diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/kernel.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 27 |
3 files changed, 30 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 63fb18dcac3..e1a429ada97 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ extern enum system_states { #define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD (1<<3) #define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK (1<<4) #define TAINT_BAD_PAGE (1<<5) +#define TAINT_USER (1<<6) extern void dump_stack(void); diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 525e365f723..623d1828259 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic); * 'R' - User forced a module unload. * 'M' - Machine had a machine check experience. * 'B' - System has hit bad_page. + * 'U' - Userspace-defined naughtiness. * * The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint(). */ @@ -158,13 +159,14 @@ const char *print_tainted(void) { static char buf[20]; if (tainted) { - snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c", + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c%c", tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ? 'P' : 'G', tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ? 'F' : ' ', tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP ? 'S' : ' ', tainted & TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ? 'R' : ' ', tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' '); + tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' ', + tainted & TAINT_USER ? 'U' : ' '); } else snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted"); diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 16ef870fa75..7733ef58aac 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ static int sysctl_ipc_data(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen, #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL static int proc_do_cad_pid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); +static int proc_dointvec_taint(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); #endif static ctl_table root_table[]; @@ -174,6 +176,7 @@ extern ctl_table inotify_table[]; int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #endif + static void *get_uts(ctl_table *table, int write) { char *which = table->data; @@ -344,14 +347,16 @@ static ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = &proc_dostring, .strategy = &sysctl_string, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL { .ctl_name = KERN_TAINTED, .procname = "tainted", .data = &tainted, .maxlen = sizeof(int), - .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint, }, +#endif { .ctl_name = KERN_CAP_BSET, .procname = "cap-bound", @@ -1927,6 +1932,7 @@ int proc_dointvec(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, #define OP_SET 0 #define OP_AND 1 +#define OP_OR 2 static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, int *valp, @@ -1938,6 +1944,7 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, switch(op) { case OP_SET: *valp = val; break; case OP_AND: *valp &= val; break; + case OP_OR: *valp |= val; break; } } else { int val = *valp; @@ -1970,6 +1977,22 @@ int proc_dointvec_bset(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op); } +/* + * Taint values can only be increased + */ +static int proc_dointvec_taint(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int op; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + op = OP_OR; + return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,ppos, + do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op); +} + struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param { int *min; int *max; |