Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
  nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
  TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
  TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
  integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
  TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
  security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
  TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
  SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
  TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
  tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
  smack: Remove redundant initialization.
  integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
  rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
  smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
  integrity: move ima_counts_get
  integrity: path_check update
  IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
  IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
  selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
  ...

31 files changed, 1690 insertions, 440 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bb244774e9d..d23c839038f 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -110,28 +110,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
 	  See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
 	  more information about this module.
-	  
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
-        int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
-        depends on SECURITY
-        default 0
-        help
-	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
-	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
-	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
-
-	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
-	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
-	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
-	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
-	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
-	  this protection disabled.
-
-	  This value can be changed after boot using the
-	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
 
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index fa77021d977..c67557cdaa8 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= lsm_audit.o
+endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index beac0258c2a..48b7e0228fa 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,28 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 
+/*
+ * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
+ * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
+ * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
+ * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
+ * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
+ * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
+ * support.  So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
+ *
+ * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
+ */
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
+{
+	static int warned;
+	if (!warned) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
+			" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
+			" capabilities.\n", fname);
+		warned = 1;
+	}
+}
+
 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
@@ -464,6 +486,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
 		/*
+		 * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+		 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
+		 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+		 */
+		if (effective && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+			warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+			goto skip;
+		}
+		/*
 		 * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 		 * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
 		 * capability sets for the file.
@@ -478,6 +509,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		if (new->euid == 0)
 			effective = true;
 	}
+skip:
 
 	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
 	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index f3b91bfbe4c..f7496c6a022 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct dentry *parent;
 
-	if (!dentry)
+	if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
 		return;
 
 	parent = dentry->d_parent;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 1e082bb987b..ff513ff737f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -22,18 +22,9 @@ static int ima_audit;
 static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long audit;
-	int rc, result = 0;
-	char *op = "ima_audit";
-	char *cause;
 
-	rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
-	if (rc || audit > 1)
-		result = 1;
-	else
-		ima_audit = audit;
-	cause = ima_audit ? "enabled" : "not_enabled";
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
-			    op, cause, result, 0);
+	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+		ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
@@ -50,23 +41,14 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
 	audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
-			 current->pid, current->cred->uid,
+			 current->pid, current_cred()->uid,
 			 audit_get_loginuid(current),
 			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
 	audit_log_task_context(ab);
-	switch (audit_msgno) {
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA:
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA:
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR:
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause);
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause);
-		break;
-	default:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op);
-	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
+	audit_log_string(ab, op);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
+	audit_log_string(ab, cause);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
 	if (fname) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 50d572b74ca..63003a63aae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
+static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 {
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
 		return;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 /*
  * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
  */
-int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 {
 	struct hash_desc desc;
 	struct scatterlist sg;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 510186f0b72..6bfc7eaebfd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  *	implemenents security file system for reporting
  *	current measurement list and IMA statistics
  */
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
@@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
  */
 int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
 {
+	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
+	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
+		return -EACCES;
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
 		return 0;
 	return -EBUSY;
@@ -315,7 +319,7 @@ static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.release = ima_release_policy
 };
 
-int ima_fs_init(void)
+int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 {
 	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
@@ -349,7 +353,7 @@ int ima_fs_init(void)
 		goto out;
 
 	ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy",
-					    S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR,
+					    S_IWUSR,
 					    ima_dir, NULL,
 					    &ima_measure_policy_ops);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index ec79f1ee992..b8dd693f879 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
 }
 
-void ima_iintcache_init(void)
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
 {
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 0b0bb8c978c..a40da7ae590 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int ima_used_chip;
  * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
  * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
  */
-static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ err_out:
 			    audit_cause, result, 0);
 }
 
-int ima_init(void)
+int __init ima_init(void)
 {
 	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f4e7266f5ae..6f611874d10 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -29,20 +29,8 @@ int ima_initialized;
 char *ima_hash = "sha1";
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
-	const char *op = "hash_setup";
-	const char *hash = "sha1";
-	int result = 0;
-	int audit_info = 0;
-
-	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
-		hash = "md5";
-		ima_hash = str;
-	} else if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) != 0) {
-		hash = "invalid_hash_type";
-		result = 1;
-	}
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH, NULL, NULL, op, hash,
-			    result, audit_info);
+	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+		ima_hash = "md5";
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
@@ -128,10 +116,6 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
-		pr_info("%s dentry_open failed\n", filename);
-		return rc;
-	}
 	iint->opencount++;
 	iint->readcount++;
 
@@ -141,6 +125,15 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static void ima_update_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, int mask)
+{
+	iint->opencount++;
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+		iint->writecount++;
+	else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
+		iint->readcount++;
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
@@ -156,10 +149,10 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
  *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
  * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
  */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask, int update_counts)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -173,11 +166,8 @@ int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
 		return 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	iint->opencount++;
-	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
-		iint->writecount++;
-	else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
-		iint->readcount++;
+	if (update_counts)
+		ima_update_counts(iint, mask);
 
 	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
 	if (rc < 0)
@@ -196,7 +186,19 @@ int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
 		struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
 		struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
 
-		file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY, current->cred);
+		file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
+				   current_cred());
+		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+			int audit_info = 0;
+
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
+					    dentry->d_name.name,
+					    "add_measurement",
+					    "dentry_open failed",
+					    1, audit_info);
+			file = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
 	}
 out:
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ out:
 	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
 	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			       int mask, int function)
@@ -234,7 +237,16 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
+/*
+ * ima_opens_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
+ * - for nfsd exported files.
+ *
+ * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
+ * imbalance messages.
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -246,8 +258,14 @@ static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
 		return;
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	iint->opencount++;
+	if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+		iint->readcount++;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		iint->writecount++;
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
 
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
@@ -272,18 +290,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
- *
- * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
-{
-	opencount_get(file);
-	return;
-}
-
 /**
  * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index b5291ad5ef5..e1278399b34 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -45,24 +45,30 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 };
 
-/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+/*
+ * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
  * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
  */
+
+/*
+ * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage.  Measures all files
+ * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root.  Dangerous because
+ * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
+ * and running executables.
+ */
 static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
-	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
-	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
-	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
@@ -71,6 +77,14 @@ static struct list_head *ima_measure;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
 
+static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	ima_use_tcb = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		int rc;
+		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid, sid;
 
 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -109,7 +123,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
-							AUDIT_EQUAL,
+							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
 							NULL);
 			break;
@@ -119,7 +133,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
-							AUDIT_EQUAL,
+							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
 							NULL);
 		default:
@@ -164,11 +178,17 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
  * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
  * the new measure_policy_rules.
  */
-void ima_init_policy(void)
+void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, entries;
+
+	/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+	if (ima_use_tcb)
+		entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
+	else
+		entries = 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
 		list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
 	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
 }
@@ -227,7 +247,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
 
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
-					   AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
+					   Audit_equal, args,
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..94b868494b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+/*
+ * common LSM auditing functions
+ *
+ * Based on code written for SELinux by :
+ *			Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * 			James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Author : Etienne Basset, <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+
+/**
+ * ipv4_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
+ * @skb : the skb
+ * @ad : the audit data to fill
+ * @proto : the layer 4 protocol
+ *
+ * return  0 on success
+ */
+int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct iphdr *ih;
+
+	ih = ip_hdr(skb);
+	if (ih == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+	ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = ih->protocol;
+	/* non initial fragment */
+	if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (ih->protocol) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr *sh = sctp_hdr(skb);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+		ad->u.net.sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+/**
+ * ipv6_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
+ * @skb : the skb
+ * @ad : the audit data to fill
+ * @proto : the layer 4 protocol
+ *
+ * return  0 on success
+ */
+int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int offset, ret = 0;
+	struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+	u8 nexthdr;
+
+	ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
+	ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
+	ret = 0;
+	/* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header
+	 * skip them */
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	offset += sizeof(*ip6);
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = nexthdr;
+	switch (nexthdr) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+	}
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+		ad->u.net.sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static inline void print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+				   struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
+				   char *name1, char *name2)
+{
+	if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
+	if (port)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
+				   __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+{
+	if (addr)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
+	if (port)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+/**
+ * dump_common_audit_data - helper to dump common audit data
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ */
+static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+				   struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+
+	if (a->tsk)
+		tsk = a->tsk;
+	if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+	}
+
+	switch (a->type) {
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d ", a->u.cap);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
+		if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
+			struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
+			if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
+				audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.fs.path);
+			} else {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+						 dentry->d_name.name);
+			}
+			inode = dentry->d_inode;
+		} else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
+			struct dentry *dentry;
+			inode = a->u.fs.inode;
+			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+			if (dentry) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+						 dentry->d_name.name);
+				dput(dentry);
+			}
+		}
+		if (inode)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+					inode->i_sb->s_id,
+					inode->i_ino);
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
+		tsk = a->u.tsk;
+		if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
+		if (a->u.net.sk) {
+			struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
+			struct unix_sock *u;
+			int len = 0;
+			char *p = NULL;
+
+			switch (sk->sk_family) {
+			case AF_INET: {
+				struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+				print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
+						inet->sport,
+						"laddr", "lport");
+				print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
+						inet->dport,
+						"faddr", "fport");
+				break;
+			}
+			case AF_INET6: {
+				struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+				struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
+
+				print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
+						inet->sport,
+						"laddr", "lport");
+				print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
+						inet->dport,
+						"faddr", "fport");
+				break;
+			}
+			case AF_UNIX:
+				u = unix_sk(sk);
+				if (u->dentry) {
+					struct path path = {
+						.dentry = u->dentry,
+						.mnt = u->mnt
+					};
+					audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &path);
+					break;
+				}
+				if (!u->addr)
+					break;
+				len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
+				p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
+				audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
+				if (*p)
+					audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
+				else
+					audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		switch (a->u.net.family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
+					a->u.net.sport,
+					"saddr", "src");
+			print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
+					a->u.net.dport,
+					"daddr", "dest");
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
+					a->u.net.sport,
+					"saddr", "src");
+			print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
+					a->u.net.dport,
+					"daddr", "dest");
+			break;
+		}
+		if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
+			struct net_device *dev;
+
+			/* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
+			dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, a->u.net.netif);
+			if (dev) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", dev->name);
+				dev_put(dev);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " key_serial=%u", a->u.key_struct.key);
+		if (a->u.key_struct.key_desc) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " key_desc=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.key_struct.key_desc);
+		}
+		break;
+#endif
+	} /* switch (a->type) */
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_lsm_audit - generic LSM auditing function
+ * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * setup the audit buffer for common security information
+ * uses callback to print LSM specific information
+ */
+void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	if (a == NULL)
+		return;
+	/* we use GFP_ATOMIC so we won't sleep */
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
+
+	if (ab == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (a->lsm_pre_audit)
+		a->lsm_pre_audit(ab, a);
+
+	dump_common_audit_data(ab, a);
+
+	if (a->lsm_post_audit)
+		a->lsm_post_audit(ab, a);
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index 40fb4f15e27..2f7ffa67c4d 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -71,18 +71,6 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 }
 
 static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
-	/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
-	.ptrace_may_access =		cap_ptrace_may_access,
-	.ptrace_traceme =		cap_ptrace_traceme,
-	.capget =			cap_capget,
-	.capset =			cap_capset,
-	.capable =			cap_capable,
-
-	.bprm_set_creds =		cap_bprm_set_creds,
-
-	.task_fix_setuid =		cap_task_fix_setuid,
-	.task_prctl =			cap_task_prctl,
-
 	.bprm_check_security =		rootplug_bprm_check_security,
 };
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5284255c5cd..dc7674fbfc7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
 
-/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
-unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
-
 static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	/* verify the security_operations structure exists */
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 7f9b5fac877..b2ab6085983 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	if (denied) {
 		if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 			rc = -EACCES;
-		else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
+		else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 			avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
 					tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
 		else
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2fcad7c33ea..195906bce26 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1980,10 +1980,6 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
 	u32 tsid, sid;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	sid = current_sid();
 
 	rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
@@ -2375,10 +2371,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	struct itimerval itimer;
-	struct sighand_struct *psig;
 	u32 osid, sid;
 	int rc, i;
-	unsigned long flags;
 
 	osid = tsec->osid;
 	sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -2398,22 +2392,20 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
 		for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
 			do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
-		flush_signals(current);
 		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-		flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
-		sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
-		recalc_sigpending();
+		if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+			__flush_signals(current);
+			flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+			sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+		}
 		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	}
 
 	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
 	 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
-	read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-	psig = current->parent->sighand;
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
-	wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
-	read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	wake_up_interruptible(&current->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 }
 
 /* superblock security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 5c3434f7626..ca835795a8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 #define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 
+#include <linux/magic.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 
 #define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
 #define SECSID_WILD			0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
 #define SECCLASS_NULL			0x0000 /* no class */
 
-#define SELINUX_MAGIC 0xf97cff8c
-
 /* Identify specific policy version changes */
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE		15
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL		16
@@ -91,9 +90,11 @@ struct av_decision {
 	u32 auditallow;
 	u32 auditdeny;
 	u32 seqno;
+	u32 flags;
 };
 
-int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid);
+/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
+#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	u16 tclass, u32 requested,
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index c6875fd3b9d..dd7cc6de77f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
 	{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 	{ AUDIT_USER,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY    },
 	{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
+	{ AUDIT_TRIM,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 	{ AUDIT_TTY_GET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
 	{ AUDIT_TTY_SET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT	},
 };
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 2d5136ec3d5..b4fc506e7a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -527,10 +527,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		goto out2;
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
-			  "%x %x %x %x %u",
+			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
 			  avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
 			  avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
-			  avd.seqno);
+			  avd.seqno, avd.flags);
 out2:
 	kfree(tcon);
 out:
@@ -803,10 +803,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (count > PAGE_SIZE) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
 	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!page) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index deeec6c013a..500e6f78e11 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	avd->auditallow = 0;
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
 	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+	avd->flags = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check for all the invalid cases.
@@ -528,31 +529,6 @@ inval_class:
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Given a sid find if the type has the permissive flag set
- */
-int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
-{
-	struct context *context;
-	u32 type;
-	int rc;
-
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-
-	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
-	BUG_ON(!context);
-
-	type = context->type;
-	/*
-	 * we are intentionally using type here, not type-1, the 0th bit may
-	 * someday indicate that we are globally setting permissive in policy.
-	 */
-	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, type);
-
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
-	return rc;
-}
-
 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
 					   struct context *ncontext,
 					   struct context *tcontext,
@@ -767,6 +743,10 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 
 	rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
 				       requested, avd);
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	    avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 42ef313f985..243bec175be 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 
 /*
  * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
@@ -179,6 +180,20 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define MAY_NOT		0
 
 /*
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxa)
+ */
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 4
+
+/*
+ * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
+ * to save some stack
+ */
+struct smk_audit_info {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct common_audit_data a;
+#endif
+};
+/*
  * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
  */
 struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
@@ -186,8 +201,8 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
 /*
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
  */
-int smk_access(char *, char *, int);
-int smk_curacc(char *, u32);
+int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
 void smack_from_cipso(u32, char *, char *);
 char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
@@ -237,4 +252,93 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
 	return sip->smk_inode;
 }
 
+/*
+ * logging functions
+ */
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
+extern int log_policy;
+
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+		int request,
+		int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/*
+ * some inline functions to set up audit data
+ * they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+			       char type)
+{
+	memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+	a->a.type = type;
+	a->a.function = func;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					 struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	a->a.u.tsk = t;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						    struct dentry *d)
+{
+	a->a.u.fs.path.dentry = d;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						 struct vfsmount *m)
+{
+	a->a.u.fs.path.mnt = m;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					      struct inode *i)
+{
+	a->a.u.fs.inode = i;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					     struct path p)
+{
+	a->a.u.fs.path = p;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	a->a.u.net.sk = sk;
+}
+
+#else /* no AUDIT */
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+			       char type)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					 struct task_struct *t)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						    struct dentry *d)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						 struct vfsmount *m)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					      struct inode *i)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					     struct path p)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					    struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif  /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index ac0a2707f6d..513dc1aa16d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -59,11 +59,18 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
  */
 static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
 
+/*
+ * what events do we log
+ * can be overwritten at run-time by /smack/logging
+ */
+int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+
 /**
  * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
  * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
  * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
  * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : a pointer to the audit data
  *
  * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
  * access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
@@ -78,10 +85,12 @@ static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
  * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
  * optimization.
  */
-int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
+int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+	       struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
 	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Hardcoded comparisons.
@@ -89,8 +98,10 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 	 * A star subject can't access any object.
 	 */
 	if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
-	    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
-		return -EACCES;
+	    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+		goto out_audit;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
 	 * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
@@ -100,20 +111,20 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 	    subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
 	    strcmp(object_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0)
-		return 0;
+		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
 	 */
 	if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
 	    strcmp(object_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
-		return 0;
+		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
 	 * with the same label.
 	 */
 	if (subject_label == object_label ||
 	    strcmp(subject_label, object_label) == 0)
-		return 0;
+		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A hat subject can read any object.
 	 * A floor object can be read by any subject.
@@ -121,10 +132,10 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
 		if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known ||
 		    strcmp(object_label, smack_known_floor.smk_known) == 0)
-			return 0;
+			goto out_audit;
 		if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known ||
 		    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_hat.smk_known) == 0)
-			return 0;
+			goto out_audit;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
@@ -148,28 +159,36 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
 	 * This is a bit map operation.
 	 */
 	if ((request & may) == request)
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EACCES;
+		goto out_audit;
+
+	rc = -EACCES;
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (a)
+		smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
+#endif
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
  * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
  * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
  *
  * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
  * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
  * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
  * to override the rules.
  */
-int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
 	int rc;
+	char *sp = current_security();
 
-	rc = smk_access(current_security(), obj_label, mode);
+	rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		return 0;
+		goto out_audit;
 
 	/*
 	 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
@@ -177,14 +196,105 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
 	 * have that label.
 	 */
 	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
-		return rc;
+		goto out_audit;
 
 	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		return 0;
 
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (a)
+		smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+#endif
 	return rc;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
+ * readable string
+ * @string : the string to fill
+ * @access : the int
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	if (access & MAY_READ)
+		string[i++] = 'r';
+	if (access & MAY_WRITE)
+		string[i++] = 'w';
+	if (access & MAY_EXEC)
+		string[i++] = 'x';
+	if (access & MAY_APPEND)
+		string[i++] = 'a';
+	string[i] = '\0';
+}
+/**
+ * smack_log_callback - SMACK specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab : the audit_buffer
+ * @a  : audit_data
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", ad->function,
+			 sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
+	audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+}
+
+/**
+ *  smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ *  @subject_label : smack label of the requester
+ *  @object_label  : smack label of the object being accessed
+ *  @request: requested permissions
+ *  @result: result from smk_access
+ *  @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.
+ */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+	       int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+	char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad;
+	struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
+
+	/* check if we have to log the current event */
+	if (result != 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	if (a->function == NULL)
+		a->function = "unknown";
+
+	/* end preparing the audit data */
+	sad = &a->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
+	sad->subject = subject_label;
+	sad->object  = object_label;
+	sad->request = request_buffer;
+	sad->result  = result;
+	a->lsm_pre_audit = smack_log_callback;
+
+	common_lsm_audit(a);
+}
+#else /* #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+               int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
 
 /**
@@ -209,7 +319,8 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 		if (found)
 			smack[i] = '\0';
 		else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' ||
-			 string[i] == '/') {
+			 string[i] == '/' || string[i] == '"' ||
+			 string[i] == '\\' || string[i] == '\'') {
 			smack[i] = '\0';
 			found = 1;
 		} else
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 98b3195347a..0023182078c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define task_security(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), security))
@@ -103,14 +102,24 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
 static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *sp, *tsp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE);
+	sp = current_security();
+	tsp = task_security(ctp);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
+
+	/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
+	rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		return 0;
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -125,14 +134,24 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 {
 	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *sp, *tsp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = smk_access(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
+
+	sp = current_security();
+	tsp = task_security(ptp);
+	/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
+	rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		return 0;
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -327,8 +346,14 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
-	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ);
+	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -346,8 +371,12 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 			  char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
 
-	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -361,10 +390,14 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
 
-	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+	sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -441,15 +474,20 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
-	int rc;
 	char *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
-	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE);
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
 		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
-		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -466,18 +504,24 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
 	/*
 	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
 	 */
-	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE);
-	if (rc == 0)
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
 		 */
-		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
-
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -491,17 +535,24 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
 	/*
 	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
 	 */
-	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
-	if (rc == 0)
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
 		 */
-		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -525,15 +576,19 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 {
 	int rc;
 	char *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
-	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 
 	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
 		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
-		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	}
-
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -548,13 +603,15 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
  */
 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	/*
 	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
 	 */
 	if (mask == 0)
 		return 0;
-
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -566,13 +623,16 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
  */
 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	/*
 	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
 	 */
 	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
 		return 0;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -584,7 +644,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
  */
 static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -602,6 +667,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
@@ -619,8 +685,11 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
 	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -672,7 +741,12 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
  */
 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -686,6 +760,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
  */
 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
@@ -696,8 +771,10 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -856,12 +933,16 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			    unsigned long arg)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 
 	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
-		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
-		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -875,7 +956,11 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  */
 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -889,8 +974,12 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			    unsigned long arg)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case F_DUPFD:
 	case F_GETFD:
@@ -898,7 +987,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	case F_GETLK:
 	case F_GETOWN:
 	case F_GETSIG:
-		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
 		break;
 	case F_SETFD:
 	case F_SETFL:
@@ -906,10 +995,10 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	case F_SETLKW:
 	case F_SETOWN:
 	case F_SETSIG:
-		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 		break;
 	default:
-		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -944,14 +1033,21 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	struct file *file;
 	int rc;
+	char *tsp = tsk->cred->security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	/*
 	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
 	 */
 	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
-	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		return 0;
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
+	smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -964,7 +1060,10 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 {
 	int may = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 	/*
 	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
 	 */
@@ -973,7 +1072,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 		may |= MAY_WRITE;
 
-	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may);
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1053,6 +1152,22 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
 }
 
 /**
+ * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @access : the access requested
+ *
+ * Return 0 if access is permitted
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
  * @p: the task object
  * @pgid: unused
@@ -1061,7 +1176,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
  */
 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1072,7 +1187,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
  */
 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1083,7 +1198,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1111,7 +1226,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 
 	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1128,7 +1243,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 
 	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1140,7 +1255,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
  */
 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1158,7 +1273,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 
 	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1170,7 +1285,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
  */
 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1181,7 +1296,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1199,18 +1314,23 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
 	/*
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
 	if (secid == 0)
-		return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+		return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	/*
 	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
 	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
 	 * we can't take privilege into account.
 	 */
-	return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+	return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p),
+			  MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1221,11 +1341,15 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
  */
 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 {
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *sp = current_security();
+	char *tsp = task_security(p);
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+	/* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
+	rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		return 0;
+		goto out_log;
 
 	/*
 	 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
@@ -1239,8 +1363,12 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 	 * the smack value.
 	 */
 	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		return 0;
-
+		rc = 0;
+	/* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
+ out_log:
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1456,12 +1584,19 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	int sk_lbl;
 	char *hostsp;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
 	if (hostsp != NULL) {
 		sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
-		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+		ad.a.u.net.family = sap->sin_family;
+		ad.a.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port;
+		ad.a.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#endif
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	} else {
 		sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
 		rc = 0;
@@ -1657,6 +1792,25 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
+ * @shp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
  * @shp: the object
  * @shmflg: access requested
@@ -1665,11 +1819,10 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
  */
 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
-	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
 	int may;
 
 	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1681,7 +1834,6 @@ static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
  */
 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
 {
-	char *ssp;
 	int may;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -1704,9 +1856,7 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-
-	ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1720,11 +1870,10 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
 			   int shmflg)
 {
-	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
 	int may;
 
 	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1766,6 +1915,25 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
+ * @sma : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
  * @sma: the object
  * @semflg: access requested
@@ -1774,11 +1942,10 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
  */
 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
-	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
 	int may;
 
 	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1790,7 +1957,6 @@ static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
  */
 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
 {
-	char *ssp;
 	int may;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -1819,8 +1985,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1837,9 +2002,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 			   unsigned nsops, int alter)
 {
-	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
-
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, MAY_READWRITE);
+	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1881,6 +2044,25 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
+ * @msq : the msq
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
+{
+	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
  * @msq: the object
  * @msqflg: access requested
@@ -1889,11 +2071,10 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
  */
 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
-	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
 	int may;
 
 	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
-	return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1905,7 +2086,6 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
  */
 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
 {
-	char *msp;
 	int may;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -1927,8 +2107,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
-	return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1942,11 +2121,10 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 				  int msqflg)
 {
-	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
-	int rc;
+	int may;
 
-	rc = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
-	return smk_curacc(msp, rc);
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1962,9 +2140,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
 {
-	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
-
-	return smk_curacc(msp, MAY_READWRITE);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1977,10 +2153,14 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
 {
 	char *isp = ipp->security;
-	int may;
+	int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
-	return smk_curacc(isp, may);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2239,8 +2419,12 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 {
 	struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
 	struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_READWRITE);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op),
+				 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2255,8 +2439,11 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 {
 	struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
 	struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2371,7 +2558,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
 	char *csp;
 	int rc;
-
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2389,13 +2576,19 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+	ad.a.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
+	ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
 	/*
 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
 	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
 	 * This is the simplist possible security model
 	 * for networking.
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+	rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
 	return rc;
@@ -2524,6 +2717,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct iphdr *hdr;
 	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
 	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
 	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -2537,11 +2731,17 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		strncpy(smack, smack_known_huh.smk_known, SMK_MAXLEN);
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+	ad.a.u.net.family = family;
+	ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
 	/*
 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
 	 * here. Read access is not required.
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+	rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2643,6 +2843,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 				const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
 {
 	struct key *keyp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	if (keyp == NULL)
@@ -2658,8 +2859,13 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	 */
 	if (cred->security == NULL)
 		return -EACCES;
-
-	return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
+#endif
+	return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security,
+				 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -2828,15 +3034,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 
 	.ptrace_may_access =		smack_ptrace_may_access,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
-	.capget = 			cap_capget,
-	.capset = 			cap_capset,
-	.capable = 			cap_capable,
 	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
-	.settime = 			cap_settime,
-	.vm_enough_memory = 		cap_vm_enough_memory,
-
-	.bprm_set_creds = 		cap_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_secureexec = 		cap_bprm_secureexec,
 
 	.sb_alloc_security = 		smack_sb_alloc_security,
 	.sb_free_security = 		smack_sb_free_security,
@@ -2860,8 +3058,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
 	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
-	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
-	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -2882,7 +3078,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.cred_commit =			smack_cred_commit,
 	.kernel_act_as =		smack_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	smack_kernel_create_files_as,
-	.task_fix_setuid =		cap_task_fix_setuid,
 	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
 	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,
 	.task_getsid = 			smack_task_getsid,
@@ -2896,7 +3091,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.task_kill = 			smack_task_kill,
 	.task_wait = 			smack_task_wait,
 	.task_to_inode = 		smack_task_to_inode,
-	.task_prctl =			cap_task_prctl,
 
 	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
 	.ipc_getsecid =			smack_ipc_getsecid,
@@ -2923,9 +3117,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.sem_semctl = 			smack_sem_semctl,
 	.sem_semop = 			smack_sem_semop,
 
-	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
-	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,
-
 	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
 
 	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 11d2cb19d7a..f83a8098072 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_AMBIENT	= 7,	/* internet ambient label */
 	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
+	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -775,7 +776,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	struct sockaddr_in newname;
 	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
 	char *sp;
-	char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX];
+	char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX + 1];
 	char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -1192,6 +1193,69 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
 };
 
 /**
+ * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d\n", log_policy);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_logging - write() for /smack/logging
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i < 0 || i > 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	log_policy = i;
+	return count;
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_logging,
+	.write		= smk_write_logging,
+};
+/**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
  * @data: unused
@@ -1221,6 +1285,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			{"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_ONLYCAP]	=
 			{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOGGING]	=
+			{"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index ddfb9cccf46..fdd1f4b8c44 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -28,7 +28,13 @@ static const char *tomoyo_mode_2[4] = {
 	"disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
 };
 
-/* Table for profile. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_control_array is a static data which contains
+ *
+ *  (1) functionality name used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile .
+ *  (2) initial values for "struct tomoyo_profile".
+ *  (3) max values for "struct tomoyo_profile".
+ */
 static struct {
 	const char *keyword;
 	unsigned int current_value;
@@ -39,7 +45,13 @@ static struct {
 	[TOMOYO_VERBOSE]          = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE",      1,       1 },
 };
 
-/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_profile is a structure which is used for holding the mode of access
+ * controls. TOMOYO has 4 modes: disabled, learning, permissive, enforcing.
+ * An administrator can define up to 256 profiles.
+ * The ->profile of "struct tomoyo_domain_info" is used for remembering
+ * the profile's number (0 - 255) assigned to that domain.
+ */
 static struct tomoyo_profile {
 	unsigned int value[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment;
@@ -428,7 +440,6 @@ void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
 	const char *name = ptr->name;
 	const int len = strlen(name);
 
-	ptr->total_len = len;
 	ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name);
 	ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
 	ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
@@ -866,7 +877,6 @@ static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
 
 	if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
 		return NULL;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	mutex_lock(&lock);
 	ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile];
 	if (ptr)
@@ -880,7 +890,6 @@ static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
 	tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
  ok:
 	mutex_unlock(&lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return ptr;
 }
 
@@ -1009,7 +1018,19 @@ static int tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Structure for policy manager. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_policy_manager_entry is a structure which is used for holding list of
+ * domainnames or programs which are permitted to modify configuration via
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_policy_manager_list .
+ *  (2) "manager" is a domainname or a program's pathname.
+ *  (3) "is_domain" is a bool which is true if "manager" is a domainname, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ *  (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	/* A path to program or a domainname. */
@@ -1018,7 +1039,36 @@ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
 	bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
 };
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_policy_manager_list is used for holding list of domainnames or
+ * programs which are permitted to modify configuration via
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo '<kernel> /sbin/mingetty /bin/login /bin/bash' > \
+ *                                        /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ *  (if you want to specify by a domainname)
+ *
+ *  or
+ *
+ * # echo '/usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy' > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ *  (if you want to specify by a program's location)
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete <kernel> /sbin/mingetty /bin/login /bin/bash' > \
+ *                                        /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ *
+ *  or
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete /usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy' > \
+ *                                        /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
 
@@ -1050,7 +1100,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
 	saved_manager = tomoyo_save_name(manager);
 	if (!saved_manager)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
 		if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
@@ -1072,7 +1121,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -1117,10 +1165,9 @@ static int tomoyo_read_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 				 list);
 		if (ptr->is_deleted)
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
 	head->read_eof = done;
@@ -1197,13 +1244,11 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 
 	if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
 		struct task_struct *p;
-		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
 		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
 		if (p)
 			domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
 		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
 	} else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
 		if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data + 7)) {
 			down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
@@ -1447,15 +1492,14 @@ static int tomoyo_read_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		    TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
 			ignore_global_allow_read
 				= TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
-				      "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
-				      "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
-				      domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
-				      transition_failed,
-				      ignore_global_allow_read)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE
+					"%u\n%s%s%s\n",
+					domain->domainname->name,
+					domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
+					transition_failed,
+					ignore_global_allow_read);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 		head->read_step = 2;
 acl_loop:
 		if (head->read_step == 3)
@@ -1463,24 +1507,22 @@ acl_loop:
 		/* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
 		down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
 		list_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
-				      &domain->acl_info_list) {
+				     &domain->acl_info_list) {
 			struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr
 				= list_entry(apos, struct tomoyo_acl_info,
-					      list);
-			if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr)) {
-				done = false;
+					     list);
+			done = tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr);
+			if (!done)
 				break;
-			}
 		}
 		up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
 		if (!done)
 			break;
 		head->read_step = 3;
 tail_mark:
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n");
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 		head->read_step = 1;
 		if (head->read_single_domain)
 			break;
@@ -1550,11 +1592,10 @@ static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		domain = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list);
 		if (domain->is_deleted)
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
-				      domain->domainname->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
+					domain->domainname->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
 	head->read_eof = done;
@@ -1594,13 +1635,11 @@ static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		const int pid = head->read_step;
 		struct task_struct *p;
 		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
-		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
 		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
 		if (p)
 			domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
 		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
 		if (domain)
 			tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
 					 domain->domainname->name);
@@ -2138,7 +2177,13 @@ static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count);
 }
 
-/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_operations is a "struct file_operations" which is used for handling
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Some files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory accept open(O_RDWR).
+ * See tomoyo_io_buffer for internals.
+ */
 static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = {
 	.open    = tomoyo_open,
 	.release = tomoyo_release,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 678f4ff16aa..6d6ba09af45 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -26,16 +26,43 @@
 struct dentry;
 struct vfsmount;
 
-/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_page_buffer is a structure which is used for holding a pathname
+ * obtained from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount" pair.
+ * As of now, it is 4096 bytes. If users complain that 4096 bytes is too small
+ * (because TOMOYO escapes non ASCII printable characters using \ooo format),
+ * we will make the buffer larger.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_page_buffer {
 	char buffer[4096];
 };
 
-/* Structure for holding a token. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_path_info is a structure which is used for holding a string data
+ * used by TOMOYO.
+ * This structure has several fields for supporting pattern matching.
+ *
+ * (1) "name" is the '\0' terminated string data.
+ * (2) "hash" is full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)).
+ *     This allows tomoyo_pathcmp() to compare by hash before actually compare
+ *     using strcmp().
+ * (3) "const_len" is the length of the initial segment of "name" which
+ *     consists entirely of non wildcard characters. In other words, the length
+ *     which we can compare two strings using strncmp().
+ * (4) "is_dir" is a bool which is true if "name" ends with "/",
+ *     false otherwise.
+ *     TOMOYO distinguishes directory and non-directory. A directory ends with
+ *     "/" and non-directory does not end with "/".
+ * (5) "is_patterned" is a bool which is true if "name" contains wildcard
+ *     characters, false otherwise. This allows TOMOYO to use "hash" and
+ *     strcmp() for string comparison if "is_patterned" is false.
+ * (6) "depth" is calculated using the number of "/" characters in "name".
+ *     This allows TOMOYO to avoid comparing two pathnames which never match
+ *     (e.g. whether "/var/www/html/index.html" matches "/tmp/sh-thd-\$").
+ */
 struct tomoyo_path_info {
 	const char *name;
 	u32 hash;          /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
-	u16 total_len;     /* = strlen(name)                       */
 	u16 const_len;     /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name)     */
 	bool is_dir;       /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/")      */
 	bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */
@@ -51,7 +78,20 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info {
  */
 #define TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
 
-/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_path_info_with_data is a structure which is used for holding a
+ * pathname obtained from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount" pair.
+ *
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" consists of "struct tomoyo_path_info"
+ * and buffer for the pathname, while "struct tomoyo_page_buffer" consists of
+ * buffer for the pathname only.
+ *
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" is intended to allow TOMOYO to release
+ * both "struct tomoyo_path_info" and buffer for the pathname by single kfree()
+ * so that we don't need to return two pointers to the caller. If the caller
+ * puts "struct tomoyo_path_info" on stack memory, we will be able to remove
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data".
+ */
 struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
 	/* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tomoyo_free(). */
 	struct tomoyo_path_info head;
@@ -61,7 +101,15 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
 };
 
 /*
- * Common header for holding ACL entries.
+ * tomoyo_acl_info is a structure which is used for holding
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to the ->acl_info_list of
+ *      "struct tomoyo_domain_info"
+ *  (2) "type" which tells
+ *      (a) type & 0x7F : type of the entry (either
+ *          "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" or
+ *          "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record")
+ *      (b) type & 0x80 : whether the entry is marked as "deleted".
  *
  * Packing "struct tomoyo_acl_info" allows
  * "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" to embed "u16" and
@@ -81,7 +129,28 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_info {
 /* This ACL entry is deleted.           */
 #define TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED        0x80
 
-/* Structure for domain information. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_info is a structure which is used for holding permissions
+ * (e.g. "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so") given to each domain.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_list .
+ *  (2) "acl_info_list" which is linked to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *  (3) "domainname" which holds the name of the domain.
+ *  (4) "profile" which remembers profile number assigned to this domain.
+ *  (5) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if this domain is marked as
+ *      "deleted", false otherwise.
+ *  (6) "quota_warned" is a bool which is used for suppressing warning message
+ *      when learning mode learned too much entries.
+ *  (7) "flags" which remembers this domain's attributes.
+ *
+ * A domain's lifecycle is an analogy of files on / directory.
+ * Multiple domains with the same domainname cannot be created (as with
+ * creating files with the same filename fails with -EEXIST).
+ * If a process reached a domain, that process can reside in that domain after
+ * that domain is marked as "deleted" (as with a process can access an already
+ * open()ed file after that file was unlink()ed).
+ */
 struct tomoyo_domain_info {
 	struct list_head list;
 	struct list_head acl_info_list;
@@ -108,10 +177,18 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info {
 #define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED        2
 
 /*
- * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
- * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
- * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
- * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
+ * tomoyo_single_path_acl_record is a structure which is used for holding an
+ * entry with one pathname operation (e.g. open(), mkdir()).
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *  (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
+ *  (3) "filename" is the pathname.
+ *
+ * Directives held by this structure are "allow_read/write", "allow_execute",
+ * "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir",
+ * "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock",
+ * "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite".
  */
 struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record {
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
@@ -120,7 +197,18 @@ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record {
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
 };
 
-/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_double_path_acl_record is a structure which is used for holding an
+ * entry with two pathnames operation (i.e. link() and rename()).
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ *  (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
+ *  (3) "filename1" is the source/old pathname.
+ *  (4) "filename2" is the destination/new pathname.
+ *
+ * Directives held by this structure are "allow_rename" and "allow_link".
+ */
 struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record {
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
 	u8 perm;
@@ -153,7 +241,29 @@ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record {
 #define TOMOYO_VERBOSE                       2
 #define TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX             3
 
-/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_io_buffer is a structure which is used for reading and modifying
+ * configuration via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ * It has many fields. ->read_var1 , ->read_var2 , ->write_var1 are used as
+ * cursors.
+ *
+ * Since the content of /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy is a list of
+ * "struct tomoyo_domain_info" entries and each "struct tomoyo_domain_info"
+ * entry has a list of "struct tomoyo_acl_info", we need two cursors when
+ * reading (one is for traversing tomoyo_domain_list and the other is for
+ * traversing "struct tomoyo_acl_info"->acl_info_list ).
+ *
+ * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with
+ * "select ", TOMOYO seeks the cursor ->read_var1 and ->write_var1 to the
+ * domain with the domainname specified by the rest of that line (NULL is set
+ * if seek failed).
+ * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with
+ * "delete ", TOMOYO deletes an entry or a domain specified by the rest of that
+ * line (->write_var1 is set to NULL if a domain was deleted).
+ * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with
+ * neither "select " nor "delete ", an entry or a domain specified by that line
+ * is appended.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
 	int (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
 	int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 2d6748741a2..1d8b1696057 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -19,11 +19,63 @@
 /* The initial domain. */
 struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_list is used for holding list of domains.
+ * The ->acl_info_list of "struct tomoyo_domain_info" is used for holding
+ * permissions (e.g. "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so") given to each domain.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # ( echo "<kernel>"; echo "allow_execute /sbin/init" ) > \
+ *                                  /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # ( echo "<kernel>"; echo "delete allow_execute /sbin/init" ) > \
+ *                                  /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * A domain is added by
+ *
+ * # echo "<kernel>" > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo "delete <kernel>" > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and all domains are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * Normally, a domainname is monotonically getting longer because a domainname
+ * which the process will belong to if an execve() operation succeeds is
+ * defined as a concatenation of "current domainname" + "pathname passed to
+ * execve()".
+ * See tomoyo_domain_initializer_list and tomoyo_domain_keeper_list for
+ * exceptions.
+ */
 LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list);
 DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
 
-/* Structure for "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_initializer_list .
+ *  (2) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a
+ *      domainname". This field is NULL if "from" clause is not specified.
+ *  (3) "program" which is a program's pathname.
+ *  (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ *  (5) "is_not" is a bool which is true if "no_initialize_domain", false
+ *      otherwise.
+ *  (6) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last
+ *      component of a domainname", false otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;    /* This may be NULL */
@@ -34,7 +86,23 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry {
 	bool is_last_name;
 };
 
-/* Structure for "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_keeper_list .
+ *  (2) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a
+ *      domainname".
+ *  (3) "program" which is a program's pathname.
+ *      This field is NULL if "from" clause is not specified.
+ *  (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ *  (5) "is_not" is a bool which is true if "no_initialize_domain", false
+ *      otherwise.
+ *  (6) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last
+ *      component of a domainname", false otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
@@ -45,7 +113,16 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry {
 	bool is_last_name;
 };
 
-/* Structure for "alias" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_alias_entry is a structure which is used for holding "alias" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_alias_list .
+ *  (2) "original_name" which is a dereferenced pathname.
+ *  (3) "aliased_name" which is a symlink's pathname.
+ *  (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_alias_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name;
@@ -67,14 +144,12 @@ void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 {
 	/* We need to serialize because this is bitfield operation. */
 	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
 	spin_lock(&lock);
 	if (!is_delete)
 		domain->flags |= flags;
 	else
 		domain->flags &= ~flags;
 	spin_unlock(&lock);
-	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
 }
 
 /**
@@ -94,7 +169,42 @@ const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
 	return cp0;
 }
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_initializer_list is used for holding list of programs which
+ * triggers reinitialization of domainname. Normally, a domainname is
+ * monotonically getting longer. But sometimes, we restart daemon programs.
+ * It would be convenient for us that "a daemon started upon system boot" and
+ * "the daemon restarted from console" belong to the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO
+ * provides a way to shorten domainnames.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd' > \
+ *                               /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd' > \
+ *                               /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^initialize_domain /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, /usr/sbin/httpd will belong to
+ * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain.
+ *
+ * You may specify a domainname using "from" keyword.
+ * "initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd from <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd"
+ * will cause "/usr/sbin/httpd" executed from "<kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd"
+ * domain to belong to "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain.
+ *
+ * You may add "no_" prefix to "initialize_domain".
+ * "initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd" and
+ * "no_initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd from <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd"
+ * will cause "/usr/sbin/httpd" to belong to "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain
+ * unless executed from "<kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd" domain.
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
 
@@ -135,7 +245,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
 	saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program);
 	if (!saved_program)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
 		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
@@ -161,7 +270,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -193,13 +301,12 @@ bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 			from = " from ";
 			domain = ptr->domainname->name;
 		}
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
-				      "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN
-				      "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name, from,
-				      domain)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+					"%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN
+					"%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name,
+					from, domain);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
 	return done;
@@ -273,7 +380,44 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(const struct tomoyo_path_info *
 	return flag;
 }
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_keeper_list is used for holding list of domainnames which
+ * suppresses domain transition. Normally, a domainname is monotonically
+ * getting longer. But sometimes, we want to suppress domain transition.
+ * It would be convenient for us that programs executed from a login session
+ * belong to the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO provides a way to suppress domain
+ * transition.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash' > \
+ *                              /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash' > \
+ *                              /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^keep_domain /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, any process which belongs to
+ * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" domain will remain in that domain,
+ * unless explicitly specified by "initialize_domain" or "no_keep_domain".
+ *
+ * You may specify a program using "from" keyword.
+ * "keep_domain /bin/pwd from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash"
+ * will cause "/bin/pwd" executed from "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash"
+ * domain to remain in "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" domain.
+ *
+ * You may add "no_" prefix to "keep_domain".
+ * "keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" and
+ * "no_keep_domain /usr/bin/passwd from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" will
+ * cause "/usr/bin/passwd" to belong to
+ * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /usr/bin/passwd" domain, unless
+ * explicitly specified by "initialize_domain".
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
 
@@ -296,7 +440,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
 	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
-	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
 	int error = -ENOMEM;
 	bool is_last_name = false;
 
@@ -315,7 +458,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
 	saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
 	if (!saved_domainname)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
 		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
@@ -341,7 +483,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -394,13 +535,12 @@ bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 			from = " from ";
 			program = ptr->program->name;
 		}
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
-				      "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN
-				      "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from,
-				      ptr->domainname->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+					"%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN
+					"%s%s%s\n", no, program, from,
+					ptr->domainname->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
 	return done;
@@ -446,7 +586,36 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname,
 	return flag;
 }
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_alias_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_alias_list is used for holding list of symlink's pathnames which are
+ * allowed to be passed to an execve() request. Normally, the domainname which
+ * the current process will belong to after execve() succeeds is calculated
+ * using dereferenced pathnames. But some programs behave differently depending
+ * on the name passed to argv[0]. For busybox, calculating domainname using
+ * dereferenced pathnames will cause all programs in the busybox to belong to
+ * the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO provides a way to allow use of symlink's
+ * pathname for checking execve()'s permission and calculating domainname which
+ * the current process will belong to after execve() succeeds.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'alias /bin/busybox /bin/cat' > \
+ *                            /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete alias /bin/busybox /bin/cat' > \
+ *                            /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^alias /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, if /bin/cat is a symlink to /bin/busybox and execution
+ * of /bin/cat is requested, permission is checked for /bin/cat rather than
+ * /bin/busybox and domainname which the current process will belong to after
+ * execve() succeeds is calculated using /bin/cat rather than /bin/busybox .
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_alias_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
 
@@ -476,7 +645,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
 	saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_save_name(aliased_name);
 	if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
 		if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
@@ -499,7 +667,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -522,12 +689,11 @@ bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_alias_entry, list);
 		if (ptr->is_deleted)
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
-				      ptr->original_name->name,
-				      ptr->aliased_name->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
+					ptr->original_name->name,
+					ptr->aliased_name->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
 	return done;
@@ -567,7 +733,6 @@ int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
 
 	name.name = domainname;
 	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
 	/* Is there an active domain? */
 	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
@@ -581,7 +746,6 @@ int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
 		break;
 	}
 	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -600,7 +764,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
 
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
 	domain = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname);
 	if (domain)
@@ -619,7 +782,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 		    domain->domainname != saved_domainname)
 			continue;
 		flag = false;
-		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
 		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 		for_each_process(p) {
 			if (tomoyo_real_domain(p) != domain)
@@ -628,7 +790,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 			break;
 		}
 		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
 		if (flag)
 			continue;
 		list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
@@ -651,7 +812,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 	}
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return domain;
 }
 
@@ -739,7 +899,7 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	}
 
 	/* Check execute permission. */
-	retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r, tmp);
+	retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 2316da8ec5b..5ae3a571559 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -14,21 +14,50 @@
 #include "realpath.h"
 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
 
-/* Structure for "allow_read" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "allow_read" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_globally_readable_list .
+ *  (2) "filename" is a pathname which is allowed to open(O_RDONLY).
+ *  (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
 	bool is_deleted;
 };
 
-/* Structure for "file_pattern" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_pattern_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "tomoyo_pattern_list" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_pattern_list .
+ *  (2) "pattern" is a pathname pattern which is used for converting pathnames
+ *      to pathname patterns during learning mode.
+ *  (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_pattern_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
 	bool is_deleted;
 };
 
-/* Structure for "deny_rewrite" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "deny_rewrite" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ *  (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_no_rewrite_list .
+ *  (2) "pattern" is a pathname which is by default not permitted to modify
+ *      already existing content.
+ *  (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ *      otherwise.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
@@ -141,7 +170,31 @@ static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
 					 struct tomoyo_domain_info *
 					 const domain, const bool is_delete);
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_globally_readable_list is used for holding list of pathnames which
+ * are by default allowed to be open()ed for reading by any process.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so' > \
+ *                               /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so' > \
+ *                               /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^allow_read /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, any process is allowed to
+ * open("/lib/libc-2.5.so", O_RDONLY).
+ * One exception is, if the domain which current process belongs to is marked
+ * as "ignore_global_allow_read", current process can't do so unless explicitly
+ * given "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so" to the domain which current process
+ * belongs to.
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
 
@@ -166,7 +219,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
 	saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
 	if (!saved_filename)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
 		if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
@@ -187,7 +239,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -249,17 +300,44 @@ bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 				 list);
 		if (ptr->is_deleted)
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
-				      ptr->filename->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
+					ptr->filename->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
 	return done;
 }
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry". */
+/* tomoyo_pattern_list is used for holding list of pathnames which are used for
+ * converting pathnames to pathname patterns during learning mode.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'file_pattern /proc/\$/mounts' > \
+ *                             /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete file_pattern /proc/\$/mounts' > \
+ *                             /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^file_pattern /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, if a process which belongs to a domain which is in
+ * learning mode requested open("/proc/1/mounts", O_RDONLY),
+ * "allow_read /proc/\$/mounts" is automatically added to the domain which that
+ * process belongs to.
+ *
+ * It is not a desirable behavior that we have to use /proc/\$/ instead of
+ * /proc/self/ when current process needs to access only current process's
+ * information. As of now, LSM version of TOMOYO is using __d_path() for
+ * calculating pathname. Non LSM version of TOMOYO is using its own function
+ * which pretends as if /proc/self/ is not a symlink; so that we can forbid
+ * current process from accessing other process's information.
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
 
@@ -284,7 +362,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
 	saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
 	if (!saved_pattern)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
 		if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
@@ -305,7 +382,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -373,17 +449,44 @@ bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_pattern_entry, list);
 		if (ptr->is_deleted)
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "%s\n",
-				      ptr->pattern->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN
+					"%s\n", ptr->pattern->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
 	return done;
 }
 
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_no_rewrite_list is used for holding list of pathnames which are by
+ * default forbidden to modify already written content of a file.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'deny_rewrite /var/log/messages' > \
+ *                              /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete deny_rewrite /var/log/messages' > \
+ *                              /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^deny_rewrite /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, if a process requested to rewrite /var/log/messages ,
+ * the process can't rewrite unless the domain which that process belongs to
+ * has "allow_rewrite /var/log/messages" entry.
+ *
+ * It is not a desirable behavior that we have to add "\040(deleted)" suffix
+ * when we want to allow rewriting already unlink()ed file. As of now,
+ * LSM version of TOMOYO is using __d_path() for calculating pathname.
+ * Non LSM version of TOMOYO is using its own function which doesn't append
+ * " (deleted)" suffix if the file is already unlink()ed; so that we don't
+ * need to worry whether the file is already unlink()ed or not.
+ */
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
 
@@ -407,7 +510,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
 	saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
 	if (!saved_pattern)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
 		if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
@@ -428,7 +530,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
 	error = 0;
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -489,11 +590,10 @@ bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry, list);
 		if (ptr->is_deleted)
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "%s\n",
-				      ptr->pattern->name)) {
-			done = false;
+		done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE
+					"%s\n", ptr->pattern->name);
+		if (!done)
 			break;
-		}
 	}
 	up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
 	return done;
@@ -745,7 +845,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
 	saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
 	if (!saved_filename)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
 	if (is_delete)
 		goto delete;
@@ -800,7 +899,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
 	}
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -836,7 +934,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
 	saved_filename2 = tomoyo_save_name(filename2);
 	if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
 	if (is_delete)
 		goto delete;
@@ -884,7 +981,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
 	}
  out:
 	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -1025,13 +1121,11 @@ int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
  *
  * @domain:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
  * @filename: Check permission for "execute".
- * @tmp:      Buffer for temporary use.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise.
  */
 int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
-			   struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp)
+			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
 {
 	const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
index 40927a84cb6..5f2e3326337 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -220,7 +220,6 @@ void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
 		= roundup(size, max(sizeof(void *), sizeof(long)));
 	if (word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX)
 		return NULL;
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	mutex_lock(&lock);
 	if (buf_used_len + word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX) {
 		if (!tomoyo_quota_for_elements ||
@@ -251,7 +250,6 @@ void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
 		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return ptr;
 }
 
@@ -267,7 +265,16 @@ static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_savename;
  */
 #define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH 256
 
-/* Structure for string data. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_name_entry is a structure which is used for linking
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info" into tomoyo_name_list .
+ *
+ * Since tomoyo_name_list manages a list of strings which are shared by
+ * multiple processes (whereas "struct tomoyo_path_info" inside
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" is not shared), a reference counter will
+ * be added to "struct tomoyo_name_entry" rather than "struct tomoyo_path_info"
+ * when TOMOYO starts supporting garbage collector.
+ */
 struct tomoyo_name_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	struct tomoyo_path_info entry;
@@ -281,10 +288,10 @@ struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list {
 };
 
 /*
- * The list for "struct tomoyo_name_entry".
- *
- * This list is updated only inside tomoyo_save_name(), thus
- * no global mutex exists.
+ * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO.
+ * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g.
+ * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of
+ * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
  */
 static struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
 
@@ -318,7 +325,6 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
 	mutex_lock(&lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH],
 			     list) {
@@ -366,7 +372,6 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
 	}
  out:
 	mutex_unlock(&lock);
-	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
 	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index e42be5c4f05..3194d09fe0f 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -262,6 +262,10 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
 	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
 }
 
+/*
+ * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
+ * registering TOMOYO.
+ */
 static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
 	.name                = "tomoyo",
 	.cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
index 41c6ebafb9c..0fd588a629c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ struct path;
 struct inode;
 struct linux_binprm;
 struct pt_regs;
-struct tomoyo_page_buffer;
 
 int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 			   const char *filename, const u8 perm);
 int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
-			   struct tomoyo_page_buffer *buf);
+			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename);
 int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 				 struct path *path, const int flag);
 int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
@@ -90,17 +88,10 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
 	return current_cred()->security;
 }
 
-/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */
 static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
 							    *task)
 {
-	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
-	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
-
-	put_cred(cred);
-	return domain;
-	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+	return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
 }
 
 #endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */