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path: root/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
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2009-05-22IMA: Add __init notation to ima functionsEric Paris
A number of IMA functions only used during init are not marked with __init. Add those notations so they are freed automatically. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-23integrity: ima iint radix_tree_lookup locking fixMimi Zohar
Based on Andrew Morton's comments: - add missing locks around radix_tree_lookup in ima_iint_insert() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06Integrity: IMA file free imbalanceMimi Zohar
The number of calls to ima_path_check()/ima_file_free() should be balanced. An extra call to fput(), indicates the file could have been accessed without first being measured. Although f_count is incremented/decremented in places other than fget/fput, like fget_light/fput_light and get_file, the current task must already hold a file refcnt. The call to __fput() is delayed until the refcnt becomes 0, resulting in ima_file_free() flagging any changes. - add hook to increment opencount for IPC shared memory(SYSV), shmat files, and /dev/zero - moved NULL iint test in opencount_get() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06integrity: IMA as an integrity service providerMimi Zohar
IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>