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2006-06-26[PATCH] coredump: shutdown current process firstOleg Nesterov
This patch optimizes zap_threads() for the case when there are no ->mm users except the current's thread group. In that case we can avoid 'for_each_process()' loop. It also adds a useful invariant: SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT (if checked under ->siglock) always implies that all threads (except may be current) have pending SIGKILL. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] coredump: some code relocationsOleg Nesterov
This is a preparation for the next patch. No functional changes. Basically, this patch moves '->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT' check into zap_threads(), and 'complete(vfork_done)' into coredump_wait outside of ->mmap_sem protected area. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] coredump: don't take tasklist_lockOleg Nesterov
This patch removes tasklist_lock from zap_threads(). This is safe wrt: do_exit: The caller holds mm->mmap_sem. This means that task which shares the same ->mm can't pass exit_mm(), so it can't be unhashed from init_task.tasks or ->thread_group lists. fork: None of sub-threads can fork after zap_process(leader). All processes which were created before this point should be visible to zap_threads() because copy_process() adds the new process to the tail of init_task.tasks list, and ->siglock lock/unlock provides a memory barrier. de_thread: It does list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &current->tasks). So zap_threads() will see either old or new leader, it does not matter. However, it can change p->sighand, so we should use lock_task_sighand() in zap_process(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] coredump: kill ptrace related stuffOleg Nesterov
With this patch zap_process() sets SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT while sending SIGKILL to the thread group. This means that a TASK_TRACED task 1. Will be awakened by signal_wake_up(1) 2. Can't sleep again via ptrace_notify() 3. Can't go to do_signal_stop() after return from ptrace_stop() in get_signal_to_deliver() So we can remove all ptrace related stuff from coredump path. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] coredump: speedup SIGKILL sendingOleg Nesterov
With this patch a thread group is killed atomically under ->siglock. This is faster because we can use sigaddset() instead of force_sig_info() and this is used in further patches. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] coredump: optimize ->mm users traversalOleg Nesterov
zap_threads() iterates over all threads to find those ones which share current->mm. All threads in the thread group share the same ->mm, so we can skip entire thread group if it has another ->mm. This patch shifts the killing of thread group into the newly added zap_process() function. This looks as unnecessary complication, but it is used in further patches. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] de_thread: fix lockless do_each_threadOleg Nesterov
We should keep the value of old_leader->tasks.next in de_thread, otherwise we can't do for_each_process/do_each_thread without tasklist_lock held. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr APIEric Paris
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same. I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] cleanup next_tid()Oleg Nesterov
Try to make next_tid() a bit more readable and deletes unnecessary "pid_alive(pos)" check. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] simplify/fix first_tid()Oleg Nesterov
first_tid: /* If nr exceeds the number of threads there is nothing todo */ if (nr) { if (nr >= get_nr_threads(leader)) goto done; } This is not reliable: sub-threads can exit after this check, so the 'for' loop below can overlap and proc_task_readdir() can return an already filldir'ed dirents. for (; pos && pid_alive(pos); pos = next_thread(pos)) { if (--nr > 0) continue; Off-by-one error, will return 'leader' when nr == 1. This patch tries to fix these problems and simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Remove tasklist_lock from proc_task_readdir.Eric W. Biederman
This is just like my previous removal of tasklist_lock from first_tgid, and next_tgid. It simply had to wait until it was rcu safe to walk the thread list. This should be the last instance of the tasklist_lock in proc. So user processes should not be able to influence the tasklist lock hold times. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Cleanup proc_fd_access_allowedEric W. Biederman
In process of getting proc_fd_access_allowed to work it has developed a few warts. In particular the special case that always allows introspection and the special case to allow inspection of kernel threads. The special case for introspection is needed for /proc/self/mem. The special case for kernel threads really should be overridable by security modules. So consolidate these checks into ptrace.c:may_attach(). The check to always allow introspection is trivial. The check to allow access to kernel threads, and zombies is a little trickier. mem_read and mem_write already verify an mm exists so it isn't needed twice. proc_fd_access_allowed only doesn't want a check to verify task->mm exits, s it prevents all access to kernel threads. So just move the task->mm check into ptrace_attach where it is needed for practical reasons. I did a quick audit and none of the security modules in the kernel seem to care if they are passed a task without an mm into security_ptrace. So the above move should be safe and it allows security modules to come up with more restrictive policy. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Use sane permission checks on the /proc/<pid>/fd/ symlinksEric W. Biederman
Since 2.2 we have been doing a chroot check to see if it is appropriate to return a read or follow one of these magic symlinks. The chroot check was asking a question about the visibility of files to the calling process and it was actually checking the destination process, and not the files themselves. That test was clearly bogus. In my first pass through I simply fixed the test to check the visibility of the files themselves. That naive approach to fixing the permissions was too strict and resulted in cases where a task could not even see all of it's file descriptors. What has disturbed me about relaxing this check is that file descriptors are per-process private things, and they are occasionaly used a user space capability tokens. Looking a little farther into the symlink path on /proc I did find userid checks and a check for capability (CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) so there were permissions checking this. But I was still concerned about privacy. Besides /proc there is only one other way to find out this kind of information, and that is ptrace. ptrace has been around for a long time and it has a well established security model. So after thinking about it I finally realized that the permission checks that make sense are the permission checks applied to ptrace_attach. The checks are simple per process, and won't cause nasty surprises for people coming from less capable unices. Unfortunately there is one case that the current ptrace_attach test does not cover: Zombies and kernel threads. Single stepping those kinds of processes is impossible. Being able to see which file descriptors are open on these tasks is important to lsof, fuser and friends. So for these special processes I made the rule you can't find out unless you have CAP_SYS_PTRACE. These proc permission checks should now conform to the principle of least surprise. As well as using much less code to implement :) Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: optimize proc_check_dentry_visibleEric W. Biederman
The code doesn't need to sleep to when making this check so I can just do the comparison and not worry about the reference counts. TODO: While looking at this I realized that my original cleanup did not push the permission check far enough down into the stack. The call of proc_check_dentry_visible needs to move out of the generic proc readlink/follow link code and into the individual get_link instances. Otherwise the shared resources checks are not quite correct (shared files_struct does not require a shared fs_struct), and there are races with unshare. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Use struct pid not struct task_refEric W. Biederman
Incrementally update my proc-dont-lock-task_structs-indefinitely patches so that they work with struct pid instead of struct task_ref. Mostly this is a straight 1-1 substitution. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: don't lock task_structs indefinitelyEric W. Biederman
Every inode in /proc holds a reference to a struct task_struct. If a directory or file is opened and remains open after the the task exits this pinning continues. With 8K stacks on a 32bit machine the amount pinned per file descriptor is about 10K. Normally I would figure a reasonable per user process limit is about 100 processes. With 80 processes, with a 1000 file descriptors each I can trigger the 00M killer on a 32bit kernel, because I have pinned about 800MB of useless data. This patch replaces the struct task_struct pointer with a pointer to a struct task_ref which has a struct task_struct pointer. The so the pinning of dead tasks does not happen. The code now has to contend with the fact that the task may now exit at any time. Which is a little but not muh more complicated. With this change it takes about 1000 processes each opening up 1000 file descriptors before I can trigger the OOM killer. Much better. [mlp@google.com: task_mmu small fixes] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Albert Cahalan <acahalan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Prasanna Meda <mlp@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: make PROC_NUMBUF the buffer size for holding integers as stringsEric W. Biederman
Currently in /proc at several different places we define buffers to hold a process id, or a file descriptor . In most of them we use either a hard coded number or a different define. Modify them all to use PROC_NUMBUF, so the code has a chance of being maintained. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] simply fix first_tgidEric W. Biederman
Like the bug Oleg spotted in first_tid there was also a small off by one error in first_tgid, when a seek was done on the /proc directory. This fixes that and changes the code structure to make it a little more obvious what is going on. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Remove tasklist_lock from proc_pid_lookup() and proc_task_lookup()Eric W. Biederman
Since we no longer need the tasklist_lock for get_task_struct the lookup methods no longer need the tasklist_lock. This just depends on my previous patch that makes get_task_struct() rcu safe. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Remove tasklist_lock from proc_pid_readdirEric W. Biederman
We don't need the tasklist_lock to safely iterate through processes anymore. This depends on my previous to task patches that make get_task_struct rcu safe, and that make next_task() rcu safe. I haven't gotten first_tid/next_tid yet only because next_thread is missing an rcu_dereference. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: refactor reading directories of tasksEric W. Biederman
There are a couple of problems this patch addresses. - /proc/<tgid>/task currently does not work correctly if you stop reading in the middle of a directory. - /proc/ currently requires a full pass through the task list with the tasklist lock held, to determine there are no more processes to read. - The hand rolled integer to string conversion does not properly running out of buffer space. - We seem to be batching reading of pids from the tasklist without reason, and complicating the logic of the code. This patch addresses that by changing how tasks are processed. A first_<task_type> function is built that handles restarts, and a next_<task_type> function is built that just advances to the next task. first_<task_type> when it detects a restart usually uses find_task_by_pid. If that doesn't work because there has been a seek on the directory, or we have already given a complete directory listing, it first checks the number tasks of that type, and only if we are under that count does it walk through all of the tasks to find the one we are interested in. The code that fills in the directory is simpler because there is only a single for loop. The hand rolled integer to string conversion is replaced by snprintf which should handle the the out of buffer case correctly. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Close the race of a process dying durning lookupEric W. Biederman
proc_lookup and task exiting are not synchronized, although some of the previous code may have suggested that. Every time before we reuse a dentry namei.c calls d_op->derevalidate which prevents us from reusing a stale dcache entry. Unfortunately it does not prevent us from returning a stale dcache entry. This race has been explicitly plugged in proc_pid_lookup but there is nothing to confine it to just that proc lookup function. So to prevent the race I call revalidate explictily in all of the proc lookup functions after I call d_add, and report an error if the revalidate does not succeed. Years ago Al Viro did something similar but those changes got lost in the churn. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Rewrite the proc dentry flush on exit optimizationEric W. Biederman
To keep the dcache from filling up with dead /proc entries we flush them on process exit. However over the years that code has gotten hairy with a dentry_pointer and a lock in task_struct and misdocumented as a correctness feature. I have rewritten this code to look and see if we have a corresponding entry in the dcache and if so flush it on process exit. This removes the extra fields in the task_struct and allows me to trivially handle the case of a /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> entry as well as the current /proc/<pid> entries. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Move proc_maps_operations into task_mmu.cEric W. Biederman
All of the functions for proc_maps_operations are already defined in task_mmu.c so move the operations structure to keep the functionality together. Since task_nommu.c implements a dummy version of /proc/<pid>/maps give it a simplified version of proc_maps_operations that it can modify to best suit its needs. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Fix the link count for /proc/<pid>/taskEric W. Biederman
Use getattr to get an accurate link count when needed. This is cheaper and more accurate than trying to derive it by walking the thread list of a process. Especially as it happens when needed stat instead of at readdir time. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Properly filter out files that are not visible to a processEric W. Biederman
Long ago and far away in 2.2 we started checking to ensure the files we displayed in /proc were visible to the current process. It was an unsophisticated time and no one was worried about functions full of FIXMES in a stable kernel. As time passed the function became sacred and was enshrined in the shrine of how things have always been. The fixes came in but only to keep the function working no one really remembering or documenting why we did things that way. The intent and the functionality make a lot of sense. Don't let /proc be an access point for files a process can see no other way. The implementation however is completely wrong. We are currently checking the root directories of the two processes, we are not checking the actual file descriptors themselves. We are strangely checking with a permission method instead of just when we use the data. This patch fixes the logic to actually check the file descriptors and make a note that implementing a permission method for this part of /proc almost certainly indicates a bug in the reasoning. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Kill proc_mem_inode_operationsEric W. Biederman
The inode operations only exist to support the proc_permission function. Currently mem_read and mem_write have all the same permission checks as ptrace. The fs check makes no sense in this context, and we can trivially get around it by calling ptrace. So simply the code by killing the strange weird case. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Remove bogus proc_task_permissionEric W. Biederman
First we can access every /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory as /proc/<pid> so proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility. Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with process visibility. kill does not implement any checks like that. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Replace proc_inode.type with proc_inode.fdEric W. Biederman
The sole renaming use of proc_inode.type is to discover the file descriptor number, so just store the file descriptor number and don't wory about processing this field. This removes any /proc limits on the maximum number of file descriptors, and clears the path to make the hard coded /proc inode numbers go away. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Simplify the ownership rules for /procEric W. Biederman
Currently in /proc if the task is dumpable all of files are owned by the tasks effective users. Otherwise the files are owned by root. Unless it is the /proc/<tgid>/ or /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory in that case we always make the directory owned by the effective user. However the special case for directories is pointless except as a way to read the effective user, because the permissions on both of those directories are world readable, and executable. /proc/<tgid>/status provides a much better way to read a processes effecitve userid, so it is silly to try to provide that on the directory. So this patch simplifies the code by removing a pointless special case and gets us one step closer to being able to remove the hard coded /proc inode numbers. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Remove unnecessary and misleading assignments from ↵Eric W. Biederman
proc_pid_make_inode The removed fields are already set by proc_alloc_inode. Initializing them in proc_alloc_inode implies they need it for proper cleanup. At least ei->pde was not set on all paths making it look like proc_alloc_inode was buggy. So just remove the redundant assignments. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Remove useless BKL in proc_pid_readlinkEric W. Biederman
We already call everything except do_proc_readlink outside of the BKL in proc_pid_followlink, and there appears to be nothing in do_proc_readlink that needs any special protection. So remove this leftover from one of the BKL cleanup efforts. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] proc: Fix the .. inode number on /proc/<pid>/fdEric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] nfsd kconfig: select things at the closest tristate instead of boolHerbert Xu
I noticed recently that my CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5 turned into a y again instead of m. It turns out that CONFIG_NFSD_V4 is selecting it to be y even though I've chosen to compile nfsd as a module. In general when we have a bool sitting under a tristate it is better to select things you need from the tristate rather than the bool since that allows the things you select to be modules. The following patch does it for nfsd. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] i4l: Gigaset drivers: add IOCTLs to compat_ioctl.hHansjoerg Lipp
Add the IOCTLs of the Gigaset drivers to compat_ioctl.h in order to make them available for 32 bit programs on 64 bit platforms. Please merge. Signed-off-by: Hansjoerg Lipp <hjlipp@web.de> Acked-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc> Cc: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] ext3: Add "-o bh" optionBadari Pulavarty
This patch adds "-o bh" option to force use of buffer_heads. This option is needed when we make "nobh" as default - and if we run into problems. Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] reiserfs: remove reiserfs_aio_write()Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: <reiserfs-dev@namesys.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keysMichael LeMay
Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] fs: use list_move()Akinobu Mita
This patch converts the combination of list_del(A) and list_add(A, B) to list_move(A, B) under fs/. Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> Cc: Hans Reiser <reiserfs-dev@namesys.com> Cc: Urban Widmark <urban@teststation.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <mita@miraclelinux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] core: use list_move()Akinobu Mita
This patch converts the combination of list_del(A) and list_add(A, B) to list_move(A, B). Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <mita@miraclelinux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] use list_add_tail() instead of list_add()Akinobu Mita
This patch converts list_add(A, B.prev) to list_add_tail(A, &B) for readability. Acked-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de> Cc: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> AOLed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <mita@miraclelinux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25[PATCH] uclinux: use PER_LINUX_32BIT in binfmt_flatMalcolm Parsons
binfmt_flat.c calls set_personality with PER_LINUX as the personality. On the arm architecture this results in the program running in 26bit usermode. PER_LINUX_32BIT should be used instead. This doesn't affect other architectures that use binfmt_flat. Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25[PATCH] xfs: update ->flush method protoAlexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25Fix NFS2 compile errorLinus Torvalds
Trond had apparently merged the same patch twice, causing a duplicate include of the "internal.h" file, with resulting obvious confusion. Tssk. I'm the only one allowed to send out trees that don't even compile! Who does this Trond guy think he is? Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25Merge git://git.linux-nfs.org/pub/linux/nfs-2.6Linus Torvalds
* git://git.linux-nfs.org/pub/linux/nfs-2.6: (51 commits) nfs: remove nfs_put_link() nfs-build-fix-99 git-nfs-build-fixes Merge branch 'odirect' NFS: alloc nfs_read/write_data as direct I/O is scheduled NFS: Eliminate nfs_get_user_pages() NFS: refactor nfs_direct_free_user_pages NFS: remove user_addr, user_count, and pos from nfs_direct_req NFS: "open code" the NFS direct write rescheduler NFS: Separate functions for counting outstanding NFS direct I/Os NLM: Fix reclaim races NLM: sem to mutex conversion locks.c: add the fl_owner to nlm_compare_locks NFS: Display the chosen RPCSEC_GSS security flavour in /proc/mounts NFS: Split fs/nfs/inode.c NFS: Fix typo in nfs_do_clone_mount() NFS: Fix compile errors introduced by referrals patches NFSv4: Ensure that referral mounts bind to a reserved port NFSv4: A root pathname is sent as a zero component4 NFSv4: Follow a referral ...
2006-06-25Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/v4l-dvbLinus Torvalds
* master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/v4l-dvb: (244 commits) V4L/DVB (4210b): git-dvb: tea575x-tuner build fix V4L/DVB (4210a): git-dvb versus matroxfb V4L/DVB (4209): Added some BTTV PCI IDs for newer boards Fixes some sync issues between V4L/DVB development and GIT V4L/DVB (4206): Cx88-blackbird: always set encoder height based on tvnorm->id V4L/DVB (4205): Merge tda9887 module into tuner. V4L/DVB (4203): Explicitly set the enum values. V4L/DVB (4202): allow selecting CX2341x port mode V4L/DVB (4200): Disable bitrate_mode when encoding mpeg-1. V4L/DVB (4199): Add cx2341x-specific control array to cx2341x.c V4L/DVB (4198): Avoid newer usages of obsoleted experimental MPEGCOMP API V4L/DVB (4197): Port new MPEG API to saa7134-empress with saa6752hs V4L/DVB (4196): Port cx88-blackbird to the new MPEG API. V4L/DVB (4193): Update cx2341x fw encoding API doc. V4L/DVB (4192): Use control helpers for saa7115, cx25840, msp3400. V4L/DVB (4191): Add CX2341X MPEG encoder module. V4L/DVB (4190): Add helper functions for control processing to v4l2-common. V4L/DVB (4189): Add videodev support for VIDIOC_S/G/TRY_EXT_CTRLS. V4L/DVB (4188): Add new MPEG control/ioctl definitions to videodev2.h V4L/DVB (4186): Add support for the DNTV Live! mini DVB-T card. ...
2006-06-25[PATCH] remove unlikely(sb) in prune_dcacheHua Zhong
likely profiling shows that the following is a miss. After boot: [+- ] Type | # True | # False | Function:Filename@Line +unlikely | 1074| 0 prune_dcache()@:fs/dcache.c@409 After a bonnie++ run: +unlikely | 66716| 19584 prune_dcache()@:fs/dcache.c@409 So remove it. Signed-off-by: Hua Zhong <hzhong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25[PATCH] ext2: cleanup: put_page and comment fixEvgeniy Dushistov
Things which force me think a little: why so? Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25[PATCH] Implement AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW flag for linkatUlrich Drepper
When the linkat() syscall was added the flag parameter was added in the last minute but it wasn't used so far. The following patch should change that. My tests show that this is all that's needed. If OLDNAME is a symlink setting the flag causes linkat to follow the symlink and create a hardlink with the target. This is actually the behavior POSIX demands for link() as well but Linux wisely does not do this. With this flag (which will most likely be in the next POSIX revision) the programmer can choose the behavior, defaulting to the safe variant. As a side effect it is now possible to implement a POSIX-compliant link(2) function for those who are interested. touch file ln -s file symlink linkat(fd, "symlink", fd, "newlink", 0) -> newlink is hardlink of symlink linkat(fd, "symlink", fd, "newlink", AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) -> newlink is hardlink of file The value of AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW is determined by the definition we already use in glibc. Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25[PATCH] fs: sys_poll with timeout -1 bug fixFrode Isaksen
If you do a poll() call with timeout -1, the wait will be a big number (depending on HZ) instead of infinite wait, since -1 is passed to the msecs_to_jiffies function. Signed-off-by: Frode Isaksen <frode.isaksen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>