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Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c84
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b7640a5f382..535586fc498 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_execve {
struct audit_aux_data d;
int argc;
int envc;
- char mem[0];
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -831,6 +831,55 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
return rc;
}
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+ int i;
+ long len, ret;
+ const char __user *p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+ char *buf;
+
+ if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+ return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) {
+ len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+ * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+ * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+ * any.
+ */
+ if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ }
+
+ buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len);
+ /*
+ * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+ * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+ * space yet.
+ */
+ if (!ret) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
+
+ kfree(buf);
+ }
+}
+
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -971,13 +1020,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
- int i;
- const char *p;
- for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
- p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
- audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
- }
+ audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -1821,32 +1864,31 @@ int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode
return 0;
}
+int audit_argv_kb = 32;
+
int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- unsigned long p, next;
- void *to;
if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ /*
+ * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more,
+ * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single
+ * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-(
+ */
+ if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10))
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->argc = bprm->argc;
ax->envc = bprm->envc;
- for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
- struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
- void *kaddr = kmap(page);
- next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
- to += next - p;
- kunmap(page);
- }
-
+ ax->mm = bprm->mm;
ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;