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2006-09-22[SELINUX]: security/selinux/hooks.c: Make 4 functions static.Adrian Bunk
This patch makes four needlessly global functions static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[NetLabel]: SELinux supportVenkat Yekkirala
Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into the following SELinux LSM hooks: * selinux_file_permission() * selinux_socket_sendmsg() * selinux_socket_post_create() * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram() * selinux_sock_graft() * selinux_inet_conn_request() The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are "NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security attributes are checked via the additional hook in selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks. In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security (mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out of NetLabel. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Fix build with SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM disabled.Venkat Yekkirala
The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled. As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in -mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child socketsVenkat Yekkirala
This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security Associations. This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policiesVenkat Yekkirala
This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the same as the socket they are set on. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Add flow labelingVenkat Yekkirala
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can be used. The following protos are currently not handled, but they should continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently do. ipmr ip_gre ipip igmp sit sctp ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device) decnet Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and stateVenkat Yekkirala
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary SELinux enforcement pieces. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sockVenkat Yekkirala
This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP LAST_ACK state). This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Define new SELinux service routineVenkat Yekkirala
This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for open requests and connection-oriented child sockets. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22[MLSXFRM]: Granular IPSec associations for use in MLS environmentsVenkat Yekkirala
The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and security associations. This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System, traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to these security levels). This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with each association used in the security context it is defined for. It also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of appropriately labeled IPSec associations. Description of changes: A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on the inbound. Outbound case: 1. Find policy for the socket. 2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy. NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket. This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS, and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket. 3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found, create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE, include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE daemon. Inbound case: 1. OLD: Find policy for the socket. NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).) 2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with the policy sec_ctx-wise. (It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that this was being accomplished by (x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok, but it turns out tmpl->id.spi would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one at the template level, which they usually don't). NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(). Forward case: This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3 from the Outbound case. Outstanding items/issues: - Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed by this patch set. This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm policy rule. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-21[CRYPTO] users: Use crypto_hash interface instead of crypto_digestHerbert Xu
This patch converts all remaining crypto_digest users to use the new crypto_hash interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2006-08-02[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patchCatherine Zhang
From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-07-31[PATCH] selinux: fix bug in security_compute_sidVenkat Yekkirala
Initializes newcontext sooner to allow for its destruction in all cases. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-31[PATCH] selinux: fix memory leakDarrel Goeddel
This patch fixes a memory leak when a policydb structure is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-14[PATCH] Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount optionsEric Paris
After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had already been used. When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and relabel_to. But if the superblock has already been labeled (with fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should be checking relabel_from and associate. This patch fixes which checks are called depending on the mount options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-10[PATCH] SELinux: add rootcontext= option to label root inode when mountingEric Paris
Introduce a new rootcontext= option to FS mounting. This option will allow you to explicitly label the root inode of an FS being mounted before that FS or inode because visible to userspace. This was found to be useful for things like stateless linux, see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=190001 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-10[PATCH] SELinux: decouple fscontext/context mount optionsEric Paris
Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options. If context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get the label specified by context=. The superblock will be labeled with the label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock security context, such as associate permissions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-01[PATCH] audit: support for object context filtersDarrel Goeddel
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements of the SELinux context. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-07-01[PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constantsDarrel Goeddel
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++---- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------- 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-06-30Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivialLinus Torvalds
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivial: Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h> remove obsolete swsusp_encrypt arch/arm26/Kconfig typos Documentation/IPMI typos Kconfig: Typos in net/sched/Kconfig v9fs: do not include linux/version.h Documentation/DocBook/mtdnand.tmpl: typo fixes typo fixes: specfic -> specific typo fixes in Documentation/networking/pktgen.txt typo fixes: occuring -> occurring typo fixes: infomation -> information typo fixes: disadvantadge -> disadvantage typo fixes: aquire -> acquire typo fixes: mecanism -> mechanism typo fixes: bandwith -> bandwidth fix a typo in the RTC_CLASS help text smb is no longer maintained Manually merged trivial conflict in arch/um/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
2006-06-30[PATCH] SELinux: Add security hook definition for getioprio and insert hooksDavid Quigley
Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation. At present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-30[PATCH] SELinux: extend task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completionDavid Quigley
This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completion. In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended task_kill hook for use in checking. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-30Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-29[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersecCatherine Zhang
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29[NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.Darrel Goeddel
This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct. This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks. Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29[PATCH] Keys: Allow in-kernel key requestor to pass auxiliary data to upcallerDavid Howells
The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key. This is because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will be contacted through rpc_pipefs. This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a pre-existing communications channel more easily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-By: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27[PATCH] poison: add & use more constantsRandy Dunlap
Add more poison values to include/linux/poison.h. It's not clear to me whether some others should be added or not, so I haven't added any of these: ./include/linux/libata.h:#define ATA_TAG_POISON 0xfafbfcfdU ./arch/ppc/8260_io/fcc_enet.c:1918: memset((char *)(&(immap->im_dprambase[(mem_addr+64)])), 0x88, 32); ./drivers/usb/mon/mon_text.c:429: memset(mem, 0xe5, sizeof(struct mon_event_text)); ./drivers/char/ftape/lowlevel/ftape-ctl.c:738: memset(ft_buffer[i]->address, 0xAA, FT_BUFF_SIZE); ./drivers/block/sx8.c:/* 0xf is just arbitrary, non-zero noise; this is sorta like poisoning */ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27[PATCH] selinux: inherit /proc/self/attr/keycreate across forkMichael LeMay
Update SELinux to cause the keycreate process attribute held in /proc/self/attr/keycreate to be inherited across a fork and reset upon execve. This is consistent with the handling of the other process attributes provided by SELinux and also makes it simpler to adapt logon programs to properly handle the keycreate attribute. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr APIEric Paris
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same. I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keysMichael LeMay
Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keysMichael LeMay
Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is granted View permission are presented. The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: allocate key serial numbers randomlyMichael LeMay
Cause key_alloc_serial() to generate key serial numbers randomly rather than in linear sequence. Using an linear sequence permits a covert communication channel to be established, in which one process can communicate with another by creating or not creating new keys within a certain timeframe. The second process can probe for the expected next key serial number and judge its existence by the error returned. This is a problem as the serial number namespace is globally shared between all tasks, regardless of their context. For more information on this topic, this old TCSEC guide is recommended: http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-030.html Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's ownerFredrik Tolf
Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the quota burden to the new user. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: discard the contents of a key on revocationDavid Howells
Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked. This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than waiting for the key to actually be destroyed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26[PATCH] keys: sort out key quota systemDavid Howells
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a process that didn't previously have one. This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-24Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/Trond Myklebust
Conflicts: fs/nfs/inode.c fs/super.c Fix conflicts between patch 'NFS: Split fs/nfs/inode.c' and patch 'VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mount'
2006-06-23[PATCH] SELinux: add task_movememory hookDavid Quigley
This patch adds new security hook, task_movememory, to be called when memory owened by a task is to be moved (e.g. when migrating pages to a this hook is identical to the setscheduler implementation, but a separate hook introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. Since the last posting, the hook has been renamed following feedback from Christoph Lameter. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23[PATCH] lsm: add task_setioprio hookJames Morris
Implement an LSM hook for setting a task's IO priority, similar to the hook for setting a tasks's nice value. A previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of multiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don't recall it being submitted upstream. Also included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched permission in the proccess class. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@linux01.gwdg.de> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to perform statfs with a known root dentryDavid Howells
Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock pointer. This complements the get_sb() patch. That reduced the significance of sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there. However, NFS does require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation. This permits the root in the vfsmount to be used instead. linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build successfully. Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mountDavid Howells
Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint. The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt() which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour). The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the superblock pointer. This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root and mnt_sb would be set directly. The patch also makes the following changes: (*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change very little. (*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb(). (*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon(). This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root, and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in dentries being left unculled. However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries with child trees. [*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree. (*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation. [akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-22[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a keyDavid Howells
Add a revocation notification method to the key type and calls it whilst the key's semaphore is still write-locked after setting the revocation flag. The patch then uses this to maintain a reference on the task_struct of the process that calls request_key() for as long as the authorisation key remains unrevoked. This fixes a potential race between two processes both of which have assumed the authority to instantiate a key (one may have forked the other for example). The problem is that there's no locking around the check for revocation of the auth key and the use of the task_struct it points to, nor does the auth key keep a reference on the task_struct. Access to the "context" pointer in the auth key must thenceforth be done with the auth key semaphore held. The revocation method is called with the target key semaphore held write-locked and the search of the context process's keyrings is done with the auth key semaphore read-locked. The check for the revocation state of the auth key just prior to searching it is done after the auth key is read-locked for the search. This ensures that the auth key can't be revoked between the check and the search. The revocation notification method is added so that the context task_struct can be released as soon as instantiation happens rather than waiting for the auth key to be destroyed, thus avoiding the unnecessary pinning of the requesting process. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-22[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystemMichael LeMay
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-20Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/Trond Myklebust
Conflicts: include/linux/nfs_fs.h Fixed up conflict with kernel header updates.
2006-06-20Merge branch 'audit.b21' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current * 'audit.b21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (25 commits) [PATCH] make set_loginuid obey audit_enabled [PATCH] log more info for directory entry change events [PATCH] fix AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND handling [PATCH] validate rule fields' types [PATCH] audit: path-based rules [PATCH] Audit of POSIX Message Queue Syscalls v.2 [PATCH] fix se_sen audit filter [PATCH] deprecate AUDIT_POSSBILE [PATCH] inline more audit helpers [PATCH] proc_loginuid_write() uses simple_strtoul() on non-terminated array [PATCH] update of IPC audit record cleanup [PATCH] minor audit updates [PATCH] fix audit_krule_to_{rule,data} return values [PATCH] add filtering by ppid [PATCH] log ppid [PATCH] collect sid of those who send signals to auditd [PATCH] execve argument logging [PATCH] fix deadlocks in AUDIT_LIST/AUDIT_LIST_RULES [PATCH] audit_panic() is audit-internal [PATCH] inotify (5/5): update kernel documentation ... Manual fixup of conflict in unclude/linux/inotify.h
2006-06-20Merge git://git.infradead.org/~dwmw2/rbtree-2.6Linus Torvalds
* git://git.infradead.org/~dwmw2/rbtree-2.6: [RBTREE] Switch rb_colour() et al to en_US spelling of 'color' for consistency Update UML kernel/physmem.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro [RBTREE] Update hrtimers to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Add explicit alignment to sizeof(long) for struct rb_node. [RBTREE] Merge colour and parent fields of struct rb_node. [RBTREE] Remove dead code in rb_erase() [RBTREE] Update JFFS2 to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Update eventpoll.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Update key.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Update ext3 to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Change rbtree off-tree marking in I/O schedulers. [RBTREE] Add accessor macros for colour and parent fields of rb_node
2006-06-20Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/Trond Myklebust
2006-06-20[PATCH] fix se_sen audit filterDarrel Goeddel
Fix a broken comparison that causes the process clearance to be checked for both se_clr and se_sen audit filters. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-06-17[SECMARK]: Add new packet controls to SELinuxJames Morris
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old packet controls. Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls. To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is still present, but not active by default. To restore previous behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a '1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged. With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is not affected at all. It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel configuration. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17[SECMARK]: Add SELinux exportsJames Morris
Add and export new functions to the in-kernel SELinux API in support of the new secmark-based packet controls. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17[SECMARK]: Add new flask definitions to SELinuxJames Morris
Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/ Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/ The code has been tested with various compilation options and in several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection tracking. This patch: Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for adding labeling rules. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>