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To retrieve the neighbour tables send RTM_GETNEIGHTBL with the
NLM_F_DUMP flag set. Every neighbour table configuration is
spread over multiple messages to avoid running into message
size limits on systems with many interfaces. The first message
in the sequence transports all not device specific data such as
statistics, configuration, and the default parameter set.
This message is followed by 0..n messages carrying device
specific parameter sets.
Although the ordering should be sufficient, NDTA_NAME can be
used to identify sequences. The initial message can be identified
by checking for NDTA_CONFIG. The device specific messages do
not contain this TLV but have NDTPA_IFINDEX set to the
corresponding interface index.
To change neighbour table attributes, send RTM_SETNEIGHTBL
with NDTA_NAME set. Changeable attribute include NDTA_THRESH[1-3],
NDTA_GC_INTERVAL, and all TLVs in NDTA_PARMS unless marked
otherwise. Device specific parameter sets can be changed by
setting NDTPA_IFINDEX to the interface index of the corresponding
device.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Per Steve Grubb's observation that there are some remaining cases where
avc_audit() directly logs untrusted strings without escaping them, here
is a patch that changes avc_audit() to use audit_log_untrustedstring()
or audit_log_hex() as appropriate. Note that d_name.name is nul-
terminated by d_alloc(), and that sun_path is nul-terminated by
unix_mkname(), so it is not necessary for the AVC to create nul-
terminated copies or to alter audit_log_untrustedstring to take a length
argument. In the case of an abstract name, we use audit_log_hex() with
an explicit length.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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When I added the logging of pid= and comm= back to avc_audit() I
screwed it up. Put it back how it should be.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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This patch changes the SELinux AVC to defer logging of paths to the audit
framework upon syscall exit, by saving a reference to the (dentry,vfsmount)
pair in an auxiliary audit item on the current audit context for processing
by audit_log_exit.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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We turned this all off because the 'exe=' was causing deadlocks on
dcache_lock. There's no need to leave the pid and comm out though.
They'll all be logged correctly if full auditing is enabled, but we
should still print them in case auditing _isn't_ enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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It's silly to have to add explicit entries for new userspace messages
as we invent them. Just treat all messages in the user range the same.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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This patch should fix the avc_alloc_node() oom condition that Andrew
reported when no policy is loaded in SELinux.
Prior to this patch, when no policy was loaded, the SELinux "security
server" (policy engine) was only returning allowed decisions for the
requested permissions for each access check. This caused the cache to
thrash when trying to use SELinux for real work with no policy loaded
(typically, the no policy loaded state is only for bootstrapping to the
point where we can load an initial policy).
This patch changes the SELinux security server to return the complete
allowed access vector at once, and then to reset the cache after the
initial policy load to flush the initial cache state created during
bootstrapping.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.
-Steve
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Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Add audit_log_type to allow callers to specify type and pid when logging.
Convert audit_log to wrapper around audit_log_type. Could have
converted all audit_log callers directly, but common case is default
of type AUDIT_KERNEL and pid 0. Update audit_log_start to take type
and pid values when creating a new audit_buffer. Move sequences that
did audit_log_start, audit_log_format, audit_set_type, audit_log_end,
to simply call audit_log_type directly. This obsoletes audit_set_type
and audit_set_pid, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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shutdown credential information. It creates a new message type
AUDIT_TERM_INFO, which is used by the audit daemon to query who issued the
shutdown.
It requires the placement of a hook function that gathers the information. The
hook is after the DAC & MAC checks and before the function returns. Racing
threads could overwrite the uid & pid - but they would have to be root and
have policy that allows signalling the audit daemon. That should be a
manageable risk.
The userspace component will be released later in audit 0.7.2. When it
receives the TERM signal, it queries the kernel for shutdown information.
When it receives it, it writes the message and exits. The message looks
like this:
type=DAEMON msg=auditd(1114551182.000) auditd normal halt, sending pid=2650
uid=525, auditd pid=1685
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.
1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET
operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation
however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux
permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.
2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel,
collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An
example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out
nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
written to the kernel.
Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux
module, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure. The use of
a separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function
handling in SELinux and is obsolete. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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The SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect
length final argument. However, the length argument turns out
to be superfluous.
I was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can
get rid of len altogether. The only place where len is used is to
check whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr. This check
is done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.
Now it might appear that we've made the code slower by deferring
the check to skb_copy_bits. However, this check should not trigger
in the common case so this is OK.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This fixes a deadlock on the dcache lock detected during testing at IBM
by moving the logging of the current executable information from the
SELinux avc_audit function to audit_log_exit (via an audit_log_task_info
helper) for processing upon syscall exit.
For consistency, the patch also removes the logging of other
task-related information from avc_audit, deferring handling to
audit_log_exit instead.
This allows simplification of the avc_audit code, allows the exe
information to be obtained more reliably, always includes the comm
information (useful for scripts), and avoids including bogus task
information for checks performed from irq or softirq.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.
Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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This patch fixes a bug in the SELinux Netlink message type detection code,
where the wrong constant was being used in a case statement. The incorrect
value is not valid for this class of object so it would not have been
reached, and fallen through to a default handler for all Netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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