Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  security: enhance DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR description
  SELinux: add netport.[ch]
  SELinux: Add network port SID cache
  SELinux: turn mount options strings into defines
  selinux/ss/services.c should #include <linux/selinux.h>
  selinux: introduce permissive types
  selinux: remove ptrace_sid
  SELinux: requesting no permissions in avc_has_perm_noaudit is a BUG()
  security: code cleanup
  security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences
  SELinux: create new open permission
  selinux: selinux/netlabel.c should #include "netlabel.h"
  SELinux: unify printk messages
  SELinux: remove unused backpointers from security objects
  SELinux: Correct the NetLabel locking for the sk_security_struct

25 files changed, 617 insertions, 270 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 5dfc206748c..49b51f96489 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -113,10 +113,12 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
 	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
 
-	  For most users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is
-	  reasonable and should cause no problems.  Programs which use vm86
-	  functionality would either need additional permissions from either
-	  the LSM or the capabilities module or have this protection disabled.
+	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+	  this protection disabled.
 
 	  This value can be changed after boot using the
 	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 06d5c9469ba..852905789ca 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
-			__FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename);
+			__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 
 out:
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 	if (ret)
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n",
-			__FUNCTION__, ret, bprm->filename);
+			__func__, ret, bprm->filename);
 
 	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index d36d6939335..7d894ef7037 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
 
 #ifdef __KDEBUG
 #define kenter(FMT, ...) \
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kleave(FMT, ...) \
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "xxx" FMT"yyy\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #else
 #define kenter(FMT, ...) \
-	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kleave(FMT, ...) \
-	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __FUNCTION__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
 	no_printk(KERN_DEBUG FMT"\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
 #endif
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index 870f13095bb..6112d1404c8 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ module_param(debug, bool, 0600);
 	do {							\
 		if (debug)					\
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %s: " fmt ,	\
-				MY_NAME , __FUNCTION__ , 	\
+				MY_NAME , __func__ , 	\
 				## arg);			\
 	} while (0)
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b1387a6b416..9beecac933b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 
 	if (verify(&dummy_security_ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s could not verify "
-		       "dummy_security_ops structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "dummy_security_ops structure.\n", __func__);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (verify(ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
-		       "security_operations structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "security_operations structure.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (verify(ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s could not verify "
-		       "security operations.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "security operations.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (ops == security_ops) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s security operations "
-		       "already registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "already registered.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 2b517d61867..a436d1cfa88 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 	int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-	range 15 22
+	range 15 23
 	default 19
 	help
 	  This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 00afd85f1ed..d47fc5e545e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ selinux-y := avc.o \
 	     nlmsgtab.o \
 	     netif.o \
 	     netnode.o \
+	     netport.o \
 	     exports.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 187964e88af..a4fc6e6d038 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -871,6 +871,8 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 denied;
 
+	BUG_ON(!requested);
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
@@ -890,13 +892,14 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
 
-	if (!requested || denied) {
-		if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT))
+	if (denied) {
+		if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
+			avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
+					tsid, tclass);
 		else
-			if (node)
-				avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT,requested,
-						ssid,tsid,tclass);
+			rc = -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d39b59cf8a0..34f2d46c798 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "netif.h"
 #include "netnode.h"
+#include "netport.h"
 #include "xfrm.h"
 #include "netlabel.h"
 
@@ -161,8 +162,7 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 	if (!tsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	tsec->task = task;
-	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	task->security = tsec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 	if (!fsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	fsec->file = file;
 	fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 	fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 	file->f_security = fsec;
@@ -275,12 +274,11 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 	if (!ssec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ssec->sk = sk;
 	ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sk->sk_security = ssec;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -324,10 +322,10 @@ enum {
 };
 
 static match_table_t tokens = {
-	{Opt_context, "context=%s"},
-	{Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
-	{Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
-	{Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
+	{Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 	{Opt_error, NULL},
 };
 
@@ -671,7 +669,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
-		       __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+		       __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1137,7 +1135,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		}
 		if (!dentry) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
-			       "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
+			       "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
 			       inode->i_ino);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
@@ -1175,7 +1173,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		if (rc < 0) {
 			if (rc != -ENODATA) {
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  getxattr returned "
-				       "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+				       "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
 				       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 				kfree(context);
 				goto out_unlock;
@@ -1190,7 +1188,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			if (rc) {
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
 				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-				       __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
+				       __func__, context, -rc,
 				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 				kfree(context);
 				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
@@ -1618,6 +1616,35 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
 	return av;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * open permission.
+ */
+static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+	u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
+		/*
+		 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
+		 */
+		if (S_ISREG(mode))
+			av |= FILE__OPEN;
+		else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
+			av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
+		else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
+			av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
+		else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
+			av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
+		else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
+			av |= DIR__OPEN;
+		else
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av "
+				"with unknown mode:%x\n", mode);
+	}
+	return av;
+}
+
 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
 {
@@ -1645,19 +1672,13 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
 {
-	struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
-	struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
-	/* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
-	if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
-		csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
-	return rc;
+	return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1879,6 +1900,22 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }
 
+/**
+ * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
+ * @task:		task to consider
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
+ * pointer to its tracer.
+ *
+ * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
+ */
+static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
+		return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /* binprm security operations */
 
 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1889,7 +1926,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (!bsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	bsec->bprm = bprm;
 	bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	bsec->set = 0;
 
@@ -2126,12 +2162,25 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
 		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
 		if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
-					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
-					  NULL);
-			if (rc) {
-				bsec->unsafe = 1;
-				return;
+			struct task_struct *tracer;
+			struct task_security_struct *sec;
+			u32 ptsid = 0;
+
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
+			if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
+				sec = tracer->security;
+				ptsid = sec->sid;
+			}
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			if (ptsid != 0) {
+				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						  PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+				if (rc) {
+					bsec->unsafe = 1;
+					return;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 		tsec->sid = sid;
@@ -2239,10 +2288,10 @@ static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
 
 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
 {
-	return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
-	        match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
-	        match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
-		match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
+	return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
 }
 
 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
@@ -2412,7 +2461,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
 			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
 			       "ino=%ld)\n",
-			       __FUNCTION__,
+			       __func__,
 			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 			return rc;
 		}
@@ -2536,7 +2585,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
 	}
 
 	return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
-			       file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
+			       open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -2646,7 +2695,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
 	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
-		       "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
+		       "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char *)value, -rc);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -3087,11 +3136,6 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
 	tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
 
-	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
-	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
-	   subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
-	tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3627,10 +3671,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 			inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
 
 			if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
-				err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
-							sk->sk_type,
-							sk->sk_protocol, snum,
-							&sid);
+				err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
 				AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
@@ -3718,8 +3760,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
 		}
 
-		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-					sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -3950,9 +3991,8 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
 
 	if (!recv_perm)
 		return 0;
-	err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-				sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
-				&port_sid);
+	err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+			      ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 		       "SELinux: failure in"
@@ -4139,7 +4179,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 	newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
@@ -4373,9 +4413,8 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
 	if (send_perm != 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-				sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
-				&port_sid);
+	err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+			      ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 		       "SELinux: failure in"
@@ -4561,7 +4600,6 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	isec->sclass = sclass;
-	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
 	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
 	perm->security = isec;
 
@@ -4583,7 +4621,6 @@ static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 	if (!msec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	msec->msg = msg;
 	msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	msg->security = msec;
 
@@ -4994,14 +5031,14 @@ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operatio
 {
 	if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
-		       "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		       "module registered.\n", __func__);
 		return -EINVAL;
  	}
 
 	secondary_ops = ops;
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
-	       __FUNCTION__,
+	       __func__,
 	       name);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -5057,6 +5094,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
 	u32 sid = 0;
 	int error;
 	char *str = value;
@@ -5145,18 +5183,24 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
 		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
 		task_lock(p);
-		if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
-			error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
+		if (tracer != NULL) {
+			struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
+			u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
 						     SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 						     PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
 			if (!error)
 				tsec->sid = sid;
 			task_unlock(p);
-			avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				  PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
 			if (error)
 				return error;
 		} else {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			tsec->sid = sid;
 			task_unlock(p);
 		}
@@ -5194,7 +5238,6 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
 	if (!ksec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ksec->obj = k;
 	if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
 		ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
 	else
@@ -5631,5 +5674,3 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif
-
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index d5696690d3a..1223b4ff9be 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -14,12 +14,17 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent")
    S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search")
    S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open")
+   S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
    S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
    S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 75b41311ab8..c4c51165c50 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
 #define DIR__REPARENT                             0x00080000UL
 #define DIR__SEARCH                               0x00100000UL
 #define DIR__RMDIR                                0x00200000UL
+#define DIR__OPEN                                 0x00400000UL
 #define FILE__IOCTL                               0x00000001UL
 #define FILE__READ                                0x00000002UL
 #define FILE__WRITE                               0x00000004UL
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@
 #define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS                    0x00020000UL
 #define FILE__ENTRYPOINT                          0x00040000UL
 #define FILE__EXECMOD                             0x00080000UL
+#define FILE__OPEN                                0x00100000UL
 #define LNK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
 #define LNK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
 #define LNK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@
 #define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS                0x00020000UL
 #define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT                      0x00040000UL
 #define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD                         0x00080000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__OPEN                            0x00100000UL
 #define BLK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
 #define BLK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
 #define BLK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@
 #define BLK_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
 #define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
 #define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
+#define BLK_FILE__OPEN                            0x00020000UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
@@ -187,6 +191,7 @@
 #define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__OPEN                           0x00020000UL
 #define FD__USE                                   0x00000001UL
 #define SOCKET__IOCTL                             0x00000001UL
 #define SOCKET__READ                              0x00000002UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 00a2809c850..9a9e7cd9a37 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -41,10 +41,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
 
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      int family);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-				     int family);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec);
 
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
@@ -73,18 +69,6 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(
-	                                       struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-					       int family)
-{
-	return;
-}
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(
-	                                    struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-					    struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
-{
-	return;
-}
 
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					       u16 family,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netport.h b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8991752eaf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index c6c2bb4ebac..300b61bad7b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -28,14 +28,12 @@
 #include "avc.h"
 
 struct task_security_struct {
-	struct task_struct *task;      /* back pointer to task object */
 	u32 osid;            /* SID prior to last execve */
 	u32 sid;             /* current SID */
 	u32 exec_sid;        /* exec SID */
 	u32 create_sid;      /* fscreate SID */
 	u32 keycreate_sid;   /* keycreate SID */
 	u32 sockcreate_sid;  /* fscreate SID */
-	u32 ptrace_sid;      /* SID of ptrace parent */
 };
 
 struct inode_security_struct {
@@ -50,7 +48,6 @@ struct inode_security_struct {
 };
 
 struct file_security_struct {
-	struct file *file;              /* back pointer to file object */
 	u32 sid;              /* SID of open file description */
 	u32 fown_sid;         /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
 	u32 isid;             /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
@@ -73,18 +70,15 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
 };
 
 struct msg_security_struct {
-	struct msg_msg *msg;		/* back pointer */
 	u32 sid;              /* SID of message */
 };
 
 struct ipc_security_struct {
-	struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perm; /* back pointer */
 	u16 sclass;	/* security class of this object */
 	u32 sid;              /* SID of IPC resource */
 };
 
 struct bprm_security_struct {
-	struct linux_binprm *bprm;     /* back pointer to bprm object */
 	u32 sid;                       /* SID for transformed process */
 	unsigned char set;
 
@@ -109,8 +103,13 @@ struct netnode_security_struct {
 	u16 family;			/* address family */
 };
 
+struct netport_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for this node */
+	u16 port;			/* port number */
+	u8 protocol;			/* transport protocol */
+};
+
 struct sk_security_struct {
-	struct sock *sk;		/* back pointer to sk object */
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
@@ -120,12 +119,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 		NLBL_REQUIRE,
 		NLBL_LABELED,
 	} nlbl_state;
-	spinlock_t nlbl_lock;		/* protects nlbl_state */
 #endif
 };
 
 struct key_security_struct {
-	struct key *obj; /* back pointer */
 	u32 sid;         /* SID of key */
 };
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 44e12ec8809..1904c462a60 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -26,13 +26,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB		20
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS	21
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		22
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE
 #endif
 
 #define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
@@ -40,6 +41,11 @@
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT	0x04
 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT	0x08
 
+#define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
+#define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR	"rootcontext="
+#define DEFCONTEXT_STR	"defcontext="
+
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
 
 extern int selinux_enabled;
@@ -48,11 +54,13 @@ extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
 /* Policy capabilities */
 enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
 	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
 
 extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 
 int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len);
 
@@ -67,6 +75,8 @@ struct av_decision {
 	u32 seqno;
 };
 
+int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid);
+
 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 	struct av_decision *avd);
@@ -92,8 +102,7 @@ int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
 			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
 
-int security_port_sid(u16 domain, u16 type, u8 protocol, u16 port,
-	u32 *out_sid);
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 0fa2be4149e..e8ee91ac12e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "security.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
@@ -69,9 +70,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
  *
  * Description:
  * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
- * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.  The
- * caller is responsibile for calling rcu_read_lock() before calling this
- * this function and rcu_read_unlock() after this function returns.
+ * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
 static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk, u32 sid)
@@ -86,11 +85,8 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk, u32 sid)
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto sock_setsid_return;
 	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0) {
-		spin_lock_bh(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
+	if (rc == 0)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
-		spin_unlock_bh(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
-	}
 
 sock_setsid_return:
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -129,45 +125,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init - Setup the NetLabel fields
- * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
- * @family: the socket family
- *
- * Description:
- * Called when a new sk_security_struct is allocated to initialize the NetLabel
- * fields.
- *
- */
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-				     int family)
-{
-	/* No locking needed, we are the only one who has access to ssec */
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
-	spin_lock_init(&ssec->nlbl_lock);
-}
-
-/**
- * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone - Copy the NetLabel fields
- * @ssec: the original sk_security_struct
- * @newssec: the cloned sk_security_struct
- *
- * Description:
- * Clone the NetLabel specific sk_security_struct fields from @ssec to
- * @newssec.
- *
- */
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
-				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
-{
-	/* We don't need to take newssec->nlbl_lock because we are the only
-	 * thread with access to newssec, but we do need to take the RCU read
-	 * lock as other threads could have access to ssec */
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, ssec->sk->sk_family);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
  * @skb: the packet
  * @family: protocol family
@@ -221,12 +178,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
-		rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
 		return;
-	}
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
@@ -239,8 +192,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 	 * here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to
 	 * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */
 	selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
-
-	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 /**
@@ -254,16 +205,13 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
  */
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)
-		rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
+		return 0;
 
-	return rc;
+	return selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -288,21 +236,21 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) ||
 	    ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)) == 0))
 		return 0;
+
 	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
 	sk = sock->sk;
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
-		rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
 		return 0;
-	}
+
 	local_bh_disable();
 	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
+	if (likely(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE))
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
+	else
+		rc = 0;
 	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 	local_bh_enable();
-	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -385,7 +333,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
 	    sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED) {
 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
@@ -396,7 +343,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 			rc = -EACCES;
 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index b59871d74da..6214a7a7314 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ out:
 nlmsg_failure:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 oom:
-	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  OOM in %s\n", __FUNCTION__);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  OOM in %s\n", __func__);
 	goto out;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..68ede3c498a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <asm/bug.h>
+
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_netport_bkt {
+	int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netport {
+	struct netport_security_struct psec;
+
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_netport_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netport_lock);
+static struct sel_netport_bkt sel_netport_hash[SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_free - Frees a port entry
+ * @p: the entry's RCU field
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
+ * function so that memory allocated to a hash table port entry can be
+ * released safely.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netport_free(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct sel_netport *port = container_of(p, struct sel_netport, rcu);
+	kfree(port);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_hashfn - Hashing function for the port table
+ * @pnum: port number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the port table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given port.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netport_hashfn(u16 pnum)
+{
+	return (pnum & (SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_find - Search for a port record
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @port: pnum
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network port table and return the matching record.  If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netport *sel_netport_find(u8 protocol, u16 pnum)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	idx = sel_netport_hashfn(pnum);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list)
+		if (port->psec.port == pnum &&
+		    port->psec.protocol == protocol)
+			return port;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_insert - Insert a new port into the table
+ * @port: the new port record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new port record to the network address hash table.  Returns zero on
+ * success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netport_insert(struct sel_netport *port)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+	idx = sel_netport_hashfn(port->psec.port);
+	list_add_rcu(&port->list, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_netport_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_netport *tail;
+		tail = list_entry(port->list.prev, struct sel_netport, list);
+		list_del_rcu(port->list.prev);
+		call_rcu(&tail->rcu, sel_netport_free);
+	} else
+		sel_netport_hash[idx].size++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port by quering the security
+ * policy.  The result is added to the network port table to speedup future
+ * queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+	struct sel_netport *new = NULL;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+	if (port != NULL) {
+		*sid = port->psec.sid;
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, &new->psec.sid);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	new->psec.port = pnum;
+	new->psec.protocol = protocol;
+	ret = sel_netport_insert(new);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*sid = new->psec.sid;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING
+		       "SELinux: failure in sel_netport_sid_slow(),"
+		       " unable to determine network port label\n");
+		kfree(new);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid - Lookup the SID of a network port
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port using the fastest method
+ * possible.  First the port table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+	if (port != NULL) {
+		*sid = port->psec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netport_sid_slow(protocol, pnum, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_flush - Flush the entire network port table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netport_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry(port, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list) {
+			list_del_rcu(&port->list);
+			call_rcu(&port->rcu, sel_netport_free);
+		}
+		sel_netport_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+}
+
+static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				    u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_netport_flush();
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netport_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+	                       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netport_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 0341567665b..26fabad0976 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@
 
 /* Policy capability filenames */
 static char *policycap_names[] = {
-	"network_peer_controls"
+	"network_peer_controls",
+	"open_perms"
 };
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
@@ -391,7 +392,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
 
 	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  context size (%u) exceeds payload "
-		       "max\n", __FUNCTION__, len);
+		       "max\n", __func__, len);
 		length = -ERANGE;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -644,7 +645,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
 
 	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  context size (%u) exceeds payload "
-		       "max\n", __FUNCTION__, len);
+		       "max\n", __func__, len);
 		length = -ERANGE;
 		goto out3;
 	}
@@ -821,7 +822,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
 
 	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  context size (%u) exceeds payload "
-		       "max\n", __FUNCTION__, len);
+		       "max\n", __func__, len);
 		length = -ERANGE;
 		goto out3;
 	}
@@ -1760,7 +1761,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 out:
 	return ret;
 err:
-	printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  failed while creating inodes\n", __FUNCTION__);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  failed while creating inodes\n", __func__);
 	goto out;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index cd10e27fc9e..916e73a18bc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -280,8 +280,8 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 	h->nel = 0;
 	h->nslot = nslot;
 	h->mask = mask;
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:%d avtab hash slots allocated. "
-	       "Num of rules:%d\n", h->nslot, nrules);
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
+	       h->nslot, nrules);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -345,18 +345,18 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 	if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
 		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
 		if (rc < 0) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 		items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
 		if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
 			return -1;
 
 		}
 		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
 		if (rc < 0) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 		items = 0;
@@ -364,19 +364,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 		key.source_type = (u16)val;
 		if (key.source_type != val) {
-			printk("security: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+			printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 		key.target_type = (u16)val;
 		if (key.target_type != val) {
-			printk("security: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+			printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 		key.target_class = (u16)val;
 		if (key.target_class != val) {
-			printk("security: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+			printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 
@@ -384,12 +384,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
 
 		if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
-			printk("security: avtab: null entry\n");
+			printk("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 		if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
 		    (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
-			printk("security: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+			printk("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
 
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		}
 
 		if (items != items2) {
-			printk("security: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
+			printk("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
 			return -1;
 		}
 		return 0;
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk("security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
 	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
 	    !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "security: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -435,19 +435,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 	}
 	if (!set || set > 1) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
-			"security:  avtab:  more than one specifier\n");
+			"SELinux:  avtab:  more than one specifier\n");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk("security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 		return -1;
 	}
 	datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
 	if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
 	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "security: avtab: invalid type\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
 		return -1;
 	}
 	return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -468,12 +468,12 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated table\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
 		goto bad;
 	}
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	if (!nel) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: table is empty\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto bad;
 	}
@@ -486,9 +486,9 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
 		rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
 		if (rc) {
 			if (rc == -ENOMEM)
-				printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: out of memory\n");
+				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
 			else if (rc == -EEXIST)
-				printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
 			else
 				rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto bad;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 50ad85d4b77..a996cf1d378 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
 	if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
 		node->cur_state = new_state;
 		if (new_state == -1)
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
 		/* turn the rules on or off */
 		for (cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
 			if (new_state <= 0) {
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 	 */
 	if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
 		if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
-			printk("security: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.");
+			printk("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.");
 			goto err;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 			node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
 			if (node_ptr) {
 				if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
-					printk("security: too many conflicting type rules.");
+					printk("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.");
 					goto err;
 				}
 				found = 0;
@@ -302,13 +302,13 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 					}
 				}
 				if (!found) {
-					printk("security: conflicting type rules.\n");
+					printk("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
 					goto err;
 				}
 			}
 		} else {
 			if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
-				printk("security: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+				printk("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
 				goto err;
 			}
 		}
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 
 	node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
 	if (!node_ptr) {
-		printk("security: could not insert rule.");
+		printk("SELinux: could not insert rule.");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
@@ -376,12 +376,12 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
 static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
 {
 	if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
-		printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+		printk("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
-		printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+		printk("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	return 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 920b5e36a1a..e499af474b3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 
 	if (mapunit != sizeof(u64) * 8) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
 		       "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n",
 		       mapunit, sizeof(u64) * 8, e->highbit);
 		goto bad;
@@ -382,19 +382,19 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
 		if (rc < 0) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
 			goto bad;
 		}
 		startbit = le32_to_cpu(startbit);
 
 		if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
 			       "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
 			       startbit, mapunit);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 		if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
 			       "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
 			       startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
 			goto bad;
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 			tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!tmp) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR
-				       "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+				       "SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
 				rc = -ENOMEM;
 				goto bad;
 			}
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 			}
 			n = tmp;
 		} else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
 			       " comes after start bit %d\n",
 			       startbit, n->startbit);
 			goto bad;
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 
 		rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
 		if (rc < 0) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
 			goto bad;
 		}
 		map = le64_to_cpu(map);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index bd7d6a00342..6bdb0ff6a92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	}
 };
 
@@ -194,6 +199,7 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 		goto out_free_symtab;
 
 	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
 
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -401,14 +407,14 @@ static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
 {
 	int i, rc = 0;
 
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "security:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
 	       p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
 	if (selinux_mls_enabled)
 		printk(", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
 		       p->p_cats.nprim);
 	printk("\n");
 
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "security:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
 	       p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
@@ -687,6 +693,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	kfree(p->type_attr_map);
 	kfree(p->undefined_perms);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
 	return;
 }
@@ -702,20 +709,20 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 
 	rc = sidtab_init(s);
 	if (rc) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  out of memory on SID table init\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  out of memory on SID table init\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
 	for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
 		if (!c->context[0].user) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security:  SID %s was never "
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  SID %s was never "
 			       "defined.\n", c->u.name);
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		if (sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0])) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to load initial "
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to load initial "
 			       "SID %s.\n", c->u.name);
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
@@ -809,13 +816,13 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
 
 	items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  range overflow\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls:  range overflow\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  truncated range\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls:  truncated range\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 	r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -826,21 +833,21 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
 
 	rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
 	if (rc) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  error reading low "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls:  error reading low "
 		       "categories\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 	if (items > 1) {
 		rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
 		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  error reading high "
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls:  error reading high "
 			       "categories\n");
 			goto bad_high;
 		}
 	} else {
 		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
 		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  out of memory\n");
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls:  out of memory\n");
 			goto bad_high;
 		}
 	}
@@ -866,7 +873,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: context truncated\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: context truncated\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 	c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -874,7 +881,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
 	c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
 		if (mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp)) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security: error reading MLS range of "
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: error reading MLS range of "
 			       "context\n");
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
@@ -882,7 +889,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
 	}
 
 	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  invalid security context\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  invalid security context\n");
 		context_destroy(c);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1128,7 +1135,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
 		cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table,
 						    cladatum->comkey);
 		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unknown common %s\n",
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unknown common %s\n",
 			       cladatum->comkey);
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto bad;
@@ -1283,13 +1290,13 @@ static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: truncated level\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
 		goto bad;
 	}
 	lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
 	if (ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  error reading level "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls:  error reading level "
 		       "categories\n");
 		goto bad;
 	}
@@ -1491,7 +1498,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		goto bad;
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  policydb magic number 0x%x does "
 		       "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
 		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
 		goto bad;
@@ -1499,27 +1506,27 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 	if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb string length %d does not "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  policydb string length %d does not "
 		       "match expected length %Zu\n",
 		       len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
 		goto bad;
 	}
 	policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!policydb_str) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to allocate memory for policydb "
 		       "string of length %d\n", len);
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto bad;
 	}
 	rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  truncated policydb string identifier\n");
 		kfree(policydb_str);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 	policydb_str[len] = 0;
 	if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb string %s does not match "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  policydb string %s does not match "
 		       "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
 		kfree(policydb_str);
 		goto bad;
@@ -1536,7 +1543,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
 	    p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
-	    	printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb version %d does not match "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  policydb version %d does not match "
 	    	       "my version range %d-%d\n",
 	    	       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
 	    	goto bad;
@@ -1570,16 +1577,20 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	    ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp) != 0)
 		goto bad;
 
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE &&
+	    ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp) != 0)
+		goto bad;
+
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to find policy compat info "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to find policy compat info "
 		       "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
 		le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
 		       "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
 			le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
 		       info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
@@ -1823,7 +1834,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
 		     genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
 			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
-				printk(KERN_ERR "security:  dup genfs "
+				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  dup genfs "
 				       "fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype);
 				kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
 				kfree(newgenfs);
@@ -1873,7 +1884,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
 				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
 				     newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
-					printk(KERN_ERR "security:  dup genfs "
+					printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  dup genfs "
 					       "entry (%s,%s)\n",
 					       newgenfs->fstype, c->u.name);
 					goto bad_newc;
@@ -1931,7 +1942,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 			if (rc)
 				goto bad;
 			if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &rt->target_range)) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "security:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			lrt = rt;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index c4ce996e202..ba593a3da87 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -243,6 +243,8 @@ struct policydb {
 
 	struct ebitmap policycaps;
 
+	struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
 	unsigned int policyvers;
 
 	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3f2bad28ee7..d75050819b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 #include "flask.h"
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 
 /*
  * This is declared in avc.c
@@ -412,10 +414,35 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	return 0;
 
 inval_class:
-	printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  unrecognized class %d\n", __FUNCTION__, tclass);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  unrecognized class %d\n", __func__, tclass);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Given a sid find if the type has the permissive flag set
+ */
+int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
+{
+	struct context *context;
+	u32 type;
+	int rc;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	BUG_ON(!context);
+
+	type = context->type;
+	/*
+	 * we are intentionally using type here, not type-1, the 0th bit may
+	 * someday indicate that we are globally setting permissive in policy.
+	 */
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, type);
+
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
                                            struct context *ncontext,
                                            struct context *tcontext,
@@ -1096,7 +1123,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 			continue;
 		if (i > p->p_classes.nprim) {
 			printk(KERN_INFO
-			       "security:  class %s not defined in policy\n",
+			       "SELinux:  class %s not defined in policy\n",
 			       def_class);
 			if (p->reject_unknown)
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -1107,7 +1134,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
 		if (strcmp(pol_class, def_class)) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "security:  class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n",
+			       "SELinux:  class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n",
 			       i, pol_class, def_class);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -1125,7 +1152,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 		nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1);
 		if (perm_val > nprim) {
 			printk(KERN_INFO
-			       "security:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
+			       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
 			       def_perm, pol_class);
 			if (p->reject_unknown)
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -1136,14 +1163,14 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 		perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
 		if (perdatum == NULL) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "security:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
+			       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
 			       def_perm, pol_class);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1);
 		if (pol_val != perm_val) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "security:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
+			       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
 			       def_perm, pol_class);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -1157,7 +1184,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 		BUG_ON(!cladatum);
 		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "security:  class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n",
+			       "SELinux:  class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n",
 			       pol_class);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -1172,7 +1199,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 			def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j];
 			if (j >= perms->nprim) {
 				printk(KERN_INFO
-				       "security:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
+				       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
 				       def_perm, pol_class);
 				if (p->reject_unknown)
 					return -EINVAL;
@@ -1183,13 +1210,13 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 			perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
 			if (perdatum == NULL) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR
-				       "security:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
+				       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
 				       def_perm, pol_class);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			if (perdatum->value != j + 1) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR
-				       "security:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
+				       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
 				       def_perm, pol_class);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
@@ -1219,7 +1246,7 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context
 		u32 len;
 
 		context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  context %s is invalid\n", s);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  context %s is invalid\n", s);
 		kfree(s);
 	}
 	return rc;
@@ -1299,7 +1326,7 @@ out:
 bad:
 	context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
 	context_destroy(&oldc);
-	printk(KERN_ERR "security:  invalidating context %s\n", s);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  invalidating context %s\n", s);
 	kfree(s);
 	goto out;
 }
@@ -1308,6 +1335,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 {
 	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
+	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
 }
 
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
@@ -1350,7 +1379,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
 		if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "security:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
+			       "SELinux:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
 			LOAD_UNLOCK;
 			sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
@@ -1384,14 +1413,14 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
 	if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR
-		       "security:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
+		       "SELinux:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
 	if (rc) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
@@ -1443,17 +1472,11 @@ err:
 
 /**
  * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
- * @domain: communication domain aka address family
- * @type: socket type
  * @protocol: protocol number
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
-		      u16 type,
-		      u8 protocol,
-		      u16 port,
-		      u32 *out_sid)
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -2203,7 +2226,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
 	if (!match) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
-			__FUNCTION__, class);
+			__func__, class);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}