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Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along
with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers. These fields and
tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a
loadable module during LSM development.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch changes the SELinux file_alloc_security function to use
GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_ATOMIC; the use of GFP_ATOMIC appears to be a
remnant of when this function was being called with the files_lock spinlock
held, and is no longer necessary. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Fix the SELinux mprotect checks on executable mappings so that they are not
re-applied when the mapping is already executable as well as cleaning up
the code. This avoids a situation where e.g. an application is prevented
from removing PROT_WRITE on an already executable mapping previously
authorized via execmem permission due to an execmod denial.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Remove the "inline" keyword from a bunch of big functions in the kernel with
the goal of shrinking it by 30kb to 40kb
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Use atomic_inc_not_zero for rcu files instead of special case rcuref.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations. It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.
The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.
When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.
When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.
Testing:
The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch disables the setting of SELinux xattrs on files created in
filesystems labeled via mountpoint labeling (mounted with the context=
option). selinux_inode_setxattr already prevents explicit setxattr from
userspace on such filesystems, so this provides consistent behavior for
file creation.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch simplifies some checks for magic siginfo values. It should not
change the behaviour in any way.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch replaces hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constants with
their symbolic names.
No changes in affected .o files.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Now that RCU applied on 'struct file' seems stable, we can place f_rcuhead
in a memory location that is not anymore used at call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead,
file_free_rcu) time, to reduce the size of this critical kernel object.
The trick I used is to move f_rcuhead and f_list in an union called f_u
The callers are changed so that f_rcuhead becomes f_u.fu_rcuhead and f_list
becomes f_u.f_list
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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security/selinux/hooks.c: In function `selinux_inode_getxattr':
security/selinux/hooks.c:2193: warning: unused variable `sbsec'
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from
getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after
the fs level getxattr() function.
The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode
to override the on-disk value. This could happen in cases such as
upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g. standard SELinux to
MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem.
In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context
that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk.
The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another
parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call,
so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with
the kernel value.
We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems
(i.e. mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the
kernel value to the user.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc
unction. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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The following patch updates the way SELinux classifies and handles IP
based protocols.
Currently, IP sockets are classified by SELinux as being either TCP, UDP
or 'Raw', the latter being a default for IP socket that is not TCP or UDP.
The classification code is out of date and uses only the socket type
parameter to socket(2) to determine the class of IP socket. So, any
socket created with SOCK_STREAM will be classified by SELinux as TCP, and
SOCK_DGRAM as UDP. Also, other socket types such as SOCK_SEQPACKET and
SOCK_DCCP are currently ignored by SELinux, which classifies them as
generic sockets, which means they don't even get basic IP level checking.
This patch changes the SELinux IP socket classification logic, so that
only an IPPROTO_IP protocol value passed to socket(2) classify the socket
as TCP or UDP. The patch also drops the check for SOCK_RAW and converts
it into a default, so that socket types like SOCK_DCCP and SOCK_SEQPACKET
are classified as SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET (instead of generic sockets).
Note that protocol-specific support for SCTP, DCCP etc. is not addressed
here, we're just getting these protocols checked at the IP layer.
This fixes a reported problem where SCTP sockets were being recognized as
generic SELinux sockets yet still being passed in one case to an IP level
check, which then fails for generic sockets.
It will also fix bugs where any SOCK_STREAM socket is classified as TCP or
any SOCK_DGRAM socket is classified as UDP.
This patch also unifies the way IP sockets classes are determined in
selinux_socket_bind(), so we use the already calculated value instead of
trying to recalculate it.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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With the use of RCU in files structure, the look-up of files using fds can now
be lock-free. The lookup is protected by rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock().
This patch changes the readers to use lock-free lookup.
Signed-off-by: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravikiran Thirumalai <kiran_th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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In order for the RCU to work, the file table array, sets and their sizes must
be updated atomically. Instead of ensuring this through too many memory
barriers, we put the arrays and their sizes in a separate structure. This
patch takes the first step of putting the file table elements in a separate
structure fdtable that is embedded withing files_struct. It also changes all
the users to refer to the file table using files_fdtable() macro. Subsequent
applciation of RCU becomes easier after this.
Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch removes the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks as
they are unused (and likely useless).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as
they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic
inode security labeling.
If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now. Also,
is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch modifies tmpfs to call the inode_init_security LSM hook to set
up the incore inode security state for new inodes before the inode becomes
accessible via the dcache.
As there is no underlying storage of security xattrs in this case, it is
not necessary for the hook to return the (name, value, len) triple to the
tmpfs code, so this patch also modifies the SELinux hook function to
correctly handle the case where the (name, value, len) pointers are NULL.
The hook call is needed in tmpfs in order to support proper security
labeling of tmpfs inodes (e.g. for udev with tmpfs /dev in Fedora). With
this change in place, we should then be able to remove the
security_inode_post_create/mkdir/... hooks safely.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created
inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the
existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it
is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache
prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the
post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be
left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works
around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is
initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes
(in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but
potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test
program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the
problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real
applications.
This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation
to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Also, support dccp sockets.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch fixes the address length checks in the selinux_socket_connect
hook to be no more restrictive than the underlying ipv4 and ipv6 code;
otherwise, this hook can reject valid connect calls. This patch is in
response to a bug report where an application was calling connect on an
INET6 socket with an address that didn't include the optional scope id and
failing due to these checks.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field. This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.
With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file). This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.
This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Currently selinux_sb_copy_data requires an entire page be allocated to
*orig when the function is called. This "requirement" is based on the fact
that we call copy_page(in_save, nosec_save) and in_save = orig when the
data is not FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. This means that if a caller were to call
do_kern_mount with only about 10 bytes of options, they would get passed
here and then we would corrupt PAGE_SIZE - 10 bytes of memory (with all
zeros.)
Currently it appears all in kernel FS's use one page of data so this has
not been a problem. An out of kernel FS did just what is described above
and it would almost always panic shortly after they tried to mount. From
looking else where in the kernel it is obvious that this string of data
must always be null terminated. (See example in do_mount where it always
zeros the last byte.) Thus I suggest we use strcpy in place of copy_page.
In this way we make sure the amount we copy is always less than or equal to
the amount we received and since do_mount is zeroing the last byte this
should be safe for all.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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kfree(NULL) is legal.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap
permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so
that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently
an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that
even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous
memory mapped in order to make it executable.
The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.
making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it
could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.
The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code
generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.
The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)
The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch
policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.
kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Add a gfp_mask to audit_log_start() and audit_log(), to reduce the
amount of GFP_ATOMIC allocation -- most of it doesn't need to be
GFP_ATOMIC. Also if the mask includes __GFP_WAIT, then wait up to
60 seconds for the auditd backlog to clear instead of immediately
abandoning the message.
The timeout should probably be made configurable, but for now it'll
suffice that it only happens if auditd is actually running.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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There is a memory leak during mount when SELinux is active and mount
options are specified.
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <geraldsc@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.
-Steve
---
Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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This patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux
module, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure. The use of
a separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function
handling in SELinux and is obsolete. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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The SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect
length final argument. However, the length argument turns out
to be superfluous.
I was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can
get rid of len altogether. The only place where len is used is to
check whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr. This check
is done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.
Now it might appear that we've made the code slower by deferring
the check to skb_copy_bits. However, this check should not trigger
in the common case so this is OK.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.
Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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