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path: root/security/selinux/hooks.c
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2008-07-15Revert "SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present"James Morris
This reverts commit 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9. From Eric Paris: "Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
2008-07-14security: remove register_security hookJames Morris
The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as a secondary module should do so explicitly. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-07-14security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hookMiklos Szeredi
The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the sb_show_options() hook. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mountsEric Paris
This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own security_sb_show_options() function. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if presentEric Paris
Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all. This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy. An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs if available and will follow the genfs rule. This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with this path we just don't need to define it! Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support: SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support: SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14SELinux: use do_each_thread as a proper do/while blockJames Morris
Use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block. Sparse complained. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2008-07-14SELinux: remove unused and shadowed addrlen variableJames Morris
Remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable. Picked up by sparse. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-07-14selinux: simplify ioctl checkingStephen Smalley
Simplify and improve the robustness of the SELinux ioctl checking by using the "access mode" bits of the ioctl command to determine the permission check rather than dealing with individual command values. This removes any knowledge of specific ioctl commands from SELinux and follows the same guidance we gave to Smack earlier. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14SELinux: enable processes with mac_admin to get the raw inode contextsStephen Smalley
Enable processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy to get undefined contexts on inodes. This extends the support for deferred mapping of security contexts in order to permit restorecon and similar programs to see the raw file contexts unknown to the system policy in order to check them. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachStephen Smalley
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security modules to permit access to reading process state without granting full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged. Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the read mode instead of attach. In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps, lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired) or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks). This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler (change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking). Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0 or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14SELinux: keep the code clean formating and syntaxEric Paris
Formatting and syntax changes whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space put open { on same line as struct def remove unneeded {} after if statements change printk("Lu") to printk("llu") convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14selinux: support deferred mapping of contextsStephen Smalley
Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this support to save the context information in the SID table and later recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context again. This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy. With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to specific program domains such as the package manager. # rmdir baz # rm bar # touch bar # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # cat setundefined.te policy_module(setundefined, 1.0) require { type unconfined_t; type unlabeled_t; } files_type(unlabeled_t) allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin; # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp # semodule -i setundefined.pp # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # cat foo.te policy_module(foo, 1.0) type foo_exec_t; files_type(foo_exec_t) # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp # semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r foo # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # semodule -i foo.pp # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r setundefined foo # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # rmdir baz # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-05-01[PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-30signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementationOleg Nesterov
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations. (sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here). NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdataDavid Howells
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessedDavid Howells
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're explicitly accessed. This solves a problem during a login process whereby set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID keyrings having the wrong security labels. This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user keyring. This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings before inventing new ones. The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in> Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29keys: add keyctl function to get a security labelDavid Howells
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29xattr: add missing consts to function argumentsDavid Howells
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28capabilities: implement per-process securebitsAndrew G. Morgan
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-22Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: [PATCH] get rid of __exit_files(), __exit_fs() and __put_fs_struct() [PATCH] proc_readfd_common() race fix [PATCH] double-free of inode on alloc_file() failure exit in create_write_pipe() [PATCH] teach seq_file to discard entries [PATCH] umount_tree() will unhash everything itself [PATCH] get rid of more nameidata passing in namespace.c [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path [PATCH] lock exclusively in collect_mounts() and drop_collected_mounts() [PATCH] move a bunch of declarations to fs/internal.h
2008-04-21[PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to pathAl Viro
Namely, ones from namespace.c Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-22SELinux: no BUG_ON(!ss_initialized) in selinux_clone_mnt_optsEric Paris
The Fedora installer actually makes multiple NFS mounts before it loads selinux policy. The code in selinux_clone_mnt_opts() assumed that the init process would always be loading policy before NFS was up and running. It might be possible to hit this in a diskless environment as well, I'm not sure. There is no need to BUG_ON() in this situation since we can safely continue given the circumstances. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-21SELinux: whitespace and formating fixes for hooks.cEric Paris
All whitespace and formatting. Nothing interesting to see here. About the only thing to remember is that we aren't supposed to initialize static variables to 0/NULL. It is done for us and doing it ourselves puts them in a different section. With this patch running checkpatch.pl against hooks.c only gives us complaints about busting the 80 character limit and declaring extern's in .c files. Apparently they don't like it, but I don't feel like going to the trouble of moving those to .h files... Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-21SELinux: clean up printksEric Paris
Make sure all printk start with KERN_* Make sure all printk end with \n Make sure all printk have the word 'selinux' in them Change "function name" to "%s", __func__ (found 2 wrong) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19Security: Introduce security= boot parameterAhmed S. Darwish
Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exportsAhmed S. Darwish
Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux. Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface. Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public since their internals are needed by the implementation of the new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooksAhmed S. Darwish
Setup the new inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid() LSM hooks for SELinux. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-04-18SELinux: Add network port SID cachePaul Moore
Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache which in turn was taken from the network interface cache. The basic idea is to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information. The hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively small. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18SELinux: turn mount options strings into definesEric Paris
Convert the strings used for mount options into #defines rather than retyping the string throughout the SELinux code. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18selinux: remove ptrace_sidRoland McGrath
This changes checks related to ptrace to get rid of the ptrace_sid tracking. It's good to disentangle the security model from the ptrace implementation internals. It's sufficient to check against the SID of the ptracer at the time a tracee attempts a transition. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18security: code cleanupAndrew Morton
ERROR: "(foo*)" should be "(foo *)" #168: FILE: security/selinux/hooks.c:2656: + "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char*)value, -rc); total: 1 errors, 0 warnings, 195 lines checked ./patches/security-replace-remaining-__function__-occurences.patch has style problems, please review. If any of these errors are false positives report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrencesHarvey Harrison
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__ Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18SELinux: create new open permissionEric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18SELinux: remove unused backpointers from security objectsJames Morris
Remove unused backpoiters from security objects. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18SELinux: Correct the NetLabel locking for the sk_security_structPaul Moore
The RCU/spinlock locking approach for the nlbl_state in the sk_security_struct was almost certainly overkill. This patch removes both the RCU and spinlock locking, relying on the existing socket locks to handle the case of multiple writers. This change also makes several code reductions possible. Less locking, less code - it's a Good Thing. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-10SELinux: don't BUG if fs reuses a superblockEric Paris
I (wrongly) assumed that nfs_xdev_get_sb() would not ever share a superblock and so cloning mount options would always be correct. Turns out that isn't the case and we could fall over a BUG_ON() that wasn't a BUG at all. Since there is little we can do to reconcile different mount options this patch just leaves the sb alone and the first set of options wins. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-08SELinux: more GFP_NOFS fixups to prevent selinux from re-entering the fs codeStephen Smalley
More cases where SELinux must not re-enter the fs code. Called from the d_instantiate security hook. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-04selinux: prevent rentry into the FSJosef Bacik
BUG fix. Keep us from re-entering the fs when we aren't supposed to. See discussion at http://marc.info/?t=120716967100004&r=1&w=2 Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-02selinux: handle files opened with flags 3 by checking ioctl permissionStephen Smalley
Handle files opened with flags 3 by checking ioctl permission. Default to returning FILE__IOCTL from file_to_av() if the f_mode has neither FMODE_READ nor FMODE_WRITE, and thus check ioctl permission on exec or transfer, thereby validating such descriptors early as with normal r/w descriptors and catching leaks of them prior to attempted usage. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-18make selinux_parse_opts_str() staticAdrian Bunk
This patch makes the needlessly global selinux_parse_opts_str() static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount optionsEric Paris
Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code since they were broken by past NFS changes. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-02-14d_path: Use struct path in struct avc_audit_dataJan Blunck
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code. To use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct avc_audit_data. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}Jan Blunck
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata. Together with the other patches of this series - it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on <dentry,vfsmount> pairs - it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed - it reduces the overall code size: without patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux with patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux This patch: Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-11selinux: support 64-bit capabilitiesStephen Smalley
Fix SELinux to handle 64-bit capabilities correctly, and to catch future extensions of capabilities beyond 64 bits to ensure that SELinux is properly updated. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-02-05VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting bufferDavid P. Quigley
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized buffer. Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be used elsewhere for Labeled NFS. The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-01-30selinux: make selinux_set_mnt_opts() staticAdrian Bunk
selinux_set_mnt_opts() can become static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30SELinux: Add warning messages on network denial due to errorPaul Moore
Currently network traffic can be sliently dropped due to non-avc errors which can lead to much confusion when trying to debug the problem. This patch adds warning messages so that when these events occur there is a user visible notification. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checksPaul Moore
This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into and out of the system. Currently SELinux does not have proper control over forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem. Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier work on this topic eventually led to this patch. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30SELinux: Allow NetLabel to directly cache SIDsPaul Moore
Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes. This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30SELinux: Enable dynamic enable/disable of the network access checksPaul Moore
This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the entry is removed it is decreased. In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the target is removed. These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine if either of these subsystems are enabled. NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled() function. This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which is not the case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>