aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2009-05-22IMA: Add __init notation to ima functionsEric Paris
A number of IMA functions only used during init are not marked with __init. Add those notations so they are freed automatically. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policyEric Paris
The IMA TCB policy is dangerous. A normal use can use all of a system's memory (which cannot be freed) simply by building and running lots of executables. The TCB policy is also nearly useless because logging in as root often causes a policy violation when dealing with utmp, thus rendering the measurements meaningless. There is no good fix for this in the kernel. A full TCB policy would need to be loaded in userspace using LSM rule matching to get both a protected and useful system. But, if too little is measured before userspace can load a real policy one again ends up with a meaningless set of measurements. One option would be to put the policy load inside the initrd in order to get it early enough in the boot sequence to be useful, but this runs into trouble with the LSM. For IMA to measure the LSM policy and the LSM policy loading mechanism it needs rules to do so, but we already talked about problems with defaulting to such broad rules.... IMA also depends on the files being measured to be on an FS which implements and supports i_version. Since the only FS with this support (ext4) doesn't even use it by default it seems silly to have any IMA rules by default. This should reduce the performance overhead of IMA to near 0 while still letting users who choose to configure their machine as such to inclue the ima_tcb kernel paramenter and get measurements during boot before they can load a customized, reasonable policy in userspace. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19SELinux: move SELINUX_MAGIC into magic.hEric Paris
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being defined in two places and could someday get out of sync. This patch moves the declaration into magic.h so it is only done once. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-15IMA: do not measure everything opened by root by defaultEric Paris
The IMA default policy measures every single file opened by root. This is terrible for most users. Consider a system (like mine) with virtual machine images. When those images are touched (which happens at boot for me) those images are measured. This is just way too much for the default case. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-06integrity: lsm audit rule matching fixMimi Zohar
An audit subsystem change replaced AUDIT_EQUAL with Audit_equal. Update calls to security_filter_rule_init()/match() to reflect the change. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-12integrity: audit updateMimi Zohar
Based on discussions on linux-audit, as per Steve Grubb's request http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/6/269, the following changes were made: - forced audit result to be either 0 or 1. - made template names const - Added new stand-alone message type: AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06IMA: fix ima_delete_rules() definitionJames Morris
Fix ima_delete_rules() definition so sparse doesn't complain. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06integrity: IMA policyMimi Zohar
Support for a user loadable policy through securityfs with support for LSM specific policy data. - free invalid rule in ima_parse_add_rule() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06integrity: IMA as an integrity service providerMimi Zohar
IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>