,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
-			      unsigned long arg2,
-			      unsigned long arg3,
-			      unsigned long arg4,
-			      unsigned long arg5)
-{
-	/* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
-	   any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
-	   the state of the current process. */
-	return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
@@ -3799,7 +3707,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		sksec->sid = isec->sid;
 		sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
+		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
 	}
 
 	return err;
@@ -3990,13 +3898,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 				  int size)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
@@ -4047,10 +3949,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	int err;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
@@ -4120,72 +4018,6 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
 			    SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
-						struct sk_buff *skb,
-						struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-						u16 family,
-						char *addrp)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	u16 sk_class;
-	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
-	u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
-
-	sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	sk_class = sksec->sclass;
-
-	switch (sk_class) {
-	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
-		node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
-		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
-		break;
-	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
-		node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
-		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
-		break;
-	case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
-		node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
-		recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
-		break;
-	default:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
-		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
-		recv_perm = 0;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	if (!recv_perm)
-		return 0;
-	err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
-			      ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
-	if (unlikely(err)) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING
-		       "SELinux: failure in"
-		       " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
-		       " network port label not found\n");
-		return err;
-	}
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
-}
-
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				       u16 family)
 {
@@ -4203,14 +4035,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
-							   family, addrp);
-	else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
 		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
 
 	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
 		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
@@ -4252,7 +4082,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
 		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -4384,7 +4214,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 	newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
@@ -4428,16 +4258,15 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		req->secid = sksec->sid;
 		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
-		return 0;
+	} else {
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		req->secid = newsid;
+		req->peer_secid = peersid;
 	}
 
-	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	req->secid = newsid;
-	req->peer_secid = peersid;
-	return 0;
+	return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
@@ -4454,7 +4283,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 
 	/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
 	 * thread with access to newsksec */
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
+	selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -4467,8 +4296,6 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		family = PF_INET;
 
 	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
-
-	selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4620,71 +4447,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
 	return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
 }
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
-						int ifindex,
-						struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-						u16 family, char *addrp)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	u16 sk_class;
-	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
-	u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
-
-	sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	sk_class = sksec->sclass;
-
-	switch (sk_class) {
-	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
-		node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
-		send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
-		break;
-	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
-		node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
-		send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
-		break;
-	case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
-		node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
-		send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
-		break;
-	default:
-		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
-		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
-		send_perm = 0;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
-		return err;
-
-	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	if (send_perm != 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
-			      ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
-	if (unlikely(err)) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING
-		       "SELinux: failure in"
-		       " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
-		       " network port label not found\n");
-		return err;
-	}
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
-}
-
 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 						int ifindex,
 						u16 family)
@@ -4705,15 +4467,10 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
 		return NF_DROP;
 
-	if (selinux_compat_net) {
-		if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
-							 &ad, family, addrp))
-			return NF_DROP;
-	} else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
 		if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP;
-	}
 
 	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
 		if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
@@ -4737,7 +4494,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
 		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
 	/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
@@ -4844,7 +4601,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4859,7 +4616,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 	int err;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -5167,11 +4924,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
 			     char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
 	u32 perms;
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
 
 	if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
 		perms = SHM__READ;
@@ -5581,7 +5333,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.netlink_recv =			selinux_netlink_recv,
 
 	.bprm_set_creds =		selinux_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_check_security =		selinux_bprm_check_security,
 	.bprm_committing_creds =	selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
 	.bprm_committed_creds =		selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
 	.bprm_secureexec =		selinux_bprm_secureexec,
@@ -5623,8 +5374,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getsecurity =		selinux_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
-	.inode_need_killpriv =		selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
-	.inode_killpriv =		selinux_inode_killpriv,
 	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
@@ -5644,17 +5393,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
 	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_commit =			selinux_cred_commit,
 	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
-	.task_setuid =			selinux_task_setuid,
-	.task_fix_setuid =		selinux_task_fix_setuid,
-	.task_setgid =			selinux_task_setgid,
 	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
 	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
 	.task_getsid =			selinux_task_getsid,
 	.task_getsecid =		selinux_task_getsecid,
-	.task_setgroups =		selinux_task_setgroups,
 	.task_setnice =			selinux_task_setnice,
 	.task_setioprio =		selinux_task_setioprio,
 	.task_getioprio =		selinux_task_getioprio,
@@ -5664,7 +5408,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_movememory =		selinux_task_movememory,
 	.task_kill =			selinux_task_kill,
 	.task_wait =			selinux_task_wait,
-	.task_prctl =			selinux_task_prctl,
 	.task_to_inode =		selinux_task_to_inode,
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index c0c885427b9..31df1d7c1ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
    S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT, "nlmsg_tty_audit")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
    S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 0ba79fe00e1..d645192ee95 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@
 #define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__OPEN                           0x00020000UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
@@ -707,6 +708,7 @@
 #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
 #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY         0x01000000UL
 #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV      0x02000000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT     0x04000000UL
 #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
 #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
 #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index b913c8d0603..b4b5b9b2f0b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/net.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/request_sock.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -42,8 +43,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
 void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
 
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-				      int family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
 
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
 				 u32 sid);
 
-void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock);
-int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				u16 family,
@@ -85,8 +85,7 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(
 }
 
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
-					       struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-					       int family)
+					       struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
 {
 	return;
 }
@@ -113,17 +112,17 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
-							u16 family)
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
+						   u16 family)
 {
-	return;
+	return 0;
 }
-static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return;
 }
-static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
-						  int mask)
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
+						    u16 family)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3cc45168f67..c4e062336ef 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -60,9 +60,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
 	u32 def_sid;			/* default SID for labeling */
 	u32 mntpoint_sid;		/* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
 	unsigned int behavior;		/* labeling behavior */
-	unsigned char initialized;	/* initialization flag */
 	unsigned char flags;		/* which mount options were specified */
-	unsigned char proc;		/* proc fs */
 	struct mutex lock;
 	struct list_head isec_head;
 	spinlock_t isec_lock;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 72447370bc9..5c3434f7626 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -37,15 +37,23 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
 #endif
 
+/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
+#define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
 #define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
 #define FSCONTEXT_MNT	0x02
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT	0x04
 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT	0x08
+/* Non-mount related flags */
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x10
+#define SE_SBPROC		0x20
+#define SE_SBLABELSUPP	0x40
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_STR	"rootcontext="
 #define DEFCONTEXT_STR	"defcontext="
+#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel"
 
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
 
@@ -80,7 +88,6 @@ int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
-	u32 decided;
 	u32 auditallow;
 	u32 auditdeny;
 	u32 seqno;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 350794ab9b4..2e984413c7b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -100,41 +100,6 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism
- * @sk: the socket to label
- *
- * Description:
- * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism.  Returns zero values
- * on success, negative values on failure.
- *
- */
-static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
-
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
-		return 0;
-
-	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
-	if (secattr == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, secattr);
-	switch (rc) {
-	case 0:
-		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
-		break;
-	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
-		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
-		rc = 0;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
  *
  * Description:
@@ -188,13 +153,9 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
  * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
  *
  */
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-				      int family)
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
 {
-	if (family == PF_INET)
-		ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
-	else
-		ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+	ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -281,127 +242,86 @@ skbuff_setsid_return:
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established - Netlabel the newly accepted connection
- * @sk: the new connection
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
+ * @req: incoming connection request socket
  *
  * Description:
- * A new connection has been established on @sk so make sure it is labeled
- * correctly with the NetLabel susbsystem.
+ * A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
+ * the new request_sock here and the stack will ensure the on-the-wire label
+ * will get preserved when a full sock is created once the connection handshake
+ * is complete.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
-	struct inet_sock *sk_inet = inet_sk(sk);
-	struct sockaddr_in addr;
-
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
-		return;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
-	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
-	if (secattr == NULL)
-		return;
+	if (family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
 
-	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, secattr);
-	switch (rc) {
-	case 0:
-		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
-		break;
-	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
-		/* no PF_INET6 support yet because we don't support any IPv6
-		 * labeling protocols */
-		if (family != PF_INET) {
-			sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
-			return;
-		}
-
-		addr.sin_family = family;
-		addr.sin_addr.s_addr = sk_inet->daddr;
-		if (netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
-					secattr) != 0) {
-			/* we failed to label the connected socket (could be
-			 * for a variety of reasons, the actual "why" isn't
-			 * important here) so we have to go to our backup plan,
-			 * labeling the packets individually in the netfilter
-			 * local output hook.  this is okay but we need to
-			 * adjust the MSS of the connection to take into
-			 * account any labeling overhead, since we don't know
-			 * the exact overhead at this point we'll use the worst
-			 * case value which is 40 bytes for IPv4 */
-			struct inet_connection_sock *sk_conn = inet_csk(sk);
-			sk_conn->icsk_ext_hdr_len += 40 -
-				      (sk_inet->opt ? sk_inet->opt->optlen : 0);
-			sk_conn->icsk_sync_mss(sk, sk_conn->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
-
-			sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
-		} else
-			sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
-		break;
-	default:
-		/* note that we are failing to label the socket which could be
-		 * a bad thing since it means traffic could leave the system
-		 * without the desired labeling, however, all is not lost as
-		 * we have a check in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to
-		 * pick up the pieces that we might drop here because we can't
-		 * return an error code */
-		break;
-	}
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto inet_conn_request_return;
+	rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
+inet_conn_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
- * @sock: the socket to label
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
+ * @sk: the new sock
  *
  * Description:
- * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
- * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ * A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
+ * socket via the request_sock struct in selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request() but
+ * we need to set the NetLabel state here since we now have a sock structure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
-	return selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sock->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (family == PF_INET)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+	else
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission - Verify the socket is NetLabel labeled
- * @inode: the file descriptor's inode
- * @mask: the permission mask
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
+ * @sock: the socket to label
+ * @family: protocol family
  *
  * Description:
- * Looks at a file's inode and if it is marked as a socket protected by
- * NetLabel then verify that the socket has been labeled, if not try to label
- * the socket now with the inode's SID.  Returns zero on success, negative
- * values on failure.
+ * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
+ * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sock *sk;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
-	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) ||
-	    ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)) == 0))
-		return 0;
-	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
-	sk = sock->sk;
-	if (sk == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	if (sksec == NULL || sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
+	if (family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
-	local_bh_disable();
-	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
-	if (likely(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE))
-		rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk);
-	else
+	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+	if (secattr == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr);
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+		break;
+	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
 		rc = 0;
-	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
-	local_bh_enable();
+		break;
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 4ed7bab89c5..c6875fd3b9d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
 	{ AUDIT_USER,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY    },
 	{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
 	{ AUDIT_TTY_GET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
-	{ AUDIT_TTY_SET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_TTY_SET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT	},
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 01ec6d2c6b9..2d5136ec3d5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@ static char *policycap_names[] = {
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 
-int selinux_compat_net = 0;
-
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long checkreqprot;
@@ -58,16 +56,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 
-static int __init selinux_compat_net_setup(char *str)
-{
-	unsigned long compat_net;
-	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &compat_net))
-		selinux_compat_net = compat_net ? 1 : 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup);
-
-
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
 
 /* global data for booleans */
@@ -450,61 +438,6 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
 	.write		= sel_write_checkreqprot,
 };
 
-static ssize_t sel_read_compat_net(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
-				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
-	ssize_t length;
-
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_compat_net);
-	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
-}
-
-static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-				    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char *page;
-	ssize_t length;
-	int new_value;
-
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
-	if (length)
-		return length;
-
-	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (*ppos != 0) {
-		/* No partial writes. */
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!page)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	length = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
-		goto out;
-
-	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (new_value) {
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE
-		       "SELinux: compat_net is deprecated, please use secmark"
-		       " instead\n");
-		selinux_compat_net = 1;
-	} else
-		selinux_compat_net = 0;
-	length = count;
-out:
-	free_page((unsigned long) page);
-	return length;
-}
-static const struct file_operations sel_compat_net_ops = {
-	.read		= sel_read_compat_net,
-	.write		= sel_write_compat_net,
-};
-
 /*
  * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
  */
@@ -595,7 +528,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
 			  "%x %x %x %x %u",
-			  avd.allowed, avd.decided,
+			  avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
 			  avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
 			  avd.seqno);
 out2:
@@ -1665,7 +1598,6 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
 		[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
 		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SEL_COMPAT_NET] = {"compat_net", &sel_compat_net_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		/* last one */ {""}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index c65e4fe4a0f..deeec6c013a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
 	 */
 	avd->allowed = 0;
-	avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
 	avd->auditallow = 0;
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
 	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
@@ -743,7 +742,6 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
-		avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
 		avd->auditallow = 0;
 		avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
 		avd->seqno = latest_granting;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b79582e4fbf..42ef313f985 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
 
 /*
  * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
@@ -40,7 +42,6 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 struct socket_smack {
 	char		*smk_out;			/* outbound label */
 	char		*smk_in;			/* inbound label */
-	int		smk_labeled;			/* label scheme */
 	char		smk_packet[SMK_LABELLEN];	/* TCP peer label */
 };
 
@@ -59,17 +60,10 @@ struct inode_smack {
  * A label access rule.
  */
 struct smack_rule {
-	char	*smk_subject;
-	char	*smk_object;
-	int	smk_access;
-};
-
-/*
- * An entry in the table of permitted label accesses.
- */
-struct smk_list_entry {
-	struct smk_list_entry	*smk_next;
-	struct smack_rule	smk_rule;
+	struct list_head	list;
+	char			*smk_subject;
+	char			*smk_object;
+	int			smk_access;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -85,7 +79,7 @@ struct smack_cipso {
  * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
  */
 struct smk_netlbladdr {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr	*smk_next;
+	struct list_head	list;
 	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
 	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
 	char			*smk_label;	/* label */
@@ -113,7 +107,7 @@ struct smk_netlbladdr {
  * the cipso direct mapping in used internally.
  */
 struct smack_known {
-	struct smack_known	*smk_next;
+	struct list_head	list;
 	char			smk_known[SMK_LABELLEN];
 	u32			smk_secid;
 	struct smack_cipso	*smk_cipso;
@@ -138,6 +132,8 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
 
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
+
 /*
  * How communications on this socket are treated.
  * Usually it's determined by the underlying netlabel code
@@ -205,8 +201,8 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern char *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
+extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
 
-extern struct smack_known *smack_known;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
@@ -214,8 +210,10 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
 
-extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
-extern struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
+extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
+extern struct list_head smack_rule_list;
+extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
+
 extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 2e0b83e77ff..ac0a2707f6d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -16,48 +16,42 @@
 #include "smack.h"
 
 struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
-	.smk_next	= NULL,
 	.smk_known	= "?",
 	.smk_secid	= 2,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
 struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
-	.smk_next	= &smack_known_huh,
 	.smk_known	= "^",
 	.smk_secid	= 3,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
 struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
-	.smk_next	= &smack_known_hat,
 	.smk_known	= "*",
 	.smk_secid	= 4,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
 struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
-	.smk_next	= &smack_known_star,
 	.smk_known	= "_",
 	.smk_secid	= 5,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
 struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
-	.smk_next	= &smack_known_floor,
 	.smk_known	= "",
 	.smk_secid	= 6,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
 struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
-	.smk_next	= &smack_known_invalid,
 	.smk_known	= "@",
 	.smk_secid	= 7,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
-struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_web;
+LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
 
 /*
  * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
@@ -87,7 +81,6 @@ static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
 int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 {
 	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
-	struct smk_list_entry *sp;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
 
 	/*
@@ -139,9 +132,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
 	 * good.
 	 */
-	for (sp = smack_list; sp != NULL; sp = sp->smk_next) {
-		srp = &sp->smk_rule;
-
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
 		if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
 		    strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
 			if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
@@ -151,6 +143,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	/*
 	 * This is a bit map operation.
 	 */
@@ -162,8 +155,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 
 /**
  * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
- * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
- * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  *
  * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
  * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
@@ -228,14 +221,17 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 
 	mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
 
-	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
-		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
+	found = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
 			break;
+		}
+	}
 
-	if (skp == NULL) {
+	if (found == 0) {
 		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (skp != NULL) {
-			skp->smk_next = smack_known;
 			strncpy(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
 			skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
 			skp->smk_cipso = NULL;
@@ -244,8 +240,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 			 * Make sure that the entry is actually
 			 * filled before putting it on the list.
 			 */
-			smp_mb();
-			smack_known = skp;
+			list_add_rcu(&skp->list, &smack_known_list);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -266,6 +261,9 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
+	/* labels cannot begin with a '-' */
+	if (string[0] == '-')
+		return NULL;
 	skp = smk_import_entry(string, len);
 	if (skp == NULL)
 		return NULL;
@@ -283,14 +281,19 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
-		if (skp->smk_secid == secid)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return skp->smk_known;
+		}
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If we got this far someone asked for the translation
 	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
 	 */
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
 }
 
@@ -305,9 +308,14 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *smack)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
-		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return skp->smk_secid;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -332,7 +340,8 @@ void smack_from_cipso(u32 level, char *cp, char *result)
 	struct smack_known *kp;
 	char *final = NULL;
 
-	for (kp = smack_known; final == NULL && kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next) {
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry(kp, &smack_known_list, list) {
 		if (kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
 			continue;
 
@@ -344,6 +353,7 @@ void smack_from_cipso(u32 level, char *cp, char *result)
 
 		spin_unlock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (final == NULL)
 		final = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
 	strncpy(result, final, SMK_MAXLEN);
@@ -360,13 +370,19 @@ void smack_from_cipso(u32 level, char *cp, char *result)
 int smack_to_cipso(const char *smack, struct smack_cipso *cp)
 {
 	struct smack_known *kp;
+	int found = 0;
 
-	for (kp = smack_known; kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(kp, &smack_known_list, list) {
 		if (kp->smk_known == smack ||
-		    strcmp(kp->smk_known, smack) == 0)
+		    strcmp(kp->smk_known, smack) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
 			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	if (kp == NULL || kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+	if (found == 0 || kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	memcpy(cp, kp->smk_cipso, sizeof(struct smack_cipso));
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e7ded1326b0..921514902ec 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
  *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
  *
  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
 #include <linux/kd.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
@@ -91,6 +94,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
 /**
  * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
  *
@@ -203,9 +207,8 @@ static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 
 /**
  * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
- * @type: file system type
  * @orig: where to start
- * @smackopts
+ * @smackopts: mount options string
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
  *
@@ -331,7 +334,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 /**
  * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
  * @dev_name: unused
- * @nd: mount point
+ * @path: mount point
  * @type: unused
  * @flags: unused
  * @data: unused
@@ -370,7 +373,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
- * @inode - the inode in need of a blob
+ * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
  *
  * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
  */
@@ -384,7 +387,7 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
- * @inode - the inode with a blob
+ * @inode: the inode with a blob
  *
  * Clears the blob pointer in inode
  */
@@ -538,7 +541,6 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
  * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
  * @inode: the inode in question
  * @mask: the access requested
- * @nd: unused
  *
  * This is the important Smack hook.
  *
@@ -607,6 +609,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
+		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
+		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
@@ -701,8 +706,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
  * @inode: the object
  * @name: attribute name
  * @buffer: where to put the result
- * @size: size of the buffer
- * @err: unused
+ * @alloc: unused
  *
  * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
  */
@@ -864,7 +868,7 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 /**
  * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
  * @file: the object
- * @cmd unused
+ * @cmd: unused
  *
  * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
  */
@@ -1003,8 +1007,8 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * commit new credentials
+/**
+ * smack_cred_commit - commit new credentials
  * @new: the new credentials
  * @old: the original credentials
  */
@@ -1014,8 +1018,8 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 
 /**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
- * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
  *
  * Set the security data for a kernel service.
  */
@@ -1032,8 +1036,8 @@ static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 
 /**
  * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
- * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified
- * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
  *
  * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
  * as the objective context of the specified inode
@@ -1242,7 +1246,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 /**
  * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
  * @p: task to copy from
- * inode: inode to copy to
+ * @inode: inode to copy to
  *
  * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
  */
@@ -1260,7 +1264,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
  * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
  * @sk: the socket
  * @family: unused
- * @priority: memory allocation priority
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
  *
  * Assign Smack pointers to current
  *
@@ -1277,7 +1281,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 
 	ssp->smk_in = csp;
 	ssp->smk_out = csp;
-	ssp->smk_labeled = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
 	ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
 
 	sk->sk_security = ssp;
@@ -1297,6 +1300,43 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 }
 
 /**
+* smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+
+	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
+		/*
+		* we break after finding the first match because
+		* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		* so we have found the most specific match
+		*/
+		if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
+		    (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
+			/* we have found the special CIPSO option */
+			if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
+				return NULL;
+			return snp->smk_label;
+		}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
  * @catset: the Smack categories
  * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
@@ -1367,11 +1407,10 @@ static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
  */
 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	ssp = sk->sk_security;
 	/*
 	 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
 	 * packet labeling based on the label.
@@ -1389,27 +1428,51 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 	else {
 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 		smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
-		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
+		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 	}
 
 	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 	local_bh_enable();
-	/*
-	 * Remember the label scheme used so that it is not
-	 * necessary to do the netlabel setting if it has not
-	 * changed the next time through.
-	 *
-	 * The -EDESTADDRREQ case is an indication that there's
-	 * a single level host involved.
-	 */
-	if (rc == 0)
-		ssp->smk_labeled = labeled;
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sap: the destination address
+ *
+ * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
+ * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
+ *
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int sk_lbl;
+	char *hostsp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
+	if (hostsp != NULL) {
+		sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+	} else {
+		sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
+		rc = 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
  * @inode: the object
  * @name: attribute name
@@ -1430,7 +1493,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	struct socket *sock;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN)
+	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN || size == 0)
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	sp = smk_import(value, size);
@@ -1490,41 +1553,6 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
 }
 
-
-/**
- * smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
- * @sip: the object end
- *
- * looks for host based access restrictions
- *
- * This version will only be appropriate for really small
- * sets of single label hosts.
- *
- * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
- */
-static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
-{
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
-	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
-
-	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
-		return NULL;
-
-	for (snp = smack_netlbladdrs; snp != NULL; snp = snp->smk_next) {
-		/*
-		 * we break after finding the first match because
-		 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
-		 * so we have found the most specific match
-		 */
-		if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr  ==
-			(siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
-			return snp->smk_label;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-
 /**
  * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
  * @sock: the socket
@@ -1538,30 +1566,12 @@ static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 				int addrlen)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	char *hostsp;
-	int rc;
-
 	if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
-
 	if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	hostsp = smack_host_label((struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
-	if (hostsp == NULL) {
-		if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
-			return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
-
-	if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
-		return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
-	return 0;
+	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1974,7 +1984,7 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
 
 /**
  * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
- * @ipcp: the object permissions
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
  * @secid: where result will be saved
  */
 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
@@ -2251,7 +2261,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 /**
  * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
  * @sock: the socket
- * @msghdr: the message
+ * @msg: the message
  * @size: the size of the message
  *
  * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
@@ -2262,9 +2272,6 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 				int size)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	char *hostsp;
-	int rc;
 
 	/*
 	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
@@ -2272,28 +2279,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
-	hostsp = smack_host_label(sip);
-	if (hostsp == NULL) {
-		if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
-			return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
-
-	if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
-		return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
-
-	return 0;
-
+	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
 }
 
 
 /**
- * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat
- * 	pair to smack
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
  * @sap: netlabel secattr
  * @sip: where to put the result
  *
@@ -2414,7 +2405,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  * @sock: the socket
  * @optval: user's destination
  * @optlen: size thereof
- * @len: max thereoe
+ * @len: max thereof
  *
  * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
  */
@@ -2493,31 +2484,24 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_sock_graft - graft access state between two sockets
- * @sk: fresh sock
- * @parent: donor socket
+ * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
  *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
+ * is creating the new socket.
  */
 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
-	int rc;
 
-	if (sk == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+	if (sk == NULL ||
+	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
 		return;
 
 	ssp = sk->sk_security;
 	ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
-	ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
-
-	rc = smack_netlabel(sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
-		       __func__, -rc);
+	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2532,35 +2516,82 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				   struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr skb_secattr;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr;
+	struct iphdr *hdr;
 	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
 	int rc;
 
-	if (skb == NULL)
-		return -EACCES;
+	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
 
-	netlbl_secattr_init(&skb_secattr);
-	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &skb_secattr);
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		smack_from_secattr(&skb_secattr, smack);
+		smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
 	else
 		strncpy(smack, smack_known_huh.smk_known, SMK_MAXLEN);
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&skb_secattr);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
 	/*
-	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
-	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
-	 *
-	 * If the request is successful save the peer's label
-	 * so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
+	 * here. Read access is not required.
 	 */
 	rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		strncpy(ssp->smk_packet, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
+	 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+	 */
+	req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
+	 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
+	 * propogate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+	 */
+	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (smack_host_label(&addr) == NULL) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		smack_to_secattr(smack, &secattr);
+		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	} else {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
+ * @sk: the new socket
+ * @req: the connection's request_sock
+ *
+ * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
+ */
+static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+				 const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	char *smack;
+
+	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
+		smack = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+		strncpy(ssp->smk_packet, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+	} else
+		ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
+}
+
 /*
  * Key management security hooks
  *
@@ -2749,7 +2780,7 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
-/*
+/**
  * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
  * @secid: incoming integer
  * @secdata: destination
@@ -2766,7 +2797,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
  * @secdata: smack label
  * @seclen: how long result is
@@ -2780,11 +2811,10 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
- * @key_ref: unused
- * @context: unused
- * @perm: unused
+ * @secdata: unused
+ * @seclen: unused
  *
  * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
  */
@@ -2913,6 +2943,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.sk_free_security = 		smack_sk_free_security,
 	.sock_graft = 			smack_sock_graft,
 	.inet_conn_request = 		smack_inet_conn_request,
+	.inet_csk_clone =		smack_inet_csk_clone,
 
  /* key management security hooks */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
@@ -2934,6 +2965,17 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
 };
 
+
+static __init void init_smack_know_list(void)
+{
+	list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_floor.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_invalid.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_web.list, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_init - initialize the smack system
  *
@@ -2954,6 +2996,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
 	cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 
+	/* initilize the smack_know_list */
+	init_smack_know_list();
 	/*
 	 * Initialize locks
 	 */
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 51f0efc50da..e03a7e19c73 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -80,10 +80,14 @@ char *smack_onlycap;
  * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
  * can write to the specified label.
  */
-struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
+
+LIST_HEAD(smk_netlbladdr_list);
+LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
 
 static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
-struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+
+const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
+
 
 #define	SEQ_READ_FINISHED	1
 
@@ -134,24 +138,27 @@ static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
 		return NULL;
-
-	return smack_list;
+	if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
+		return NULL;
+	return smack_rule_list.next;
 }
 
 static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	struct smk_list_entry *skp = ((struct smk_list_entry *) v)->smk_next;
+	struct list_head *list = v;
 
-	if (skp == NULL)
+	if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
 		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
-
-	return skp;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return list->next;
 }
 
 static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
-	struct smk_list_entry *slp = (struct smk_list_entry *) v;
-	struct smack_rule *srp = &slp->smk_rule;
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
 
 	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
 		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
@@ -212,32 +219,23 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
  */
 static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
 {
-	struct smk_list_entry *sp;
-	struct smk_list_entry *newp;
+	struct smack_rule *sp;
 	int ret = 0;
-
+	int found;
 	mutex_lock(&smack_list_lock);
 
-	for (sp = smack_list; sp != NULL; sp = sp->smk_next)
-		if (sp->smk_rule.smk_subject == srp->smk_subject &&
-		    sp->smk_rule.smk_object == srp->smk_object) {
-			sp->smk_rule.smk_access = srp->smk_access;
+	found = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+		if (sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject &&
+		    sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object) {
+			found = 1;
+			sp->smk_access = srp->smk_access;
 			break;
 		}
-
-	if (sp == NULL) {
-		newp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smk_list_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (newp == NULL) {
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		newp->smk_rule = *srp;
-		newp->smk_next = smack_list;
-		smack_list = newp;
 	}
+	if (found == 0)
+		list_add_rcu(&srp->list, &smack_rule_list);
 
-out:
 	mutex_unlock(&smack_list_lock);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -245,7 +243,7 @@ out:
 
 /**
  * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
@@ -261,7 +259,7 @@ out:
 static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct smack_rule rule;
+	struct smack_rule *rule;
 	char *data;
 	int rc = -EINVAL;
 
@@ -272,9 +270,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 */
 	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
-	if (*ppos != 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (count != SMK_LOADLEN)
+
+	if (*ppos != 0 || count != SMK_LOADLEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -286,25 +283,31 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rule.smk_subject = smk_import(data, 0);
-	if (rule.smk_subject == NULL)
+	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rule == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
-	rule.smk_object = smk_import(data + SMK_LABELLEN, 0);
-	if (rule.smk_object == NULL)
-		goto out;
+	rule->smk_subject = smk_import(data, 0);
+	if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
+		goto out_free_rule;
 
-	rule.smk_access = 0;
+	rule->smk_object = smk_import(data + SMK_LABELLEN, 0);
+	if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
+		goto out_free_rule;
+
+	rule->smk_access = 0;
 
 	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN]) {
 	case '-':
 		break;
 	case 'r':
 	case 'R':
-		rule.smk_access |= MAY_READ;
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_READ;
 		break;
 	default:
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
 	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 1]) {
@@ -312,10 +315,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		break;
 	case 'w':
 	case 'W':
-		rule.smk_access |= MAY_WRITE;
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_WRITE;
 		break;
 	default:
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
 	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 2]) {
@@ -323,10 +326,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		break;
 	case 'x':
 	case 'X':
-		rule.smk_access |= MAY_EXEC;
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_EXEC;
 		break;
 	default:
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
 	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 3]) {
@@ -334,17 +337,20 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		break;
 	case 'a':
 	case 'A':
-		rule.smk_access |= MAY_APPEND;
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_APPEND;
 		break;
 	default:
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
-	rc = smk_set_access(&rule);
+	rc = smk_set_access(rule);
 
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = count;
+	goto out;
 
+out_free_rule:
+	kfree(rule);
 out:
 	kfree(data);
 	return rc;
@@ -402,6 +408,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
 
 /**
  * smk_unlbl_ambient - initialize the unlabeled domain
+ * @oldambient: previous domain string
  */
 static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
 {
@@ -432,24 +439,26 @@ static void *cipso_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
 		return NULL;
+	if (list_empty(&smack_known_list))
+		return NULL;
 
-	return smack_known;
+	return smack_known_list.next;
 }
 
 static void *cipso_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = ((struct smack_known *) v)->smk_next;
+	struct list_head  *list = v;
 
 	/*
-	 * Omit labels with no associated cipso value
+	 * labels with no associated cipso value wont be printed
+	 * in cipso_seq_show
 	 */
-	while (skp != NULL && !skp->smk_cipso)
-		skp = skp->smk_next;
-
-	if (skp == NULL)
+	if (list_is_last(list, &smack_known_list)) {
 		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
-	return skp;
+	return list->next;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -458,7 +467,9 @@ static void *cipso_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
  */
 static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = (struct smack_known *) v;
+	struct list_head  *list = v;
+	struct smack_known *skp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
 	struct smack_cipso *scp = skp->smk_cipso;
 	char *cbp;
 	char sep = '/';
@@ -513,7 +524,7 @@ static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 /**
  * smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
@@ -557,6 +568,11 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto unlockedout;
 	}
 
+	/* labels cannot begin with a '-' */
+	if (data[0] == '-') {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto unlockedout;
+	}
 	data[count] = '\0';
 	rule = data;
 	/*
@@ -637,18 +653,21 @@ static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
 		return NULL;
-
-	return smack_netlbladdrs;
+	if (list_empty(&smk_netlbladdr_list))
+		return NULL;
+	return smk_netlbladdr_list.next;
 }
 
 static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = ((struct smk_netlbladdr *) v)->smk_next;
+	struct list_head *list = v;
 
-	if (skp == NULL)
+	if (list_is_last(list, &smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
 		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
-	return skp;
+	return list->next;
 }
 #define BEBITS	(sizeof(__be32) * 8)
 
@@ -657,7 +676,9 @@ static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
  */
 static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = (struct smk_netlbladdr *) v;
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp =
+			 list_entry(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
 	unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	int maskn;
 	u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr);
@@ -701,30 +722,36 @@ static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
  *
  * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_netlbladdrs list
  * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_netlbladdr_lock in smk_write_netlbladdr
+ *
  */
 static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *m;
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *m, *m_next;
 
-	if (smack_netlbladdrs == NULL) {
-		smack_netlbladdrs = new;
+	if (list_empty(&smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
 		return;
 	}
 
+	m = list_entry(rcu_dereference(smk_netlbladdr_list.next),
+			 struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+
 	/* the comparison '>' is a bit hacky, but works */
-	if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > smack_netlbladdrs->smk_mask.s_addr) {
-		new->smk_next = smack_netlbladdrs;
-		smack_netlbladdrs = new;
+	if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m->smk_mask.s_addr) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
 		return;
 	}
-	for (m = smack_netlbladdrs; m != NULL; m = m->smk_next) {
-		if (m->smk_next == NULL) {
-			m->smk_next = new;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
+		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
 			return;
 		}
-		if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m->smk_next->smk_mask.s_addr) {
-			new->smk_next = m->smk_next;
-			m->smk_next = new;
+		m_next = list_entry(rcu_dereference(m->list.next),
+				 struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+		if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m_next->smk_mask.s_addr) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
 			return;
 		}
 	}
@@ -733,7 +760,7 @@ static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
 
 /**
  * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
@@ -754,6 +781,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 	struct in_addr mask;
 	unsigned int m;
+	int found;
 	u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
 	__be32 nsa;
 	u32 temp_mask;
@@ -788,9 +816,18 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (m > BEBITS)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
-	if (sp == NULL)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	/* if smack begins with '-', its an option, don't import it */
+	if (smack[0] != '-') {
+		sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
+		if (sp == NULL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* check known options */
+		if (strcmp(smack, smack_cipso_option) == 0)
+			sp = (char *)smack_cipso_option;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	for (temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
 		temp_mask |= mask_bits;
@@ -807,14 +844,17 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	/* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
-	for (skp = smack_netlbladdrs; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+	found = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
 		if (skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
-		    skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr)
+		    skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr) {
+			found = 1;
 			break;
-
+		}
+	}
 	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
 
-	if (skp == NULL) {
+	if (found == 0) {
 		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (skp == NULL)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -826,18 +866,23 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			smk_netlbladdr_insert(skp);
 		}
 	} else {
-		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
-			&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
-			PF_INET, &audit_info);
+		/* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
+		 * wasnt the special CIPSO option */
+		if (skp->smk_label != smack_cipso_option)
+			rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+					&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
+					PF_INET, &audit_info);
+		else
+			rc = 0;
 		skp->smk_label = sp;
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
 	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
 	 */
-
-	if (rc == 0)
+	if (rc == 0 && sp != smack_cipso_option)
 		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
 			&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
 			smack_to_secid(skp->smk_label), &audit_info);
@@ -884,7 +929,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_doi(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 /**
  * smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
@@ -949,7 +994,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_direct(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 /**
  * smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
@@ -1024,7 +1069,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 /**
  * smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
@@ -1099,7 +1144,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 /**
  * smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c8f38579323
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	bool "TOMOYO Linux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
+	  Required userspace tools and further information may be
+	  found at <http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/>.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..10ccd686b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..92cea656ad2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2206 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.c
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+
+/* Has loading policy done? */
+bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+
+/* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */
+static const char *tomoyo_mode_4[4] = {
+	"disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing"
+};
+/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */
+static const char *tomoyo_mode_2[4] = {
+	"disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
+};
+
+/* Table for profile. */
+static struct {
+	const char *keyword;
+	unsigned int current_value;
+	const unsigned int max_value;
+} tomoyo_control_array[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = {
+	[TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE]     = { "MAC_FOR_FILE",        0,       3 },
+	[TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY] = { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY", 2048, INT_MAX },
+	[TOMOYO_VERBOSE]          = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE",      1,       1 },
+};
+
+/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+static struct tomoyo_profile {
+	unsigned int value[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment;
+} *tomoyo_profile_ptr[TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES];
+
+/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */
+static bool tomoyo_manage_by_non_root;
+
+/* Utility functions. */
+
+/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
+/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file);
+/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+			       const int buffer_len);
+/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+				const int buffer_len);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF.
+ * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+	return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+	return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
+ *
+ * @c1: The first character.
+ * @c2: The second character.
+ * @c3: The third character.
+ *
+ * Returns byte value.
+ */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
+{
+	return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
+ *
+ * @src:  Pointer to pointer to the string.
+ * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
+ * if @src starts with @find.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
+{
+	const int len = strlen(find);
+	char *tmp = *src;
+
+	if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
+		return false;
+	tmp += len;
+	*src = tmp;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to normalize.
+ *
+ * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
+ * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned char *sp = buffer;
+	unsigned char *dp = buffer;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp))
+		sp++;
+	while (*sp) {
+		if (!first)
+			*dp++ = ' ';
+		first = false;
+		while (tomoyo_is_valid(*sp))
+			*dp++ = *sp++;
+		while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp))
+			sp++;
+	}
+	*dp = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
+ * @filename:     The pathname to check.
+ * @start_type:   Should the pathname start with '/'?
+ *                1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard?
+ *                1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @end_type:     Should the pathname end with '/'?
+ *                1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @function:     The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+			    const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+			    const char *function)
+{
+	bool contains_pattern = false;
+	unsigned char c;
+	unsigned char d;
+	unsigned char e;
+	const char *original_filename = filename;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		goto out;
+	c = *filename;
+	if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */
+		if (c != '/')
+			goto out;
+	} else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */
+		if (c == '/')
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (c)
+		c = *(filename + strlen(filename) - 1);
+	if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */
+		if (c != '/')
+			goto out;
+	} else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */
+		if (c == '/')
+			goto out;
+	}
+	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			switch ((c = *filename++)) {
+			case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+				continue;
+			case '$':   /* "\$" */
+			case '+':   /* "\+" */
+			case '?':   /* "\?" */
+			case '*':   /* "\*" */
+			case '@':   /* "\@" */
+			case 'x':   /* "\x" */
+			case 'X':   /* "\X" */
+			case 'a':   /* "\a" */
+			case 'A':   /* "\A" */
+			case '-':   /* "\-" */
+				if (pattern_type == -1)
+					break; /* Must not contain pattern */
+				contains_pattern = true;
+				continue;
+			case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+			case '1':
+			case '2':
+			case '3':
+				d = *filename++;
+				if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+					break;
+				e = *filename++;
+				if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+					break;
+				c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e);
+				if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c))
+					continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
+			}
+			goto out;
+		} else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */
+		if (!contains_pattern)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+ out:
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function,
+	       original_filename);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
+ * @domainname:   The domainname to check.
+ * @function:     The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+			      const char *function)
+{
+	unsigned char c;
+	unsigned char d;
+	unsigned char e;
+	const char *org_domainname = domainname;
+
+	if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME,
+				   TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN))
+		goto out;
+	domainname += TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN;
+	if (!*domainname)
+		return true;
+	do {
+		if (*domainname++ != ' ')
+			goto out;
+		if (*domainname++ != '/')
+			goto out;
+		while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') {
+			domainname++;
+			if (c == '\\') {
+				c = *domainname++;
+				switch ((c)) {
+				case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+					continue;
+				case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+				case '1':
+				case '2':
+				case '3':
+					d = *domainname++;
+					if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+						break;
+					e = *domainname++;
+					if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+						break;
+					c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e);
+					if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c))
+						/* pattern is not \000 */
+						continue;
+				}
+				goto out;
+			} else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) {
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (*domainname);
+	return true;
+ out:
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid domainname '%s'\n", function,
+	       org_domainname);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The token to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	return !strncmp(buffer, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to find.
+ *
+ * Caller must call down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); or
+ * down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); .
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		if (!domain->is_deleted &&
+		    !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+			return domain;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns path depth of the string.
+ *
+ * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
+ * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_depth(const char *pathname)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (pathname) {
+		const char *ep = pathname + strlen(pathname);
+		if (pathname < ep--) {
+			if (*ep != '/')
+				i++;
+			while (pathname <= ep)
+				if (*ep-- == '/')
+					i += 2;
+		}
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
+ *
+ * @filename: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename)
+{
+	char c;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return 0;
+	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+		if (c != '\\') {
+			len++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename++;
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+			len += 2;
+			continue;
+		case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			len += 4;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in.
+ *
+ * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name.
+ */
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
+{
+	const char *name = ptr->name;
+	const int len = strlen(name);
+
+	ptr->total_len = len;
+	ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name);
+	ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
+	ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
+	ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
+	ptr->depth = tomoyo_path_depth(name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character
+ * and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
+					    const char *filename_end,
+					    const char *pattern,
+					    const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+		char c;
+		if (*pattern != '\\') {
+			if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+				return false;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename;
+		pattern++;
+		switch (*pattern) {
+			int i;
+			int j;
+		case '?':
+			if (c == '/') {
+				return false;
+			} else if (c == '\\') {
+				if (filename[1] == '\\')
+					filename++;
+				else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1))
+					filename += 3;
+				else
+					return false;
+			}
+			break;
+		case '\\':
+			if (c != '\\')
+				return false;
+			if (*++filename != '\\')
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '+':
+			if (!isdigit(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			if (!isxdigit(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			if (!tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '0':
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1)
+			    && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) {
+				filename += 3;
+				pattern += 2;
+				break;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		case '*':
+		case '@':
+			for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(
+						    filename + i, filename_end,
+						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+					return true;
+				c = filename[i];
+				if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+					break;
+				if (c != '\\')
+					continue;
+				if (filename[i + 1] == '\\')
+					i++;
+				else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+					i += 3;
+				else
+					break; /* Bad pattern. */
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		default:
+			j = 0;
+			c = *pattern;
+			if (c == '$') {
+				while (isdigit(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'X') {
+				while (isxdigit(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'A') {
+				while (tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			}
+			for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(
+						    filename + i, filename_end,
+						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+					return true;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+		}
+		filename++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+	       (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+		pattern += 2;
+	return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
+					   const char *filename_end,
+					   const char *pattern,
+					   const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+	bool first = true;
+	bool result;
+
+	while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+		/* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+		if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+			continue;
+		result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename,
+							 filename_end,
+							 pattern_start,
+							 pattern - 2);
+		if (first)
+			result = !result;
+		if (result)
+			return false;
+		first = false;
+		pattern_start = pattern;
+	}
+	result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+						 pattern_start, pattern_end);
+	return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern:  The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ *   \\     \ itself.
+ *   \ooo   Octal representation of a byte.
+ *   \*     More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'.
+ *   \@     More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'.
+ *   \?     1 byte character other than '/'.
+ *   \$     More than or equals to 1 decimal digit.
+ *   \+     1 decimal digit.
+ *   \X     More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \x     1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \A     More than or equals to 1 alphabet character.
+ *   \a     1 alphabet character.
+ *   \-     Subtraction operator.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern)
+{
+	/*
+	  if (!filename || !pattern)
+	  return false;
+	*/
+	const char *f = filename->name;
+	const char *p = pattern->name;
+	const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+	/* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+	if (!pattern->is_patterned)
+		return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+	/* Dont compare if the number of '/' differs. */
+	if (filename->depth != pattern->depth)
+		return false;
+	/* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+	if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+		return false;
+	f += len;
+	p += len;
+	/* Main loop. Compare each directory component. */
+	while (*f && *p) {
+		const char *f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+		const char *p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+		if (!f_delimiter)
+			f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
+		if (!p_delimiter)
+			p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(f, f_delimiter,
+						    p, p_delimiter))
+			return false;
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (*f)
+			f++;
+		p = p_delimiter;
+		if (*p)
+			p++;
+	}
+	/* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+	while (*p == '\\' &&
+	       (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+		p += 2;
+	return !*f && !*p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @fmt:  The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns true if output was written, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The snprintf() will truncate, but tomoyo_io_printf() won't.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int len;
+	int pos = head->read_avail;
+	int size = head->readbuf_size - pos;
+
+	if (size <= 0)
+		return false;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size)
+		return false;
+	head->read_avail += len;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process.
+ *
+ * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	const char *cp = NULL;
+
+	if (!mm)
+		return NULL;
+	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+		if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
+			cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	return cp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_msg - Get warning message.
+ *
+ * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode?
+ *
+ * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING".
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce)
+{
+	if (is_enforce)
+		return "ERROR";
+	else
+		return "WARNING";
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @index:  The functionality to check mode.
+ *
+ * TOMOYO checks only process context.
+ * This code disables TOMOYO's enforcement in case the function is called from
+ * interrupt context.
+ */
+unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				const u8 index)
+{
+	const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(in_interrupt()))
+		return 0;
+	return tomoyo_policy_loaded && index < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX
+#if TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES != 256
+		&& profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES
+#endif
+		&& tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] ?
+		tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to
+ * console.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+{
+	return tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain)
+{
+	unsigned int count = 0;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+
+	if (!domain)
+		return true;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+			continue;
+		switch (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr)) {
+			struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl1;
+			struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl2;
+			u16 perm;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+			acl1 = container_of(ptr,
+				    struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+					    head);
+			perm = acl1->perm;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm &
+			    ((1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL) |
+			     (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+			acl2 = container_of(ptr,
+				    struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+					    head);
+			perm = acl2->perm;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL))
+				count++;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	if (count < tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY))
+		return true;
+	if (!domain->quota_warned) {
+		domain->quota_warned = true;
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: "
+		       "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. "
+		       "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name);
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile.
+ *
+ * @profile: Profile number to create.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
+								int profile)
+{
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
+		return NULL;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile];
+	if (ptr)
+		goto ok;
+	ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto ok;
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++)
+		ptr->value[i] = tomoyo_control_array[i].current_value;
+	mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+	tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
+ ok:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_profile - Write to profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int value;
+	char *cp;
+	struct tomoyo_profile *profile;
+	unsigned long num;
+
+	cp = strchr(data, '-');
+	if (cp)
+		*cp = '\0';
+	if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (cp)
+		data = cp + 1;
+	profile = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(num);
+	if (!profile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	cp = strchr(data, '=');
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp = '\0';
+	if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
+		profile->comment = tomoyo_save_name(cp + 1);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_control_array[i].keyword))
+			continue;
+		if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) {
+			int j;
+			const char **modes;
+			switch (i) {
+			case TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
+				modes = tomoyo_mode_2;
+				break;
+			default:
+				modes = tomoyo_mode_4;
+				break;
+			}
+			for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+				if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j]))
+					continue;
+				value = j;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (j == 4)
+				return -EINVAL;
+		} else if (value > tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value) {
+			value = tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value;
+		}
+		profile->value[i] = value;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_profile - Read from profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	static const int total = TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1;
+	int step;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	for (step = head->read_step; step < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total;
+	     step++) {
+		const u8 index = step / total;
+		u8 type = step % total;
+		const struct tomoyo_profile *profile
+			= tomoyo_profile_ptr[index];
+		head->read_step = step;
+		if (!profile)
+			continue;
+		if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */
+			if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n",
+					      index, profile->comment ?
+					      profile->comment->name : ""))
+				break;
+			continue;
+		}
+		type--;
+		if (type < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) {
+			const unsigned int value = profile->value[type];
+			const char **modes = NULL;
+			const char *keyword
+				= tomoyo_control_array[type].keyword;
+			switch (tomoyo_control_array[type].max_value) {
+			case 3:
+				modes = tomoyo_mode_4;
+				break;
+			case 1:
+				modes = tomoyo_mode_2;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (modes) {
+				if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index,
+						      keyword, modes[value]))
+					break;
+			} else {
+				if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index,
+						      keyword, value))
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (step == TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total)
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Structure for policy manager. */
+struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	/* A path to program or a domainname. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *manager;
+	bool is_domain;  /* True if manager is a domainname. */
+	bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
+};
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
+ *
+ * @manager:   The path to manager or the domainnamme.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
+				       const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *new_entry;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_manager;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	bool is_domain = false;
+
+	if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(manager)) {
+		if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(manager, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		is_domain = true;
+	} else {
+		if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	saved_manager = tomoyo_save_name(manager);
+	if (!saved_manager)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->manager = saved_manager;
+	new_entry->is_domain = is_domain;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_manager_policy - Write manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+	if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) {
+		tomoyo_manage_by_non_root = !is_delete;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_update_manager_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_manager_policy - Read manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+			     &tomoyo_policy_manager_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry,
+				 list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	head->read_eof = done;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
+ * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+	const char *exe;
+	const struct task_struct *task = current;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return true;
+	if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
+		return false;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
+		if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain
+		    && !tomoyo_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager)) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	if (found)
+		return true;
+	exe = tomoyo_get_exe();
+	if (!exe)
+		return false;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
+		if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain
+		    && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+	if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
+		static pid_t last_pid;
+		const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+		if (last_pid != pid) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to "
+			       "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe);
+			last_pid = pid;
+		}
+	}
+	tomoyo_free(exe);
+	return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_select_one - Parse select command.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				 const char *data)
+{
+	unsigned int pid;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
+		struct task_struct *p;
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		if (p)
+			domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+	} else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
+		if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data + 7)) {
+			down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+			domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data + 7);
+			up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+		}
+	} else
+		return false;
+	head->write_var1 = domain;
+	/* Accessing read_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */
+	if (!head->read_buf)
+		return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */
+	head->read_avail = 0;
+	tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
+	head->read_single_domain = true;
+	head->read_eof = !domain;
+	if (domain) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *d;
+		head->read_var1 = NULL;
+		down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry(d, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+			if (d == domain)
+				break;
+			head->read_var1 = &d->list;
+		}
+		up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+		head->read_var2 = NULL;
+		head->read_bit = 0;
+		head->read_step = 0;
+		if (domain->is_deleted)
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = head->write_var1;
+	bool is_delete = false;
+	bool is_select = false;
+	bool is_undelete = false;
+	unsigned int profile;
+
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE))
+		is_delete = true;
+	else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT))
+		is_select = true;
+	else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_UNDELETE))
+		is_undelete = true;
+	if (is_select && tomoyo_is_select_one(head, data))
+		return 0;
+	/* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+	if (!tomoyo_is_policy_manager())
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data)) {
+		domain = NULL;
+		if (is_delete)
+			tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
+		else if (is_select) {
+			down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+			domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data);
+			up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+		} else if (is_undelete)
+			domain = tomoyo_undelete_domain(data);
+		else
+			domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0);
+		head->write_var1 = domain;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u", &profile) == 1
+	    && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) {
+		if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+			domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!strcmp(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)) {
+		tomoyo_set_domain_flag(domain, is_delete,
+			       TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_single_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_single_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+					 struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *
+					 ptr)
+{
+	int pos;
+	u8 bit;
+	const char *atmark = "";
+	const char *filename;
+	const u16 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+	filename = ptr->filename->name;
+	for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION;
+	     bit++) {
+		const char *msg;
+		if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+			continue;
+		/* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
+		if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL ||
+		     bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)
+		    && (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+			continue;
+		msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(bit);
+		pos = head->read_avail;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
+				      atmark, filename))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	head->read_bit = 0;
+	return true;
+ out:
+	head->read_bit = bit;
+	head->read_avail = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_double_path_acl - Print a double path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_double_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+					 struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *
+					 ptr)
+{
+	int pos;
+	const char *atmark1 = "";
+	const char *atmark2 = "";
+	const char *filename1;
+	const char *filename2;
+	const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+	u8 bit;
+
+	filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
+	filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
+	for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION;
+	     bit++) {
+		const char *msg;
+		if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+			continue;
+		msg = tomoyo_dp2keyword(bit);
+		pos = head->read_avail;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
+				      atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	head->read_bit = 0;
+	return true;
+ out:
+	head->read_bit = bit;
+	head->read_avail = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_entry - Print an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_entry(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+			       struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const u8 acl_type = tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr);
+
+	if (acl_type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+		return true;
+	if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl
+			= container_of(ptr,
+				       struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+				       head);
+		return tomoyo_print_single_path_acl(head, acl);
+	}
+	if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) {
+		struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl
+			= container_of(ptr,
+				       struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+				       head);
+		return tomoyo_print_double_path_acl(head, acl);
+	}
+	BUG(); /* This must not happen. */
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_policy - Read domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *dpos;
+	struct list_head *apos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	if (head->read_step == 0)
+		head->read_step = 1;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+		const char *quota_exceeded = "";
+		const char *transition_failed = "";
+		const char *ignore_global_allow_read = "";
+		domain = list_entry(dpos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list);
+		if (head->read_step != 1)
+			goto acl_loop;
+		if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain)
+			continue;
+		/* Print domainname and flags. */
+		if (domain->quota_warned)
+			quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n";
+		if (domain->flags & TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED)
+			transition_failed = "transition_failed\n";
+		if (domain->flags &
+		    TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
+			ignore_global_allow_read
+				= TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+				      "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
+				      "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
+				      domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
+				      transition_failed,
+				      ignore_global_allow_read)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		head->read_step = 2;
+acl_loop:
+		if (head->read_step == 3)
+			goto tail_mark;
+		/* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
+		down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+		list_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
+				      &domain->acl_info_list) {
+			struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr
+				= list_entry(apos, struct tomoyo_acl_info,
+					      list);
+			if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr)) {
+				done = false;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+		if (!done)
+			break;
+		head->read_step = 3;
+tail_mark:
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		head->read_step = 1;
+		if (head->read_single_domain)
+			break;
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	head->read_eof = done;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_profile - Assign profile for specified domain.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ *     ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) |
+ *     /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	unsigned long profile;
+
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp = '\0';
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	domain = tomoyo_find_domain(cp + 1);
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (domain && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES
+	    && (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded))
+		domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_profile - Read only domainname and profile.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns list of profile number and domainname pairs.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ *     grep -A 1 '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy |
+ *     awk ' { if ( domainname == "" ) { if ( $1 == "<kernel>" )
+ *     domainname = $0; } else if ( $1 == "use_profile" ) {
+ *     print $2 " " domainname; domainname = ""; } } ; '
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+		domain = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list);
+		if (domain->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
+				      domain->domainname->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	head->read_eof = done;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	unsigned long pid;
+	/* No error check. */
+	strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid);
+	head->read_step = (int) pid;
+	head->read_eof = false;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success,
+ * empty string otherwise.
+ * The PID is specified by tomoyo_write_pid() so that the user can obtain
+ * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) {
+		const int pid = head->read_step;
+		struct task_struct *p;
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		if (p)
+			domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+		if (domain)
+			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
+					 domain->domainname->name);
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_exception_policy - Write exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+		return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false,
+							 is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+		return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+		return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false,
+							      is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+		return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true,
+							      is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS))
+		return tomoyo_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ))
+		return tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN))
+		return tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
+		return tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_exception_policy - Read exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		switch (head->read_step) {
+		case 0:
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 1;
+		case 1:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 2;
+		case 2:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 3;
+		case 3:
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 4;
+		case 4:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 5;
+		case 5:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_alias_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 6;
+		case 6:
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 7;
+		case 7:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_file_pattern(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 8;
+		case 8:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 9;
+		case 9:
+			head->read_eof = true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* path to policy loader */
+static const char *tomoyo_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
+ *
+ * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
+	 * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
+	 * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
+	 * policies are not loaded yet.
+	 * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+	 */
+	struct nameidata nd;
+
+	if (path_lookup(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
+		       "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tomoyo_loader);
+		return false;
+	}
+	path_put(&nd.path);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
+ *
+ * @filename: The program about to start.
+ *
+ * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
+ * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
+ * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
+ * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename)
+{
+	char *argv[2];
+	char *envp[3];
+
+	if (tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
+	 * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
+	 * be passed.
+	 * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
+	 * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
+	    strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
+		return;
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists())
+		return;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
+	       tomoyo_loader);
+	argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader;
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	envp[0] = "HOME=/";
+	envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+	envp[2] = NULL;
+	call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01\n");
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
+	tomoyo_policy_loaded = true;
+	{ /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+		down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+			const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+			if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile])
+				continue;
+			panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
+			      profile, domain->domainname->name);
+		}
+		up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_version: Get version.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns version information.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "2.2.0-pre");
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_self_domain - Get the current process's domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the current process's domainname.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		/*
+		 * tomoyo_domain()->domainname != NULL
+		 * because every process belongs to a domain and
+		 * the domain's name cannot be NULL.
+		 */
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", tomoyo_domain()->domainname->name);
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of interface.
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Associates policy handler and returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*head));
+
+	if (!head)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	mutex_init(&head->io_sem);
+	switch (type) {
+	case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_policy;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_policy;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_exception_policy;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_exception_policy;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_self_domain;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_profile;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_profile;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_pid;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_pid;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_VERSION:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_version;
+		head->readbuf_size = 128;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_MEMINFO:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_memory_quota;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_memory_counter;
+		head->readbuf_size = 512;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_PROFILE:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_profile;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_profile;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_MANAGER:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */
+		head->write = tomoyo_write_manager_policy;
+		head->read = tomoyo_read_manager_policy;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened
+		 * for reading.
+		 */
+		head->read = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (!head->readbuf_size)
+			head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+		head->read_buf = tomoyo_alloc(head->readbuf_size);
+		if (!head->read_buf) {
+			tomoyo_free(head);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened
+		 * for writing.
+		 */
+		head->write = NULL;
+	} else if (head->write) {
+		head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+		head->write_buf = tomoyo_alloc(head->writebuf_size);
+		if (!head->write_buf) {
+			tomoyo_free(head->read_buf);
+			tomoyo_free(head);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	file->private_data = head;
+	/*
+	 * Call the handler now if the file is
+	 * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
+	 * so that the user can use
+	 * cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain"
+	 * to know the current process's domainname.
+	 */
+	if (type == TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN)
+		tomoyo_read_control(file, NULL, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:       Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer:     Poiner to buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+			       const int buffer_len)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+	char *cp;
+
+	if (!head->read)
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+		return -EINTR;
+	/* Call the policy handler. */
+	len = head->read(head);
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Write to buffer. */
+	len = head->read_avail;
+	if (len > buffer_len)
+		len = buffer_len;
+	if (!len)
+		goto out;
+	/* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */
+	cp = head->read_buf;
+	if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) {
+		len = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	head->read_avail -= len;
+	memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail);
+ out:
+	mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:       Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer:     Pointer to buffer to read from.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+				const int buffer_len)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+	int error = buffer_len;
+	int avail_len = buffer_len;
+	char *cp0 = head->write_buf;
+
+	if (!head->write)
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	/* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+	if (head->write != tomoyo_write_pid &&
+	    head->write != tomoyo_write_domain_policy &&
+	    !tomoyo_is_policy_manager())
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+		return -EINTR;
+	/* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */
+	while (avail_len > 0) {
+		char c;
+		if (head->write_avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		} else if (get_user(c, buffer)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+		buffer++;
+		avail_len--;
+		cp0[head->write_avail++] = c;
+		if (c != '\n')
+			continue;
+		cp0[head->write_avail - 1] = '\0';
+		head->write_avail = 0;
+		tomoyo_normalize_line(cp0);
+		head->write(head);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Releases memory and returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+
+	/* Release memory used for policy I/O. */
+	tomoyo_free(head->read_buf);
+	head->read_buf = NULL;
+	tomoyo_free(head->write_buf);
+	head->write_buf = NULL;
+	tomoyo_free(head);
+	head = NULL;
+	file->private_data = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alloc_acl_element - Allocate permanent memory for ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @acl_type:  Type of ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the ACL entry on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type)
+{
+	int len;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+
+	switch (acl_type) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+		len = sizeof(struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record);
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+		len = sizeof(struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(len);
+	if (!ptr)
+		return NULL;
+	ptr->type = acl_type;
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
+		- ((u8 *) NULL);
+	return tomoyo_open_control(key, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return tomoyo_close_control(file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+			   loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tomoyo_read_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = {
+	.open    = tomoyo_open,
+	.release = tomoyo_release,
+	.read    = tomoyo_read,
+	.write   = tomoyo_write,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
+ *
+ * @name:   The name of the interface file.
+ * @mode:   The permission of the interface file.
+ * @parent: The parent directory.
+ * @key:    Type of interface.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode,
+				       struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
+{
+	securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
+			       &tomoyo_operations);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;
+
+	/* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
+	if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+		return 0;
+
+	tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy",    0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("self_domain",      0400, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN);
+	tomoyo_create_entry(".domain_status",   0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS);
+	tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status",  0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("meminfo",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_MEMINFO);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("profile",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_PROFILE);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("manager",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_MANAGER);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("version",          0400, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_VERSION);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(tomoyo_initerface_init);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..26a76d67aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.h
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+
+struct dentry;
+struct vfsmount;
+
+/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
+struct tomoyo_page_buffer {
+	char buffer[4096];
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a token. */
+struct tomoyo_path_info {
+	const char *name;
+	u32 hash;          /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
+	u16 total_len;     /* = strlen(name)                       */
+	u16 const_len;     /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name)     */
+	bool is_dir;       /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/")      */
+	bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */
+	u16 depth;         /* = tomoyo_path_depth(name)            */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the max length of a token.
+ *
+ * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters.
+ * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style
+ * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
+
+/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
+struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
+	/* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tomoyo_free(). */
+	struct tomoyo_path_info head;
+	char barrier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+	char body[TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN];
+	char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Common header for holding ACL entries.
+ *
+ * Packing "struct tomoyo_acl_info" allows
+ * "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" to embed "u16" and
+ * "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record" to embed "u8"
+ * without enlarging their structure size.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_acl_info {
+	struct list_head list;
+	/*
+	 * Type of this ACL entry.
+	 *
+	 * MSB is is_deleted flag.
+	 */
+	u8 type;
+} __packed;
+
+/* This ACL entry is deleted.           */
+#define TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED        0x80
+
+/* Structure for domain information. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct list_head acl_info_list;
+	/* Name of this domain. Never NULL.          */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+	u8 profile;        /* Profile number to use. */
+	u8 is_deleted;     /* Delete flag.
+			      0 = active.
+			      1 = deleted but undeletable.
+			      255 = deleted and no longer undeletable. */
+	bool quota_warned; /* Quota warnning flag.   */
+	/* DOMAIN_FLAGS_*. Use tomoyo_set_domain_flag() to modify. */
+	u8 flags;
+};
+
+/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES 256
+
+/* Ignore "allow_read" directive in exception policy. */
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ 1
+/*
+ * This domain was unable to create a new domain at tomoyo_find_next_domain()
+ * because the name of the domain to be created was too long or
+ * it could not allocate memory.
+ * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED        2
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
+ * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
+	u16 perm;
+	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
+	u8 perm;
+	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1;
+	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2;
+};
+
+/* Keywords for ACLs. */
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS                     "alias "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ                "allow_read "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE                    "delete "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE              "deny_rewrite "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN              "file_pattern "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN         "initialize_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN               "keep_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN      "no_initialize_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN            "no_keep_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT                    "select "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_UNDELETE                  "undelete "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE               "use_profile "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ  "ignore_global_allow_read"
+/* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */
+#define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME                         "<kernel>"
+#define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN                     (sizeof(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) - 1)
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+#define TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE                  0  /* domain_policy.conf */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY              1
+#define TOMOYO_VERBOSE                       2
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX             3
+
+/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
+struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
+	int (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
+	int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
+	/* Exclusive lock for this structure.   */
+	struct mutex io_sem;
+	/* The position currently reading from. */
+	struct list_head *read_var1;
+	/* Extra variables for reading.         */
+	struct list_head *read_var2;
+	/* The position currently writing to.   */
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *write_var1;
+	/* The step for reading.                */
+	int read_step;
+	/* Buffer for reading.                  */
+	char *read_buf;
+	/* EOF flag for reading.                */
+	bool read_eof;
+	/* Read domain ACL of specified PID?    */
+	bool read_single_domain;
+	/* Extra variable for reading.          */
+	u8 read_bit;
+	/* Bytes available for reading.         */
+	int read_avail;
+	/* Size of read buffer.                 */
+	int readbuf_size;
+	/* Buffer for writing.                  */
+	char *write_buf;
+	/* Bytes available for writing.         */
+	int write_avail;
+	/* Size of write buffer.                */
+	int writebuf_size;
+};
+
+/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain);
+/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
+bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+	__attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+/* Check whether the domainname is correct. */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+			      const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token is correct. */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+			    const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+			    const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
+bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern);
+/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/*
+ * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
+bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
+/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tomoyo_dp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */
+const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
+/* Get warning message. */
+const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
+/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Delete a domain. */
+int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data);
+/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+					   const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+				      const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write",
+ * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and
+ * "allow_link" entry in domain policy.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			     const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Find a domain by the given name. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
+							    domainname,
+							    const u8 profile);
+/* Undelete a domain. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_undelete_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Check mode for specified functionality. */
+unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				const u8 index);
+/* Allocate memory for structures. */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type);
+/* Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members. */
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr);
+/* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename);
+/* Change "struct tomoyo_domain_info"->flags. */
+void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			    const bool is_delete, const u8 flags);
+
+/* strcmp() for "struct tomoyo_path_info" structure. */
+static inline bool tomoyo_pathcmp(const struct tomoyo_path_info *a,
+				  const struct tomoyo_path_info *b)
+{
+	return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_acl_type1(struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	return ptr->type & ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_acl_type2(struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	return ptr->type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_valid - Check whether the character is a valid char.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a valid character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_valid(const unsigned char c)
+{
+	return c > ' ' && c < 127;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_invalid - Check whether the character is an invalid char.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an invalid character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_invalid(const unsigned char c)
+{
+	return c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127);
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list;
+extern struct rw_semaphore tomoyo_domain_list_lock;
+
+/* Lock for domain->acl_info_list. */
+extern struct rw_semaphore tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock;
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+
+/* The kernel's domain. */
+extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+/**
+ * list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie.
+ * @pos:        the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor.
+ * @cookie:     the &struct list_head to use as a cookie.
+ * @head:       the head for your list.
+ *
+ * Same with list_for_each() except that this primitive uses @cookie
+ * so that we can continue iteration.
+ * @cookie must be NULL when iteration starts, and @cookie will become
+ * NULL when iteration finishes.
+ */
+#define list_for_each_cookie(pos, cookie, head)                       \
+	for (({ if (!cookie)                                          \
+				     cookie = head; }),               \
+	     pos = (cookie)->next;                                    \
+	     prefetch(pos->next), pos != (head) || ((cookie) = NULL); \
+	     (cookie) = pos, pos = pos->next)
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..093a756030b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,878 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/domain.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+
+/* Variables definitions.*/
+
+/* The initial domain. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list);
+DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+
+/* Structure for "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;    /* This may be NULL */
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *program;
+	bool is_deleted;
+	bool is_not;       /* True if this entry is "no_initialize_domain".  */
+	/* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */
+	bool is_last_name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *program;       /* This may be NULL */
+	bool is_deleted;
+	bool is_not;       /* True if this entry is "no_keep_domain".        */
+	/* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */
+	bool is_last_name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "alias" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_alias_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *aliased_name;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_domain_flag - Set or clear domain's attribute flags.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ * @flags:     Flags to set or clear.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			    const bool is_delete, const u8 flags)
+{
+	/* We need to serialize because this is bitfield operation. */
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+	spin_lock(&lock);
+	if (!is_delete)
+		domain->flags |= flags;
+	else
+		domain->flags &= ~flags;
+	spin_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_last_name - Get last component of a domainname.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns the last component of the domainname.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+{
+	const char *cp0 = domain->domainname->name;
+	const char *cp1 = strrchr(cp0, ' ');
+
+	if (cp1)
+		return cp1 + 1;
+	return cp0;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain. May be NULL.
+ * @program:    The name of program.
+ * @is_not:     True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete:  True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
+						  const char *program,
+						  const bool is_not,
+						  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *new_entry;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	bool is_last_name = false;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
+	if (domainname) {
+		if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
+		    tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+			is_last_name = true;
+		else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
+		if (!saved_domainname)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program);
+	if (!saved_program)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
+		    ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
+		    ptr->program != saved_program)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
+	new_entry->program = saved_program;
+	new_entry->is_not = is_not;
+	new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+			     &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list) {
+		const char *no;
+		const char *from = "";
+		const char *domain = "";
+		struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry,
+				  list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : "";
+		if (ptr->domainname) {
+			from = " from ";
+			domain = ptr->domainname->name;
+		}
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+				      "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN
+				      "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name, from,
+				      domain)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+	return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_not:    True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+					   const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *cp = strstr(data, " from ");
+
+	if (cp) {
+		*cp = '\0';
+		return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(cp + 6, data,
+							      is_not,
+							      is_delete);
+	}
+	return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, data, is_not,
+						      is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_domain_initializer - Check whether the given program causes domainname reinitialization.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program:    The name of program.
+ * @last_name:  The last component of @domainname.
+ *
+ * Returns true if executing @program reinitializes domain transition,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+					 domainname,
+					 const struct tomoyo_path_info *program,
+					 const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+					 last_name)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+	bool flag = false;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr,  &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->domainname) {
+			if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+				if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+					continue;
+			} else {
+				if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name))
+					continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->is_not) {
+			flag = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		flag = true;
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+	return flag;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program:    The name of program. May be NULL.
+ * @is_not:     True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete:  True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
+					     const char *program,
+					     const bool is_not,
+					     const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *new_entry;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	bool is_last_name = false;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
+	    tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+		is_last_name = true;
+	else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (program) {
+		if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program);
+		if (!saved_program)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
+	if (!saved_domainname)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
+		    ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
+		    ptr->program != saved_program)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
+	new_entry->program = saved_program;
+	new_entry->is_not = is_not;
+	new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_not:    True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+				      const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *cp = strstr(data, " from ");
+
+	if (cp) {
+		*cp = '\0';
+		return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(cp + 6, data, is_not,
+							 is_delete);
+	}
+	return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(data, NULL, is_not, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+			     &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+		const char *no;
+		const char *from = "";
+		const char *program = "";
+
+		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : "";
+		if (ptr->program) {
+			from = " from ";
+			program = ptr->program->name;
+		}
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+				      "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN
+				      "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from,
+				      ptr->domainname->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+	return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_domain_keeper - Check whether the given program causes domain transition suppression.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program:    The name of program.
+ * @last_name:  The last component of @domainname.
+ *
+ * Returns true if executing @program supresses domain transition,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname,
+				    const struct tomoyo_path_info *program,
+				    const struct tomoyo_path_info *last_name)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+	bool flag = false;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+			if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name))
+				continue;
+		}
+		if (ptr->program && tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->is_not) {
+			flag = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		flag = true;
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+	return flag;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_alias_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_alias_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_alias_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @original_name: The original program's real name.
+ * @aliased_name:  The symbolic program's symbolic link's name.
+ * @is_delete:     True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
+				     const char *aliased_name,
+				     const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_alias_entry *new_entry;
+	struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_original_name;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_aliased_name;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__) ||
+	    !tomoyo_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
+	saved_original_name = tomoyo_save_name(original_name);
+	saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_save_name(aliased_name);
+	if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
+		    ptr->aliased_name != saved_aliased_name)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->original_name = saved_original_name;
+	new_entry->aliased_name = saved_aliased_name;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_alias_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_alias_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+
+		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_alias_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
+				      ptr->original_name->name,
+				      ptr->aliased_name->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+	return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_alias_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
+}
+
+/* Domain create/delete/undelete handler. */
+
+/* #define TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE */
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "tomoyo_delete_domain %s\n", domainname);
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted);
+	}
+#endif
+	/* Is there an active domain? */
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain2;
+		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+		if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+			continue;
+		if (domain->is_deleted ||
+		    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		/* Mark already deleted domains as non undeletable. */
+		list_for_each_entry(domain2, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+			if (!domain2->is_deleted ||
+			    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain2->domainname, &name))
+				continue;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+			if (domain2->is_deleted != 255)
+				printk(KERN_DEBUG
+				       "Marked %p as non undeletable\n",
+				       domain2);
+#endif
+			domain2->is_deleted = 255;
+		}
+		/* Delete and mark active domain as undeletable. */
+		domain->is_deleted = 1;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "Marked %p as undeletable\n", domain);
+#endif
+		break;
+	}
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_undelete_domain - Undelete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_undelete_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *candidate_domain = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "tomoyo_undelete_domain %s\n", domainname);
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted);
+	}
+#endif
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+			continue;
+		if (!domain->is_deleted) {
+			/* This domain is active. I can't undelete. */
+			candidate_domain = NULL;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p is active. I can't undelete.\n",
+			       domain);
+#endif
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Is this domain undeletable? */
+		if (domain->is_deleted == 1)
+			candidate_domain = domain;
+	}
+	if (candidate_domain) {
+		candidate_domain->is_deleted = 0;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p was undeleted.\n", candidate_domain);
+#endif
+	}
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return candidate_domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @profile:    Profile number to assign if the domain was newly created.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
+							    domainname,
+							    const u8 profile)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
+
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	domain = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname);
+	if (domain)
+		goto out;
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+		goto out;
+	saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
+	if (!saved_domainname)
+		goto out;
+	/* Can I reuse memory of deleted domain? */
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		struct task_struct *p;
+		struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+		bool flag;
+		if (!domain->is_deleted ||
+		    domain->domainname != saved_domainname)
+			continue;
+		flag = false;
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		for_each_process(p) {
+			if (tomoyo_real_domain(p) != domain)
+				continue;
+			flag = true;
+			break;
+		}
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+		if (flag)
+			continue;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "Reusing %p %s\n", domain,
+		       domain->domainname->name);
+#endif
+		list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+			ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+		}
+		tomoyo_set_domain_flag(domain, true, domain->flags);
+		domain->profile = profile;
+		domain->quota_warned = false;
+		mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+		domain->is_deleted = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* No memory reusable. Create using new memory. */
+	domain = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*domain));
+	if (domain) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->acl_info_list);
+		domain->domainname = saved_domainname;
+		domain->profile = profile;
+		list_add_tail(&domain->list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+	}
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
+ *
+ * @bprm:           Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ * @next_domain:    Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			    struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
+	 * tomoyo_realpath() = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN.
+	 */
+	struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*tmp));
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+	const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name;
+	const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
+	char *new_domain_name = NULL;
+	char *real_program_name = NULL;
+	char *symlink_program_name = NULL;
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(old_domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	int retval = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info r; /* real name */
+	struct tomoyo_path_info s; /* symlink name */
+	struct tomoyo_path_info l; /* last name */
+	static bool initialized;
+
+	if (!tmp)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!initialized) {
+		/*
+		 * Built-in initializers. This is needed because policies are
+		 * not loaded until starting /sbin/init.
+		 */
+		tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/hotplug",
+						       false, false);
+		tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/modprobe",
+						       false, false);
+		initialized = true;
+	}
+
+	/* Get tomoyo_realpath of program. */
+	retval = -ENOENT;
+	/* I hope tomoyo_realpath() won't fail with -ENOMEM. */
+	real_program_name = tomoyo_realpath(original_name);
+	if (!real_program_name)
+		goto out;
+	/* Get tomoyo_realpath of symbolic link. */
+	symlink_program_name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name);
+	if (!symlink_program_name)
+		goto out;
+
+	r.name = real_program_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r);
+	s.name = symlink_program_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&s);
+	l.name = tomoyo_get_last_name(old_domain);
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&l);
+
+	/* Check 'alias' directive. */
+	if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, &s)) {
+		struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+		/* Is this program allowed to be called via symbolic links? */
+		down_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
+			if (ptr->is_deleted ||
+			    tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, ptr->original_name) ||
+			    tomoyo_pathcmp(&s, ptr->aliased_name))
+				continue;
+			memset(real_program_name, 0, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN);
+			strncpy(real_program_name, ptr->aliased_name->name,
+				TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
+			tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r);
+			break;
+		}
+		up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+	}
+
+	/* Check execute permission. */
+	retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r, tmp);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	new_domain_name = tmp->buffer;
+	if (tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) {
+		/* Transit to the child of tomoyo_kernel_domain domain. */
+		snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1,
+			 TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME " " "%s", real_program_name);
+	} else if (old_domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain &&
+		   !tomoyo_policy_loaded) {
+		/*
+		 * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before starting
+		 * /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain if executing
+		 * initializers because they might start before /sbin/init.
+		 */
+		domain = old_domain;
+	} else if (tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) {
+		/* Keep current domain. */
+		domain = old_domain;
+	} else {
+		/* Normal domain transition. */
+		snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1,
+			 "%s %s", old_domain_name, real_program_name);
+	}
+	if (domain || strlen(new_domain_name) >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN)
+		goto done;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	domain = tomoyo_find_domain(new_domain_name);
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	if (domain)
+		goto done;
+	if (is_enforce)
+		goto done;
+	domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(new_domain_name,
+						  old_domain->profile);
+ done:
+	if (domain)
+		goto out;
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n",
+	       new_domain_name);
+	if (is_enforce)
+		retval = -EPERM;
+	else
+		tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
+				       TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_free(real_program_name);
+	tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name);
+	*next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
+	tomoyo_free(tmp);
+	return retval;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..65f50c1c5ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1241 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/file.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+
+/* Structure for "allow_read" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "file_pattern" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_pattern_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "deny_rewrite" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Keyword array for single path operations. */
+static const char *tomoyo_sp_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL] = "read/write",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL]    = "execute",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL]       = "read",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL]      = "write",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL]     = "create",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL]     = "unlink",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL]      = "mkdir",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL]      = "rmdir",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL]     = "mkfifo",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL]     = "mksock",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL]    = "mkblock",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL]     = "mkchar",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL]   = "truncate",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL]    = "symlink",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL]    = "rewrite",
+};
+
+/* Keyword array for double path operations. */
+static const char *tomoyo_dp_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL]    = "link",
+	[TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL]  = "rename",
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sp2keyword - Get the name of single path operation.
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of single path operation.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation)
+{
+	return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION)
+		? tomoyo_sp_keyword[operation] : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_dp2keyword - Get the name of double path operation.
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of double path operation.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_dp2keyword(const u8 operation)
+{
+	return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION)
+		? tomoyo_dp_keyword[operation] : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_strendswith - Check whether the token ends with the given token.
+ *
+ * @name: The token to check.
+ * @tail: The token to find.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @name ends with @tail, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_strendswith(const char *name, const char *tail)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	if (!name || !tail)
+		return false;
+	len = strlen(name) - strlen(tail);
+	return len >= 0 && !strcmp(name + len, tail);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_path - Get realpath.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_path(struct path *path)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data *buf = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*buf));
+
+	if (!buf)
+		return NULL;
+	/* Reserve one byte for appending "/". */
+	error = tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf->body,
+					   sizeof(buf->body) - 2);
+	if (!error) {
+		buf->head.name = buf->body;
+		tomoyo_fill_path_info(&buf->head);
+		return &buf->head;
+	}
+	tomoyo_free(buf);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Lock for domain->acl_info_list. */
+DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+
+static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
+					 const char *filename2,
+					 struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+					 const domain, const bool is_delete);
+static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
+					 struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+					 const domain, const bool is_delete);
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @filename:  Filename unconditionally permitted to open() for reading.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
+						 const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *new_entry;
+	struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
+	if (!saved_filename)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->filename = saved_filename;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file - Check if the file is unconditionnaly permitted to be open()ed for reading.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if any domain can open @filename for reading, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+					     filename)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+	bool found = false;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
+		if (!ptr->is_deleted &&
+		    tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->filename)) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+	return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	return tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+			     &tomoyo_globally_readable_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list_entry(pos,
+				 struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry,
+				 list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
+				      ptr->filename->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+	return done;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @pattern:   Pathname pattern.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
+					    const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *new_entry;
+	struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 1, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
+	if (!saved_pattern)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
+		if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_file_pattern - Get patterned pathname.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to find patterned pathname.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to pathname pattern if matched, @filename otherwise.
+ */
+static const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+tomoyo_get_file_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern = NULL;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern))
+			continue;
+		pattern = ptr->pattern;
+		if (tomoyo_strendswith(pattern->name, "/\\*")) {
+			/* Do nothing. Try to find the better match. */
+		} else {
+			/* This would be the better match. Use this. */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+	if (pattern)
+		filename = pattern;
+	return filename;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_pattern_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	return tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_file_pattern - Read "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_pattern_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_pattern_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "%s\n",
+				      ptr->pattern->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+	return done;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @pattern:   Pathname pattern that are not rewritable by default.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
+					  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *new_entry, *ptr;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
+	if (!saved_pattern)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
+	list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
+	error = 0;
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file - Check if the given pathname is not permitted to be rewrited.
+ *
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" directive,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern))
+			continue;
+		found = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+	return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	return tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	bool done = true;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "%s\n",
+				      ptr->pattern->name)) {
+			done = false;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+	return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_file_acl - Update file's read/write/execute ACL.
+ *
+ * @filename:  Filename.
+ * @perm:      Permission (between 1 to 7).
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is legacy support interface for older policy syntax.
+ * Current policy syntax uses "allow_read/write" instead of "6",
+ * "allow_read" instead of "4", "allow_write" instead of "2",
+ * "allow_execute" instead of "1".
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_file_acl(const char *filename, u8 perm,
+				  struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain,
+				  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	if (perm > 7 || !perm) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid permission '%d %s'\n",
+		       __func__, perm, filename);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (filename[0] != '@' && tomoyo_strendswith(filename, "/"))
+		/*
+		 * Only 'allow_mkdir' and 'allow_rmdir' are valid for
+		 * directory permissions.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	if (perm & 4)
+		tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL, filename,
+					      domain, is_delete);
+	if (perm & 2)
+		tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL, filename,
+					      domain, is_delete);
+	if (perm & 1)
+		tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL,
+					      filename, domain, is_delete);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2 - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:          Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename:        Filename to check.
+ * @perm:            Permission.
+ * @may_use_pattern: True if patterned ACL is permitted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+					 domain,
+					 const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+					 filename,
+					 const u16 perm,
+					 const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+	int error = -EPERM;
+
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl;
+		if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+				   head);
+		if (!(acl->perm & perm))
+			continue;
+		if (may_use_pattern || !acl->filename->is_patterned) {
+			if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename,
+							 acl->filename))
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			continue;
+		}
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_file_acl - Check permission for opening files.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @operation: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute").
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_file_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				 const u8 operation)
+{
+	u16 perm = 0;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+		return 0;
+	if (operation == 6)
+		perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL;
+	else if (operation == 4)
+		perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL;
+	else if (operation == 2)
+		perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL;
+	else if (operation == 1)
+		perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL;
+	else
+		BUG();
+	return tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, perm,
+					     operation != 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_file_perm2 - Check permission for opening files.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @perm:      Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute").
+ * @operation: Operation name passed used for verbose mode.
+ * @mode:      Access control mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_file_perm2(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain,
+				   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				   const u8 perm, const char *operation,
+				   const u8 mode)
+{
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	const char *msg = "<unknown>";
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return 0;
+	error = tomoyo_check_file_acl(domain, filename, perm);
+	if (error && perm == 4 &&
+	    (domain->flags & TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ) == 0
+	    && tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(filename))
+		error = 0;
+	if (perm == 6)
+		msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL);
+	else if (perm == 4)
+		msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL);
+	else if (perm == 2)
+		msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL);
+	else if (perm == 1)
+		msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL);
+	else
+		BUG();
+	if (!error)
+		return 0;
+	if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain))
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s(%s) %s' denied "
+		       "for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, operation,
+		       filename->name, tomoyo_get_last_name(domain));
+	if (is_enforce)
+		return error;
+	if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) {
+		/* Don't use patterns for execute permission. */
+		const struct tomoyo_path_info *patterned_file = (perm != 1) ?
+			tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename) : filename;
+		tomoyo_update_file_acl(patterned_file->name, perm,
+				       domain, false);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_file_policy - Update file related list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			     const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *filename = strchr(data, ' ');
+	char *filename2;
+	unsigned int perm;
+	u8 type;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*filename++ = '\0';
+	if (sscanf(data, "%u", &perm) == 1)
+		return tomoyo_update_file_acl(filename, (u8) perm, domain,
+					      is_delete);
+	if (strncmp(data, "allow_", 6))
+		goto out;
+	data += 6;
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) {
+		if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_sp_keyword[type]))
+			continue;
+		return tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(type, filename,
+						     domain, is_delete);
+	}
+	filename2 = strchr(filename, ' ');
+	if (!filename2)
+		goto out;
+	*filename2++ = '\0';
+	for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) {
+		if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_dp_keyword[type]))
+			continue;
+		return tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(type, filename, filename2,
+						     domain, is_delete);
+	}
+ out:
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_single_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" list.
+ *
+ * @type:      Type of operation.
+ * @filename:  Filename.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
+					 struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+					 const domain, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	static const u16 rw_mask =
+		(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL);
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+	struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const u16 perm = 1 << type;
+
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
+	if (!saved_filename)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	if (is_delete)
+		goto delete;
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_acl_type1(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+				   head);
+		if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+			continue;
+		/* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */
+		if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+			acl->perm = 0;
+		acl->perm |= perm;
+		if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) == rw_mask)
+			acl->perm |= 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL;
+		else if (acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))
+			acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+		ptr->type &= ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Not found. Append it to the tail. */
+	acl = tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL);
+	if (!acl)
+		goto out;
+	acl->perm = perm;
+	if (perm == (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))
+		acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+	acl->filename = saved_filename;
+	list_add_tail(&acl->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
+	error = 0;
+	goto out;
+ delete:
+	error = -ENOENT;
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+				   head);
+		if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+			continue;
+		acl->perm &= ~perm;
+		if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) != rw_mask)
+			acl->perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL);
+		else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+			acl->perm &= ~rw_mask;
+		if (!acl->perm)
+			ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_double_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record" list.
+ *
+ * @type:      Type of operation.
+ * @filename1: First filename.
+ * @filename2: Second filename.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
+					 const char *filename2,
+					 struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+					 const domain, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename1;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename2;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+	struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename1, 0, 0, 0, __func__) ||
+	    !tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename2, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_filename1 = tomoyo_save_name(filename1);
+	saved_filename2 = tomoyo_save_name(filename2);
+	if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	if (is_delete)
+		goto delete;
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_acl_type1(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+				   head);
+		if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
+		    acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+			continue;
+		/* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */
+		if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+			acl->perm = 0;
+		acl->perm |= perm;
+		ptr->type &= ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Not found. Append it to the tail. */
+	acl = tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL);
+	if (!acl)
+		goto out;
+	acl->perm = perm;
+	acl->filename1 = saved_filename1;
+	acl->filename2 = saved_filename2;
+	list_add_tail(&acl->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
+	error = 0;
+	goto out;
+ delete:
+	error = -ENOENT;
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+				   head);
+		if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
+		    acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+			continue;
+		acl->perm &= ~perm;
+		if (!acl->perm)
+			ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+ out:
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_single_path_acl - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @type:     Type of operation.
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_single_path_acl(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+					const u8 type,
+					const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+	if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+		return 0;
+	return tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, 1 << type, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_double_path_acl - Check permission for double path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @type:      Type of operation.
+ * @filename1: First filename to check.
+ * @filename2: Second filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_double_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+					const u8 type,
+					const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+					filename1,
+					const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+					filename2)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+	const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+	int error = -EPERM;
+
+	if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+		return 0;
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl;
+		if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+				   head);
+		if (!(acl->perm & perm))
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename1, acl->filename1))
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename2, acl->filename2))
+			continue;
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2 - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @mode:      Access control mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+						const domain, u8 operation,
+						const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+						filename, const u8 mode)
+{
+	const char *msg;
+	int error;
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+	if (!mode)
+		return 0;
+ next:
+	error = tomoyo_check_single_path_acl(domain, operation, filename);
+	msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(operation);
+	if (!error)
+		goto ok;
+	if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain))
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s' denied for %s\n",
+		       tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, filename->name,
+		       tomoyo_get_last_name(domain));
+	if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) {
+		const char *name = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename)->name;
+		tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(operation, name, domain, false);
+	}
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+ ok:
+	/*
+	 * Since "allow_truncate" doesn't imply "allow_rewrite" permission,
+	 * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission if the filename is
+	 * specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword.
+	 */
+	if (!error && operation == TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL &&
+	    tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(filename)) {
+		operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL;
+		goto next;
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_file_perm - Check permission for sysctl()'s "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @perm:      Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write").
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			   const char *filename, const u8 perm)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+
+	if (!mode)
+		return 0;
+	name.name = filename;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, &name, perm, "sysctl", mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_exec_perm - Check permission for "execute".
+ *
+ * @domain:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename: Check permission for "execute".
+ * @tmp:      Buffer for temporary use.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+			   struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp)
+{
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+
+	if (!mode)
+		return 0;
+	return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, filename, 1, "do_execve", mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_open_permission - Check permission for "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @path:   Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @flag:   Flags for open().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				 struct path *path, const int flag)
+{
+	const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info *buf;
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+	if (!mode || !path->mnt)
+		return 0;
+	if (acc_mode == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (path->dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+		/*
+		 * I don't check directories here because mkdir() and rmdir()
+		 * don't call me.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	buf = tomoyo_get_path(path);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	error = 0;
+	/*
+	 * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword,
+	 * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not
+	 * opened for append mode or the filename is truncated at open time.
+	 */
+	if ((acc_mode & MAY_WRITE) &&
+	    ((flag & O_TRUNC) || !(flag & O_APPEND)) &&
+	    (tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf))) {
+		error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+						     TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL,
+							     buf, mode);
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		error = tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, buf, acc_mode, "open",
+						mode);
+	if (!error && (flag & O_TRUNC))
+		error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+						     TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+							     buf, mode);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_free(buf);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_1path_perm - Check permission for "create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate" and "symlink".
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			    const u8 operation, struct path *path)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info *buf;
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+	if (!mode || !path->mnt)
+		return 0;
+	buf = tomoyo_get_path(path);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	switch (operation) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL:
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL:
+		if (!buf->is_dir) {
+			/*
+			 * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/."
+			 */
+			strcat((char *) buf->name, "/");
+			tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf);
+		}
+	}
+	error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain, operation, buf,
+						     mode);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_free(buf);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission - Check permission for "rewrite".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filp: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				    struct file *filp)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	struct tomoyo_path_info *buf;
+
+	if (!mode || !filp->f_path.mnt)
+		return 0;
+	buf = tomoyo_get_path(&filp->f_path);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	if (!tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf)) {
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+						     TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL,
+						     buf, mode);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_free(buf);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_2path_perm - Check permission for "rename" and "link".
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path1:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @path2:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain,
+			    const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
+			    struct path *path2)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info *buf1, *buf2;
+	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	const char *msg;
+
+	if (!mode || !path1->mnt || !path2->mnt)
+		return 0;
+	buf1 = tomoyo_get_path(path1);
+	buf2 = tomoyo_get_path(path2);
+	if (!buf1 || !buf2)
+		goto out;
+	{
+		struct dentry *dentry = path1->dentry;
+		if (dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+			/*
+			 * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/."
+			 */
+			if (!buf1->is_dir) {
+				strcat((char *) buf1->name, "/");
+				tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf1);
+			}
+			if (!buf2->is_dir) {
+				strcat((char *) buf2->name, "/");
+				tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf2);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	error = tomoyo_check_double_path_acl(domain, operation, buf1, buf2);
+	msg = tomoyo_dp2keyword(operation);
+	if (!error)
+		goto out;
+	if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain))
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s %s' "
+		       "denied for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce),
+		       msg, buf1->name, buf2->name,
+		       tomoyo_get_last_name(domain));
+	if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) {
+		const char *name1 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf1)->name;
+		const char *name2 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf2)->name;
+		tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(operation, name1, name2, domain,
+					      false);
+	}
+ out:
+	tomoyo_free(buf1);
+	tomoyo_free(buf2);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d47f16b844b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+ *
+ * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string.
+ *
+ * @buffer:  Buffer for ASCII string.
+ * @buflen:  Size of @buffer.
+ * @str:     Binary string.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str)
+{
+	while (1) {
+		const unsigned char c = *(unsigned char *) str++;
+
+		if (tomoyo_is_valid(c)) {
+			if (--buflen <= 0)
+				break;
+			*buffer++ = (char) c;
+			if (c != '\\')
+				continue;
+			if (--buflen <= 0)
+				break;
+			*buffer++ = (char) c;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!c) {
+			if (--buflen <= 0)
+				break;
+			*buffer = '\0';
+			return 0;
+		}
+		buflen -= 4;
+		if (buflen <= 0)
+			break;
+		*buffer++ = '\\';
+		*buffer++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
+		*buffer++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+		*buffer++ = (c & 7) + '0';
+	}
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_from_path2 - Returns realpath(3) of the given dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path:        Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @newname:     Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @newname_len: Size of @newname.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
+ * \ooo style octal string.
+ * Character \ is converted to \\ string.
+ */
+int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
+			       int newname_len)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	char *sp;
+
+	if (!dentry || !path->mnt || !newname || newname_len <= 2048)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
+		/* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */
+		static const int offset = 1536;
+		sp = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, newname + offset,
+					   newname_len - offset);
+	} else {
+		/* Taken from d_namespace_path(). */
+		struct path root;
+		struct path ns_root = { };
+		struct path tmp;
+
+		read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
+		root = current->fs->root;
+		path_get(&root);
+		read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+		spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
+		if (root.mnt && root.mnt->mnt_ns)
+			ns_root.mnt = mntget(root.mnt->mnt_ns->root);
+		if (ns_root.mnt)
+			ns_root.dentry = dget(ns_root.mnt->mnt_root);
+		spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
+		spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+		tmp = ns_root;
+		sp = __d_path(path, &tmp, newname, newname_len);
+		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+		path_put(&root);
+		path_put(&ns_root);
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(sp))
+		error = PTR_ERR(sp);
+	else
+		error = tomoyo_encode(newname, sp - newname, sp);
+	/* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */
+	if (!error && dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)
+	    && *newname) {
+		sp = newname + strlen(newname);
+		if (*(sp - 1) != '/') {
+			if (sp < newname + newname_len - 4) {
+				*sp++ = '/';
+				*sp = '\0';
+			} else {
+				error = -ENOMEM;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (error)
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tomoyo_realpath: Pathname too long.\n");
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
+{
+	char *buf = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer));
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer)
+		     <= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
+	if (!buf)
+		return NULL;
+	if (tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf,
+				       TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0)
+		return buf;
+	tomoyo_free(buf);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname)
+{
+	struct nameidata nd;
+
+	if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd) == 0) {
+		char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&nd.path);
+		path_put(&nd.path);
+		return buf;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
+{
+	struct nameidata nd;
+
+	if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, 0, &nd) == 0) {
+		char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&nd.path);
+		path_put(&nd.path);
+		return buf;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for non-string data. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements;
+/* Quota for holding non-string data. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_elements;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alloc_element - Allocate permanent memory for structures.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Memory has to be zeroed.
+ * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
+{
+	static char *buf;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	static unsigned int buf_used_len = PATH_MAX;
+	char *ptr = NULL;
+	/*Assumes sizeof(void *) >= sizeof(long) is true. */
+	const unsigned int word_aligned_size
+		= roundup(size, max(sizeof(void *), sizeof(long)));
+	if (word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	if (buf_used_len + word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX) {
+		if (!tomoyo_quota_for_elements ||
+		    tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements
+		    + PATH_MAX <= tomoyo_quota_for_elements)
+			ptr = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ptr) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
+			       "for tomoyo_alloc_element().\n");
+			if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+				panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+		} else {
+			buf = ptr;
+			tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements += PATH_MAX;
+			buf_used_len = word_aligned_size;
+			ptr = buf;
+		}
+	} else if (word_aligned_size) {
+		int i;
+		ptr = buf + buf_used_len;
+		buf_used_len += word_aligned_size;
+		for (i = 0; i < word_aligned_size; i++) {
+			if (!ptr[i])
+				continue;
+			printk(KERN_ERR "WARNING: Reserved memory was tainted! "
+			       "The system might go wrong.\n");
+			ptr[i] = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for string data in bytes. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename;
+/* Quota for holding string data in bytes. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_savename;
+
+/*
+ * TOMOYO uses this hash only when appending a string into the string
+ * table. Frequency of appending strings is very low. So we don't need
+ * large (e.g. 64k) hash size. 256 will be sufficient.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH 256
+
+/* Structure for string data. */
+struct tomoyo_name_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info entry;
+};
+
+/* Structure for available memory region. */
+struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *ptr;             /* Pointer to a free area. */
+	int len;               /* Length of the area.     */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct tomoyo_name_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside tomoyo_save_name(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_save_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
+ *
+ * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
+{
+	static LIST_HEAD(fmb_list);
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr;
+	unsigned int hash;
+	/* fmb contains available size in bytes.
+	   fmb is removed from the fmb_list when fmb->len becomes 0. */
+	struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list *fmb;
+	int len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+	len = strlen(name) + 1;
+	if (len > TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Name too long "
+		       "for tomoyo_save_name().\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH],
+			     list) {
+		if (hash == ptr->entry.hash && !strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry(fmb, &fmb_list, list) {
+		if (len <= fmb->len)
+			goto ready;
+	}
+	if (!tomoyo_quota_for_savename ||
+	    tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename + PATH_MAX
+	    <= tomoyo_quota_for_savename)
+		cp = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+	else
+		cp = NULL;
+	fmb = kzalloc(sizeof(*fmb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cp || !fmb) {
+		kfree(cp);
+		kfree(fmb);
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
+		       "for tomoyo_save_name().\n");
+		if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+			panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+		ptr = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename += PATH_MAX;
+	list_add(&fmb->list, &fmb_list);
+	fmb->ptr = cp;
+	fmb->len = PATH_MAX;
+ ready:
+	ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto out;
+	ptr->entry.name = fmb->ptr;
+	memmove(fmb->ptr, name, len);
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
+	fmb->ptr += len;
+	fmb->len -= len;
+	list_add_tail(&ptr->list, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]);
+	if (fmb->len == 0) {
+		list_del(&fmb->list);
+		kfree(fmb);
+	}
+ out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_init - Initialize realpath related code.
+ */
+void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN > PATH_MAX);
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[i]);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list);
+	tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_save_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME);
+	list_add_tail(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+	down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+		panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain");
+	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for temporary purpose. */
+static atomic_t tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alloc - Allocate memory for temporary purpose.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size)
+{
+	void *p = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p)
+		atomic_add(ksize(p), &tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size);
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_free - Release memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc().
+ *
+ * @p: Pointer returned by tomoyo_alloc(). May be NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_free(const void *p)
+{
+	if (p) {
+		atomic_sub(ksize(p), &tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size);
+		kfree(p);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns memory usage.
+ */
+int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		const unsigned int shared
+			= tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename;
+		const unsigned int private
+			= tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements;
+		const unsigned int dynamic
+			= atomic_read(&tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size);
+		char buffer[64];
+
+		memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+		if (tomoyo_quota_for_savename)
+			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+				 "   (Quota: %10u)",
+				 tomoyo_quota_for_savename);
+		else
+			buffer[0] = '\0';
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Shared:  %10u%s\n", shared, buffer);
+		if (tomoyo_quota_for_elements)
+			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+				 "   (Quota: %10u)",
+				 tomoyo_quota_for_elements);
+		else
+			buffer[0] = '\0';
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Private: %10u%s\n", private, buffer);
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Dynamic: %10u\n", dynamic);
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total:   %10u\n",
+				 shared + private + dynamic);
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, "Shared: %u", &size) == 1)
+		tomoyo_quota_for_savename = size;
+	else if (sscanf(data, "Private: %u", &size) == 1)
+		tomoyo_quota_for_elements = size;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.h b/security/tomoyo/realpath.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7ec9fc9cbc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.h
+ *
+ * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
+
+struct path;
+struct tomoyo_path_info;
+struct tomoyo_io_buffer;
+
+/* Convert binary string to ascii string. */
+int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str);
+
+/* Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. */
+int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
+			       int newname_len);
+
+/*
+ * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname);
+/*
+ * Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that it doesn't follow the final symlink.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname);
+/* Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that the pathname is already solved. */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path);
+
+/*
+ * Allocate memory for ACL entry.
+ * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size);
+
+/*
+ * Keep the given name on the RAM.
+ * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name);
+
+/* Allocate memory for temporary use (e.g. permission checks). */
+void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size);
+
+/* Free memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc(). */
+void tomoyo_free(const void *p);
+
+/* Check for memory usage. */
+int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+
+/* Set memory quota. */
+int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+
+/* Initialize realpath related code. */
+void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void);
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H) */
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3eeeae12c4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+ *
+ * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			       gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+	 * we don't need to duplicate.
+	 */
+	new->security = old->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
+	 * operation.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
+	 * for the first time.
+	 */
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		tomoyo_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+	/*
+	 * Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
+	 * execve operation.
+	 */
+	bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
+	 * using current domain.
+	 */
+	if (!domain) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
+		int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
+
+		if (!retval)
+			bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
+		return retval;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
+	 * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
+	 */
+	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+static int tomoyo_prepend(char **buffer, int *buflen, const char *str)
+{
+	int namelen = strlen(str);
+
+	if (*buflen < namelen)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	*buflen -= namelen;
+	*buffer -= namelen;
+	memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sysctl_path - return the realpath of a ctl_table.
+ * @table: pointer to "struct ctl_table".
+ *
+ * Returns realpath(3) of the @table on success.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ *
+ * This function uses tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_sysctl_path(struct ctl_table *table)
+{
+	int buflen = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN;
+	char *buf = tomoyo_alloc(buflen);
+	char *end = buf + buflen;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!buf)
+		return NULL;
+
+	*--end = '\0';
+	buflen--;
+	while (table) {
+		char num[32];
+		const char *sp = table->procname;
+
+		if (!sp) {
+			memset(num, 0, sizeof(num));
+			snprintf(num, sizeof(num) - 1, "=%d=", table->ctl_name);
+			sp = num;
+		}
+		if (tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, sp) ||
+		    tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, "/"))
+			goto out;
+		table = table->parent;
+	}
+	if (tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, "/proc/sys"))
+		goto out;
+	error = tomoyo_encode(buf, end - buf, end);
+ out:
+	if (!error)
+		return buf;
+	tomoyo_free(buf);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+	int error;
+	char *name;
+
+	op &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE;
+	if (!op)
+		return 0;
+	name = tomoyo_sysctl_path(table);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = tomoyo_check_file_perm(tomoyo_domain(), name, op);
+	tomoyo_free(name);
+	return error;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+				unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+				       path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL,
+				       &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     int mode)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL,
+				       &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL,
+				       &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       const char *old_name)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL,
+				       &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     int mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL;
+
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL;
+		break;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       type, &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+	struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+	return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL,
+				       &path1, &path2);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      struct path *new_parent,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
+	struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
+	return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+				       TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL,
+				       &path1, &path2);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
+		return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(tomoyo_domain(), file);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	int flags = f->f_flags;
+
+	if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
+		flags++;
+	flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
+	/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
+	if (current->in_execve)
+		return 0;
+	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
+}
+
+static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
+	.name                = "tomoyo",
+	.cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+	.bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
+	.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+	.sysctl              = tomoyo_sysctl,
+#endif
+	.file_fcntl          = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
+	.dentry_open         = tomoyo_dentry_open,
+	.path_truncate       = tomoyo_path_truncate,
+	.path_unlink         = tomoyo_path_unlink,
+	.path_mkdir          = tomoyo_path_mkdir,
+	.path_rmdir          = tomoyo_path_rmdir,
+	.path_symlink        = tomoyo_path_symlink,
+	.path_mknod          = tomoyo_path_mknod,
+	.path_link           = tomoyo_path_link,
+	.path_rename         = tomoyo_path_rename,
+};
+
+static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+
+	if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+		return 0;
+	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
+	if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+		panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+	cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+	tomoyo_realpath_init();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(tomoyo_init);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a0c8f6e0bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+
+struct tomoyo_path_info;
+struct path;
+struct inode;
+struct linux_binprm;
+struct pt_regs;
+struct tomoyo_page_buffer;
+
+int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			   const char *filename, const u8 perm);
+int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+			   struct tomoyo_page_buffer *buf);
+int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				 struct path *path, const int flag);
+int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			    const u8 operation, struct path *path);
+int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+			    const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
+			    struct path *path2);
+int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+				    struct file *filp);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			    struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain);
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL                 0
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL                 1
+
+/* Index numbers for File Controls. */
+
+/*
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set
+ * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set.
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are
+ * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared.
+ */
+
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL    0
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL       1
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL          2
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL         3
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL        4
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL        5
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL         6
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL         7
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL        8
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL        9
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL      10
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL       11
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL     12
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL      13
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL      14
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15
+
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL         0
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL       1
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2
+
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY          0
+#define TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY       1
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS         2
+#define TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS        3
+#define TOMOYO_MEMINFO               4
+#define TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN            5
+#define TOMOYO_VERSION               6
+#define TOMOYO_PROFILE               7
+#define TOMOYO_MANAGER               8
+
+extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
+{
+	return current_cred()->security;
+}
+
+/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */
+static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
+							    *task)
+{
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return domain;
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */