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__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't
be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to
set a default at compile time. This value is still tunable after boot
in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
Discussion:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.
Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.
The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is
fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs.
This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has
been used as motivation for not using initramfs.
Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally
used by SELinux but can now be safely removed:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.
Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume
future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.
An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.
An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.
Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.
Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Remove unneeded export.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.
This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.
To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.
Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate
implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for
capabiilty of any process.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;
- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
mm/, security/, & sound/;
many more drivers/ to go)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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