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2007-04-25[NETLINK]: Switch cb_lock spinlock to mutex and allow to override itPatrick McHardy
Switch cb_lock to mutex and allow netlink kernel users to override it with a subsystem specific mutex for consistent locking in dump callbacks. All netlink_dump_start users have been audited not to rely on any side-effects of the previously used spinlock. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25[NETLINK]: Introduce nlmsg_hdr() helperArnaldo Carvalho de Melo
For the common "(struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data" sequence, so that we reduce the number of direct accesses to skb->data and for consistency with all the other cast skb member helpers. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25[SK_BUFF]: Convert skb->tail to sk_buff_data_tArnaldo Carvalho de Melo
So that it is also an offset from skb->head, reduces its size from 8 to 4 bytes on 64bit architectures, allowing us to combine the 4 bytes hole left by the layer headers conversion, reducing struct sk_buff size to 256 bytes, i.e. 4 64byte cachelines, and since the sk_buff slab cache is SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN... :-) Many calculations that previously required that skb->{transport,network, mac}_header be first converted to a pointer now can be done directly, being meaningful as offsets or pointers. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25[SK_BUFF]: Introduce skb_network_offset()Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
For the quite common 'skb->nh.raw - skb->data' sequence. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-03-14[PATCH] sanitize security_getprocattr() APIAl Viro
have it return the buffer it had allocated Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-26Always initialize scontext and scontext_lenStephen Smalley
Always initialize *scontext and *scontext_len in security_sid_to_context. (via http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/2/23/135) Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-02-26Reassign printk levels in selinux kernel codeEric Paris
Below is a patch which demotes many printk lines to KERN_DEBUG from KERN_INFO. It should help stop the spamming of logs with messages in which users are not interested nor is there any action that users should take. It also promotes some KERN_INFO to KERN_ERR such as when there are improper attempts to register/unregister security modules. A similar patch was discussed a while back on list: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=116656343500003&r=1&w=2 This patch addresses almost all of the issues raised. I believe the only advice not taken was in the demoting of messages related to undefined permissions and classes. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++--- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodesStephen Smalley
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing, as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over them. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] sysctl: fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sidEric W. Biederman
I goofed and when reenabling the fine grained selinux labels for sysctls and forgot to add the "/sys" prefix before consulting the policy database. When computing the same path using proc_dir_entries we got the "/sys" for free as it was part of the tree, but it isn't true for clt_table trees. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tablesEric W. Biederman
It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are initializing. [akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.hTim Schmielau
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes. There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the course of cleaning it up. To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble. Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha, arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig, allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted by unnecessarily included header files). Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12[PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 9Arjan van de Ven
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to these shared resources. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-11[PATCH] Replace regular code with appropriate calls to container_of()Robert P. J. Day
Replace a small number of expressions with a call to the "container_of()" macro. Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-11[PATCH] Transform kmem_cache_alloc()+memset(0) -> kmem_cache_zalloc().Robert P. J. Day
Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call. Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-01-26[SELINUX]: Fix 2.6.20-rc6 build when no xfrmVenkat Yekkirala
This patch is an incremental fix to the flow_cache_genid patch for selinux that breaks the build of 2.6.20-rc6 when xfrm is not configured. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-01-23[SELINUX]: increment flow cache genidVenkat Yekkirala
Currently, old flow cache entries remain valid even after a reload of SELinux policy. This patch increments the flow cache generation id on policy (re)loads so that flow cache entries are revalidated as needed. Thanks to Herbet Xu for pointing this out. See: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=116841378704536&w=2 There's also a general issue as well as a solution proposed by David Miller for when flow_cache_genid wraps. I might be submitting a separate patch for that later. I request that this be applied to 2.6.20 since it's a security relevant fix. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-01-09NetLabel: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid()Paul Moore
The spinlock protecting the update of the "sksec->nlbl_state" variable is not currently softirq safe which can lead to problems. This patch fixes this by changing the spin_{un}lock() functions into spin_{un}lock_bh() functions. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-01-08selinux: Delete mls_copy_contextVenkat Yekkirala
This deletes mls_copy_context() in favor of mls_context_cpy() and replaces mls_scopy_context() with mls_context_cpy_low(). Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-01-02[PATCH] selinux: fix selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() lockingParag Warudkar
do not call a sleeping lock API in an RCU read section. lock_sock_nested can sleep, its BH counterpart doesn't. selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() needs to use the BH counterpart unconditionally. Compile tested. From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> added BH disabling, because this function can be called from non-atomic contexts too, so a naked bh_lock_sock() would be deadlock-prone. Boot-tested the resulting kernel. Signed-off-by: Parag Warudkar <paragw@paragw.zapto.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-10[PATCH] fdtable: Make fdarray and fdsets equal in sizeVadim Lobanov
Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the fdarray and two fdsets. The code allows the number of fds supported by the fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset). In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all. Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal. This patch removes fdtable->max_fdset. As an added bonus, most of the supporting code becomes simpler. Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08[PATCH] struct path: convert selinuxJosef Sipek
Signed-off-by: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08[PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty lockingPeter Zijlstra
Fix the locking of signal->tty. Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current' or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway. (NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules) Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access). It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing. (NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info invocations) [schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix] [akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07[PATCH] slab: remove kmem_cache_tChristoph Lameter
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache. The patch was generated using the following script: #!/bin/sh # # Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources. # set -e for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do quilt add $file sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$ mv /tmp/$$ $file quilt refresh done The script was run like this sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache" Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07[PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_KERNELChristoph Lameter
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07[PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_ATOMICChristoph Lameter
SLAB_ATOMIC is an alias of GFP_ATOMIC Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-04[PATCH] selinux endianness annotationsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-02Rename class_destroy to avoid namespace conflicts.James Morris
We're seeing increasing namespace conflicts between the global class_destroy() function declared in linux/device.h, and the private function in the SELinux core code. This patch renames the SELinux function to cls_destroy() to avoid this conflict. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02NetLabel: convert to an extensibile/sparse category bitmapPaul Moore
The original NetLabel category bitmap was a straight char bitmap which worked fine for the initial release as it only supported 240 bits due to limitations in the CIPSO restricted bitmap tag (tag type 0x01). This patch converts that straight char bitmap into an extensibile/sparse bitmap in order to lay the foundation for other CIPSO tag types and protocols. This patch also has a nice side effect in that all of the security attributes passed by NetLabel into the LSM are now in a format which is in the host's native byte/bit ordering which makes the LSM specific code much simpler; look at the changes in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c as an example. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02Compile fix for "peer secid consolidation for external network labeling"James Morris
Use a forward declaration instead of dragging in skbuff.h and related junk. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02SELinux: peer secid consolidation for external network labelingPaul Moore
Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled IPsec and NetLabel. In addition, create a new function, security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further simplify the code in a few places. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02NetLabel: SELinux cleanupsPaul Moore
This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code. A summary of the changes include: * Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex. * Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(). * Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel sk_security functions. * Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of the common case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02NetLabel: make netlbl_lsm_secattr struct easier/quicker to understandPaul Moore
The existing netlbl_lsm_secattr struct required the LSM to check all of the fields to determine if any security attributes were present resulting in a lot of work in the common case of no attributes. This patch adds a 'flags' field which is used to indicate which attributes are present in the structure; this should allow the LSM to do a quick comparison to determine if the structure holds any security attributes. Example: if (netlbl_lsm_secattr->flags) /* security attributes present */ else /* NO security attributes present */ Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02[IPv6] prefix: Convert RTM_NEWPREFIX notifications to use the new netlink apiThomas Graf
RTM_GETPREFIX is completely unused and is thus removed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02[SELinux]: Add support for DCCPJames Morris
This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02SELinux: Fix SA selection semanticsVenkat Yekkirala
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's. With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs: 1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom } 2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t self:association { sendto }; allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom }; Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02SELinux: Return correct context for SO_PEERSECVenkat Yekkirala
Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of the peer (as represented by the SA from the peer) as opposed to the SA used by the local/source socket. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02SELinux: Various xfrm labeling fixesVenkat Yekkirala
Since the upstreaming of the mlsxfrm modification a few months back, testing has resulted in the identification of the following issues/bugs that are resolved in this patch set. 1. Fix the security context used in the IKE negotiation to be the context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule. 2. Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of the peer as opposed to the source. 3. Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same context as the originating socket/flow. The following would be the result of applying this patchset: - SO_PEERSEC will now correctly return the peer's context. - IKE deamons will receive the context of the source socket/flow as opposed to the SPD rule's context so that the negotiated SA will be at the same context as the source socket/flow. - The SELinux policy will require one or more of the following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs: 1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom } 2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t self:association { sendto }; allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom }; This Patch: Pass correct security context to IKE for use in negotiation Fix the security context passed to IKE for use in negotiation to be the context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule so that the SA carries the label of the originating socket/flow. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-01Merge branch 'for-2.6.20' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-2.6.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: SELinux: validate kernel object classes and permissions SELinux: ensure keys constant in hashtab_search SELinux: export object class and permission definitions SELinux: remove current object class and permission validation mechanism
2006-11-28SELinux: validate kernel object classes and permissionsChad Sellers
This is a new object class and permission validation scheme that validates against the defined kernel headers. This scheme allows extra classes and permissions that do not conflict with the kernel definitions to be added to the policy. This validation is now done for all policy loads, not just subsequent loads after the first policy load. The implementation walks the three structrures containing the defined object class and permission values and ensures their values are the same in the policy being loaded. This includes verifying the object classes themselves, the permissions they contain, and the permissions they inherit from commons. Classes or permissions that are present in the kernel but missing from the policy cause a warning (printed to KERN_INFO) to be printed, but do not stop the policy from loading, emulating current behavior. Any other inconsistencies cause the load to fail. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28SELinux: ensure keys constant in hashtab_searchChad Sellers
Makes the key argument passed into hashtab_search and all the functions it calls constant. These functions include hash table function pointers hash_value and keycmp. The only implementations of these currently are symhash and symcmp, which do not modify the key. The key parameter should never be changed by any of these, so it should be const. This is necessary to allow calling these functions with keys found in kernel object class and permission definitions. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28SELinux: export object class and permission definitionsChad Sellers
Moves the definition of the 3 structs containing object class and permission definitions from avc.c to avc_ss.h so that the security server can access them for validation on policy load. This also adds a new struct type, defined_classes_perms_t, suitable for allowing the security server to access these data structures from the avc. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28SELinux: remove current object class and permission validation mechanismChad Sellers
Removes the current SELinux object class and permission validation code, as the current code makes it impossible to change or remove object classes and permissions on a running system. Additionally, the current code does not actually validate that the classes and permissions are correct, but instead merely validates that they do not change between policy reloads. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-27selinux: fix dentry_open() error checkAkinobu Mita
The return value of dentry_open() shoud be checked by IS_ERR(). Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-30[NetLabel]: protect the CIPSOv4 socket option from setsockopt()Paul Moore
This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket. The first is the requirement that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send. The second change is to SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they send. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-10-15NetLabel: better error handling involving mls_export_cat()Paul Moore
Upon inspection it looked like the error handling for mls_export_cat() was rather poor. This patch addresses this by NULL'ing out kfree()'d pointers before returning and checking the return value of the function everywhere it is called. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11SELinux: Bug fix in polidydb_destroyChad Sellers
This patch fixes two bugs in policydb_destroy. Two list pointers (policydb.ocontexts[i] and policydb.genfs) were not being reset to NULL when the lists they pointed to were being freed. This caused a problem when the initial policy load failed, as the policydb being destroyed was not a temporary new policydb that was thrown away, but rather was the global (active) policydb. Consequently, later functions, particularly sys_bind->selinux_socket_bind->security_node_sid and do_rw_proc->selinux_sysctl->selinux_proc_get_sid->security_genfs_sid tried to dereference memory that had previously been freed. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matchingVenkat Yekkirala
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled" IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable xfrm(s) applied. The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by default" in the above case. This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context). Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied, such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). This patch: Fix the selinux side of things. This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated with the IPSec policy rule. Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case is now handled properly. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11NetLabel: use SECINITSID_UNLABELED for a base SIDpaul.moore@hp.com
This patch changes NetLabel to use SECINITSID_UNLABLELED as it's source of SELinux type information when generating a NetLabel context. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11NetLabel: fix a cache race conditionpaul.moore@hp.com
Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems. This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-03Still more typo fixesMatt LaPlante
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>