| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Since commit 02b51df1b07b4e9ca823c89284e704cadb323cd1 (proc connector: add
event for process becoming session leader) we have the following warning:
Badness at kernel/softirq.c:143
[...]
Krnl PSW : 0404c00180000000 00000000001481d4 (local_bh_enable+0xb0/0xe0)
[...]
Call Trace:
([<000000013fe04100>] 0x13fe04100)
[<000000000048a946>] sk_filter+0x9a/0xd0
[<000000000049d938>] netlink_broadcast+0x2c0/0x53c
[<00000000003ba9ae>] cn_netlink_send+0x272/0x2b0
[<00000000003baef0>] proc_sid_connector+0xc4/0xd4
[<0000000000142604>] __set_special_pids+0x58/0x90
[<0000000000159938>] sys_setsid+0xb4/0xd8
[<00000000001187fe>] sysc_noemu+0x10/0x16
[<00000041616cb266>] 0x41616cb266
The warning is
---> WARN_ON_ONCE(in_irq() || irqs_disabled());
The network code must not be called with disabled interrupts but
sys_setsid holds the tasklist_lock with spinlock_irq while calling the
connector.
After a discussion we agreed that we can move proc_sid_connector from
__set_special_pids to sys_setsid.
We also agreed that it is sufficient to change the check from
task_session(curr) != pid into err > 0, since if we don't change the
session, this means we were already the leader and return -EPERM.
One last thing:
There is also daemonize(), and some people might want to get a
notification in that case. Since daemonize() is only needed if a user
space does kernel_thread this does not look important (and there seems
to be no consensus if this connector should be called in daemonize). If
we really want this, we can add proc_sid_connector to daemonize() in an
additional patch (Scott?)
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Scott James Remnant <scott@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ak/linux-mce-2.6
* 'hwpoison' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ak/linux-mce-2.6: (21 commits)
HWPOISON: Enable error_remove_page on btrfs
HWPOISON: Add simple debugfs interface to inject hwpoison on arbitary PFNs
HWPOISON: Add madvise() based injector for hardware poisoned pages v4
HWPOISON: Enable error_remove_page for NFS
HWPOISON: Enable .remove_error_page for migration aware file systems
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7
HWPOISON: Add PR_MCE_KILL prctl to control early kill behaviour per process
HWPOISON: shmem: call set_page_dirty() with locked page
HWPOISON: Define a new error_remove_page address space op for async truncation
HWPOISON: Add invalidate_inode_page
HWPOISON: Refactor truncate to allow direct truncating of page v2
HWPOISON: check and isolate corrupted free pages v2
HWPOISON: Handle hardware poisoned pages in try_to_unmap
HWPOISON: Use bitmask/action code for try_to_unmap behaviour
HWPOISON: x86: Add VM_FAULT_HWPOISON handling to x86 page fault handler v2
HWPOISON: Add poison check to page fault handling
HWPOISON: Add basic support for poisoned pages in fault handler v3
HWPOISON: Add new SIGBUS error codes for hardware poison signals
HWPOISON: Add support for poison swap entries v2
HWPOISON: Export some rmap vma locking to outside world
...
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Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater
mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall.
->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD
systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs
which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was
notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed.
To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The
first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The
second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all
task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill
->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm
struct exists.
Note:
exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss.
it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting.
test programs
========================================================
getrusage.c
===========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
printf("allocate 100MB\n");
consume(100);
printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n");
printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n");
printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n");
printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("allocate +50MB\n");
consume(50);
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n");
printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 0 -g 300");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase5: zombie\n");
printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n");
printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("pre_wait");
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 400");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n");
show_rusage("initial");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("after_zombie");
} else {
system("./child -n 500");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n");
show_rusage("initial");
execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL);
return 0;
}
child.c
=======
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include "common.h"
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
int c;
long consume_size = 0;
long grandchild_consume_size = 0;
int show = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'n':
consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
show = 1;
break;
case 'g':
grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (show)
show_rusage("exec");
if (consume_size) {
printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size);
consume(consume_size);
}
if (grandchild_consume_size) {
if (fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size);
consume(grandchild_consume_size);
exit(0);
}
}
return 0;
}
common.c
========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
void show_rusage(char *prefix)
{
int err, err2;
struct rusage rusage_self;
struct rusage rusage_children;
printf("%s: ", prefix);
err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self);
if (!err)
printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss);
err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children);
if (!err2)
printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss);
printf("\n");
}
/* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */
void make_pagefault(void)
{
void *addr;
int size = getpagesize();
int i;
for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
err("make_pagefault");
memset(addr, 0, size);
munmap(addr, size);
}
}
void consume(int mega)
{
size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024;
void *ptr;
ptr = malloc(sz);
memset(ptr, 0, sz);
make_pagefault();
}
pid_t __fork(void)
{
pid_t pid;
pid = fork();
make_pagefault();
return pid;
}
common.h
========
void show_rusage(char *prefix);
void make_pagefault(void);
void consume(int mega);
pid_t __fork(void);
FreeBSD result (expected result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 103492 children 0
fork child: self 103540 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 103540 children 103540
child: self 103564 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 103564 children 103564
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 154860 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 103564 children 154860
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 103564 children 308720
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 103564 children 308720
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720
post_wait: self 103564 children 411312
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 103564 children 411312
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 103624 children 411312
exec: self 103624 children 411312
Linux result (actual test result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 102848 children 0
fork child: self 102572 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 102876 children 102644
child: self 102572 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 102876 children 102644
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 153804 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 102876 children 153864
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 102876 children 307536
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 102876 children 307536
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536
post_wait: self 102876 children 410076
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 102876 children 410076
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 102880 children 410076
exec: self 102880 children 410076
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events!
In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its
initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is
becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging,
monitoring, analysis facility.
Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem
'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending
code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and
less appropriate.
All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance
events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables
and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion)
The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes
it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well.
Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and
suggested a rename.
User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch
should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to
keep the size down.)
This patch has been generated via the following script:
FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config')
sed -i \
-e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \
-e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \
-e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \
-e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \
-e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \
-e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \
$FILES
for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do
M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g')
mv $N $M
done
FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*)
sed -i \
-e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \
-e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \
-e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \
-e 's/counter/event/g' \
-e 's/Counter/Event/g' \
$FILES
... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be
used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts
a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this
change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches
is the smallest: the end of the merge window.
Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some
stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch.
( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal
with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit
over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but
in case there's something left where 'counter' would be
better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis
instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. )
Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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This allows processes to override their early/late kill
behaviour on hardware memory errors.
Typically applications which are memory error aware is
better of with early kill (see the error as soon
as possible), all others with late kill (only
see the error when the error is really impacting execution)
There's a global sysctl, but this way an application
can set its specific policy.
We're using two bits, one to signify that the process
stated its intention and that
I also made the prctl future proof by enforcing
the unused arguments are 0.
The state is inherited to children.
Note this makes us officially run out of process flags
on 32bit, but the next patch can easily add another field.
Manpage patch will be supplied separately.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
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Move supplementary groups implementation to kernel/groups.c .
kernel/sys.c already accumulated quite a few random stuff.
Do strictly copy/paste + add required headers to compile. Compile-tested
on many configs and archs.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge reason: This brach was on -rc1, refresh it to almost-rc4 to pick up
the latest upstream fixes.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Impact: cleanup, fix
Clean up sys_shutdown() exit path. Factor out common code. Return
correct error code instead of always 0 on failure.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge reason: we have gathered quite a few conflicts, need to merge upstream
Conflicts:
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
arch/x86/mm/iomap_32.c
include/linux/sched.h
kernel/Makefile
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
Remove two unneeded exports and make two symbols static in fs/mpage.c
Cleanup after commit 585d3bc06f4ca57f975a5a1f698f65a45ea66225
Trim includes of fdtable.h
Don't crap into descriptor table in binfmt_som
Trim includes in binfmt_elf
Don't mess with descriptor table in load_elf_binary()
Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
New helper - current_umask()
check_unsafe_exec() doesn't care about signal handlers sharing
New locking/refcounting for fs_struct
Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c)
Get rid of bumping fs_struct refcount in pivot_root(2)
Kill unsharing fs_struct in __set_personality()
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We are wasting 2 words in signal_struct without any reason to implement
task_pgrp_nr() and task_session_nr().
task_session_nr() has no callers since
2e2ba22ea4fd4bb85f0fa37c521066db6775cbef, we can remove it.
task_pgrp_nr() is still (I believe wrongly) used in fs/autofsX and
fs/coda.
This patch reimplements task_pgrp_nr() via task_pgrp_nr_ns(), and kills
__pgrp/__session and the related helpers.
The change in drivers/char/tty_io.c is cosmetic, but hopefully makes sense
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <number6@the-village.bc.nu> [tty parts]
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/mm/iomap_32.c
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Impact: fix hung task with certain (non-default) rt-limit settings
Corey Hickey reported that on using setuid to change the uid of a
rt process, the process would be unkillable and not be running.
This is because there was no rt runtime for that user group. Add
in a check to see if a user can attach an rt task to its task group.
On failure, return EINVAL, which is also returned in
CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED.
Reported-by: Corey Hickey <bugfood-ml@fatooh.org>
Signed-off-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c
arch/x86/mm/fault.c
drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
kernel/irq/handle.c
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Revert commit 0c2d64fb6cae9aae480f6a46cfe79f8d7d48b59f because it causes
(arguably poorly designed) existing userspace to spend interminable
periods closing billions of not-open file descriptors.
We could bring this back, with some sort of opt-in tunable in /proc, which
defaults to "off".
Peter's alanysis follows:
: I spent several hours trying to get to the bottom of a serious
: performance issue that appeared on one of our servers after upgrading to
: 2.6.28. In the end it's what could be considered a userspace bug that
: was triggered by a change in 2.6.28. Since this might also affect other
: people I figured I'd at least document what I found here, and maybe we
: can even do something about it:
:
:
: So, I upgraded some of debian.org's machines to 2.6.28.1 and immediately
: the team maintaining our ftp archive complained that one of their
: scripts that previously ran in a few minutes still hadn't even come
: close to being done after an hour or so. Downgrading to 2.6.27 fixed
: that.
:
: Turns out that script is forking a lot and something in it or python or
: whereever closes all the file descriptors it doesn't want to pass on.
: That is, it starts at zero and goes up to ulimit -n/RLIMIT_NOFILE and
: closes them all with a few exceptions.
:
: Turns out that takes a long time when your limit -n is now 2^20 (1048576).
:
: With 2.6.27.* the ulimit -n was the standard 1024, but with 2.6.28 it is
: now a thousand times that.
:
: 2.6.28 included a patch titled "rlimit: permit setting RLIMIT_NOFILE to
: RLIM_INFINITY" (0c2d64fb6cae9aae480f6a46cfe79f8d7d48b59f)[1] that
: allows, as the title implies, to set the limit for number of files to
: infinity.
:
: Closer investigation showed that the broken default ulimit did not apply
: to "system" processes (like stuff started from init). In the end I
: could establish that all processes that passed through pam_limit at one
: point had the bad resource limit.
:
: Apparently the pam library in Debian etch (4.0) initializes the limits
: to some default values when it doesn't have any settings in limit.conf
: to override them. Turns out that for nofiles this is RLIM_INFINITY.
: Commenting out "case RLIMIT_NOFILE" in pam_limit.c:267 of our pam
: package version 0.79-5 fixes that - tho I'm not sure what side effects
: that has.
:
: Debian lenny (the upcoming 5.0 version) doesn't have this issue as it
: uses a different pam (version).
Reported-by: Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>
Cc: Adam Tkac <vonsch@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Conflicts:
include/linux/syscalls.h
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|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
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|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
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Conflicts:
include/linux/kernel_stat.h
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
sched: fix section mismatch
sched: fix double kfree in failure path
sched: clean up arch_reinit_sched_domains()
sched: mark sched_create_sysfs_power_savings_entries() as __init
getrusage: RUSAGE_THREAD should return ru_utime and ru_stime
sched: fix sched_slice()
sched_clock: prevent scd->clock from moving backwards, take #2
sched: sched.c declare variables before they get used
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At the moment, the times() system call will appear to fail for a period
shortly after boot, while the value it want to return is between -4095 and
-1. The same thing will also happen for the time() system call on 32-bit
platforms some time in 2106 or so.
On some platforms, such as x86, this is unavoidable because of the system
call ABI, but other platforms such as powerpc have a separate error
indication from the return value, so system calls can in fact return small
negative values without indicating an error. On those platforms,
force_successful_syscall_return() provides a way to indicate that the
system call return value should not be treated as an error even if it is
in the range which would normally be taken as a negative error number.
This adds a force_successful_syscall_return() call to the time() and
times() system calls plus their 32-bit compat versions, so that they don't
erroneously indicate an error on those platforms whose system call ABI has
a separate error indication. This will not affect anything on other
platforms.
Joakim Tjernlund added the fix for time() and the compat versions of
time() and times(), after I did the fix for times().
Signed-off-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund@transmode.se>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Impact: task stats regression fix
Original getrusage(RUSAGE_THREAD) implementation can return ru_utime and
ru_stime. But commit "f06febc: timers: fix itimer/many thread hang" broke it.
this patch restores it.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (63 commits)
stacktrace: provide save_stack_trace_tsk() weak alias
rcu: provide RCU options on non-preempt architectures too
printk: fix discarding message when recursion_bug
futex: clean up futex_(un)lock_pi fault handling
"Tree RCU": scalable classic RCU implementation
futex: rename field in futex_q to clarify single waiter semantics
x86/swiotlb: add default swiotlb_arch_range_needs_mapping
x86/swiotlb: add default phys<->bus conversion
x86: unify pci iommu setup and allow swiotlb to compile for 32 bit
x86: add swiotlb allocation functions
swiotlb: consolidate swiotlb info message printing
swiotlb: support bouncing of HighMem pages
swiotlb: factor out copy to/from device
swiotlb: add arch hook to force mapping
swiotlb: allow architectures to override phys<->bus<->phys conversions
swiotlb: add comment where we handle the overflow of a dma mask on 32 bit
rcu: fix rcutorture behavior during reboot
resources: skip sanity check of busy resources
swiotlb: move some definitions to header
swiotlb: allow architectures to override swiotlb pool allocation
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
include/linux/hardirq.h
as per Ingo's suggestions.
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Conflicts:
fs/exec.c
include/linux/init_task.h
Simple context conflicts.
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Add a way for self-monitoring tasks to disable/enable counters summarily,
via a prctl:
PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_DISABLE 31
PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_ENABLE 32
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.
Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.
User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).
When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.
This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:
>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David
>Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
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Impact: relax the locking of cpu-time accounting calls
->siglock buys nothing for thread_group_cputime() in do_sys_times() and
wait_task_zombie() (which btw takes the unrelated parent's ->siglock).
Actually I think do_sys_times() doesn't need ->siglock at all.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Conflicts:
kernel/time/tick-sched.c
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
|
'timers/ntp', 'timers/posixtimers' and 'timers/debug' into v28-timers-for-linus
|
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c
|
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utsname() is quite expensive to calculate. Cache it in a local.
text data bss dec hex filename
before: 11136 720 16 11872 2e60 kernel/sys.o
after: 11096 720 16 11832 2e38 kernel/sys.o
Acked-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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On sethostname() and setdomainname(), previous information may be retained
if it was longer than than the new hostname/domainname.
This can be demonstrated trivially by calling sethostname() first with a
long name, then with a short name, and then calling uname() to retrieve
the full buffer that contains the hostname (and possibly parts of the old
hostname), one just has to look past the terminating zero.
I don't know if we should really care that much (hence the RFC); the only
scenarios I can possibly think of is administrator putting something
sensitive in the hostname (or domain name) by accident, and changing it
back will not undo the mistake entirely, though it's not like we can
recover gracefully from "rm -rf /" either... The other scenario is
namespaces (CLONE_NEWUTS) where some information may be unintentionally
"inherited" from the previous namespace (a program wants to hide the
original name and does clone + sethostname, but some information is still
left).
I think the patch may be defended on grounds of the principle of least
surprise. But I am not adamant :-)
(I guess the question now is whether userspace should be able to
write embedded NULs into the buffer or not...)
At least the observation has been made and the patch has been presented.
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When a process wants to set the limit of open files to RLIM_INFINITY it
gets EPERM even if it has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability.
For example, BIND does:
...
#elif defined(NR_OPEN) && defined(__linux__)
/*
* Some Linux kernels don't accept RLIM_INFINIT; the maximum
* possible value is the NR_OPEN defined in linux/fs.h.
*/
if (resource == isc_resource_openfiles && rlim_value == RLIM_INFINITY) {
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = NR_OPEN;
unixresult = setrlimit(unixresource, &rl);
if (unixresult == 0)
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
#elif ...
If we allow setting RLIMIT_NOFILE to RLIM_INFINITY we increase portability
- you don't have to check if OS is linux and then use different schema for
limits.
The spec says "Specifying RLIM_INFINITY as any resource limit value on a
successful call to setrlimit() shall inhibit enforcement of that resource
limit." and we're presently not doing that.
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Introduce a kref to the tty structure and use it to protect the tty->signal
tty references. For now we don't introduce it for anything else.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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We want to be able to control the default "rounding" that is used by
select() and poll() and friends. This is a per process property
(so that we can have a "nice" like program to start certain programs with
a looser or stricter rounding) that can be set/get via a prctl().
For this purpose, a field called "timer_slack_ns" is added to the task
struct. In addition, a field called "default_timer_slack"ns" is added
so that tasks easily can temporarily to a more/less accurate slack and then
back to the default.
The default value of the slack is set to 50 usec; this is significantly less
than 2.6.27's average select() and poll() timing error but still allows
the kernel to group timers somewhat to preserve power behavior. Applications
and admins can override this via the prctl()
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
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When user calls sys_setpriority(PRIO_PGRP ...) on a NPTL style multi-LWP
process, only the task leader of the process is affected, all other
sibling LWP threads didn't receive the setting. The problem was that the
iterator used in sys_setpriority() only iteartes over one task for each
process, ignoring all other sibling thread.
Introduce a new macro do_each_pid_thread / while_each_pid_thread to walk
each thread of a process. Convert 4 call sites in {set/get}priority and
ioprio_{set/get}.
Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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