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path: root/drivers/char/tty_audit.c
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2009-06-11tty: remove buffer special casingAlan Cox
Long long ago a 4K kmalloc allocated two pages so the tty layer used the page allocator, except on some machines where the page size was huge. This was removed from the core tty layer with the tty buffer re-implementation but not from tty_audit or the n_tty ldisc. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31Trim includes of fdtable.hAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09Audit: Log TIOCSTIAl Viro
AUDIT_TTY records currently log all data read by processes marked for TTY input auditing, even if the data was "pushed back" using the TIOCSTI ioctl, not typed by the user. This patch records all TIOCSTI calls to disambiguate the input. It generates one audit message per character pushed back; considering TIOCSTI is used very rarely, this simple solution is probably good enough. (The only program I could find that uses TIOCSTI is mailx/nail in "header editing" mode, e.g. using the ~h escape. mailx is used very rarely, and the escapes are used even rarer.) Signed-Off-By: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the tty driverDavid Howells
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds. Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id(). Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be addressed by later patches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-13audit: Handle embedded NUL in TTY input auditingMiloslav Trmac
Data read from a TTY can contain an embedded NUL byte (e.g. after pressing Ctrl-2, or sent to a PTY). After the previous patch, the data would be logged only up to the first NUL. This patch modifies the AUDIT_TTY record to always use the hexadecimal format, which does not terminate at the first NUL byte. The vast majority of recorded TTY input data will contain either ' ' or '\n', so the hexadecimal format would have been used anyway. Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-05-01[PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28[patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditingMiloslav Trmac
Remove the code that automatically disables TTY input auditing in processes that open TTYs when they have no other TTY open; this heuristic was intended to automatically handle daemons, but it has false positives (e.g. with sshd) that make it impossible to control TTY input auditing from a PAM module. With this patch, TTY input auditing is controlled from user-space only. On the other hand, not even for daemons does it make sense to audit "input" from PTY masters; this data was produced by a program writing to the PTY slave, and does not represent data entered by the user. Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28Audit: standardize string audit interfacesEric Paris
This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use: void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n); void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf); void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n); void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string); This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messagesEric Paris
Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages so we can audit who sent netlink messages. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-02-08tty_audit: fix checkpatch complaintAlan Cox
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-01[AUDIT] add session id to audit messagesEric Paris
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is labeled ses= or oses= Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01[PATCH] switch audit_get_loginuid() to task_struct *Al Viro
all callers pass something->audit_context Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-07-16Audit: add TTY input auditingMiloslav Trmac
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>