diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c | 538 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c | 642 |
2 files changed, 1180 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c36c4389baa --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,538 @@ +/* + * Ultra Wide Band + * AES-128 CCM Encryption + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Intel Corporation + * Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky.perez-gonzalez@intel.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version + * 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA + * 02110-1301, USA. + * + * + * We don't do any encryption here; we use the Linux Kernel's AES-128 + * crypto modules to construct keys and payload blocks in a way + * defined by WUSB1.0[6]. Check the erratas, as typos are are patched + * there. + * + * Thanks a zillion to John Keys for his help and clarifications over + * the designed-by-a-committee text. + * + * So the idea is that there is this basic Pseudo-Random-Function + * defined in WUSB1.0[6.5] which is the core of everything. It works + * by tweaking some blocks, AES crypting them and then xoring + * something else with them (this seems to be called CBC(AES) -- can + * you tell I know jack about crypto?). So we just funnel it into the + * Linux Crypto API. + * + * We leave a crypto test module so we can verify that vectors match, + * every now and then. + * + * Block size: 16 bytes -- AES seems to do things in 'block sizes'. I + * am learning a lot... + * + * Conveniently, some data structures that need to be + * funneled through AES are...16 bytes in size! + */ + +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/uwb.h> +#include <linux/usb/wusb.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#define D_LOCAL 0 +#include <linux/uwb/debug.h> + + +/* + * Block of data, as understood by AES-CCM + * + * The code assumes this structure is nothing but a 16 byte array + * (packed in a struct to avoid common mess ups that I usually do with + * arrays and enforcing type checking). + */ +struct aes_ccm_block { + u8 data[16]; +} __attribute__((packed)); + +/* + * Counter-mode Blocks (WUSB1.0[6.4]) + * + * According to CCM (or so it seems), for the purpose of calculating + * the MIC, the message is broken in N counter-mode blocks, B0, B1, + * ... BN. + * + * B0 contains flags, the CCM nonce and l(m). + * + * B1 contains l(a), the MAC header, the encryption offset and padding. + * + * If EO is nonzero, additional blocks are built from payload bytes + * until EO is exahusted (FIXME: padding to 16 bytes, I guess). The + * padding is not xmitted. + */ + +/* WUSB1.0[T6.4] */ +struct aes_ccm_b0 { + u8 flags; /* 0x59, per CCM spec */ + struct aes_ccm_nonce ccm_nonce; + __be16 lm; +} __attribute__((packed)); + +/* WUSB1.0[T6.5] */ +struct aes_ccm_b1 { + __be16 la; + u8 mac_header[10]; + __le16 eo; + u8 security_reserved; /* This is always zero */ + u8 padding; /* 0 */ +} __attribute__((packed)); + +/* + * Encryption Blocks (WUSB1.0[6.4.4]) + * + * CCM uses Ax blocks to generate a keystream with which the MIC and + * the message's payload are encoded. A0 always encrypts/decrypts the + * MIC. Ax (x>0) are used for the sucesive payload blocks. + * + * The x is the counter, and is increased for each block. + */ +struct aes_ccm_a { + u8 flags; /* 0x01, per CCM spec */ + struct aes_ccm_nonce ccm_nonce; + __be16 counter; /* Value of x */ +} __attribute__((packed)); + +static void bytewise_xor(void *_bo, const void *_bi1, const void *_bi2, + size_t size) +{ + u8 *bo = _bo; + const u8 *bi1 = _bi1, *bi2 = _bi2; + size_t itr; + for (itr = 0; itr < size; itr++) + bo[itr] = bi1[itr] ^ bi2[itr]; +} + +/* + * CC-MAC function WUSB1.0[6.5] + * + * Take a data string and produce the encrypted CBC Counter-mode MIC + * + * Note the names for most function arguments are made to (more or + * less) match those used in the pseudo-function definition given in + * WUSB1.0[6.5]. + * + * @tfm_cbc: CBC(AES) blkcipher handle (initialized) + * + * @tfm_aes: AES cipher handle (initialized) + * + * @mic: buffer for placing the computed MIC (Message Integrity + * Code). This is exactly 8 bytes, and we expect the buffer to + * be at least eight bytes in length. + * + * @key: 128 bit symmetric key + * + * @n: CCM nonce + * + * @a: ASCII string, 14 bytes long (I guess zero padded if needed; + * we use exactly 14 bytes). + * + * @b: data stream to be processed; cannot be a global or const local + * (will confuse the scatterlists) + * + * @blen: size of b... + * + * Still not very clear how this is done, but looks like this: we + * create block B0 (as WUSB1.0[6.5] says), then we AES-crypt it with + * @key. We bytewise xor B0 with B1 (1) and AES-crypt that. Then we + * take the payload and divide it in blocks (16 bytes), xor them with + * the previous crypto result (16 bytes) and crypt it, repeat the next + * block with the output of the previous one, rinse wash (I guess this + * is what AES CBC mode means...but I truly have no idea). So we use + * the CBC(AES) blkcipher, that does precisely that. The IV (Initial + * Vector) is 16 bytes and is set to zero, so + * + * See rfc3610. Linux crypto has a CBC implementation, but the + * documentation is scarce, to say the least, and the example code is + * so intricated that is difficult to understand how things work. Most + * of this is guess work -- bite me. + * + * (1) Created as 6.5 says, again, using as l(a) 'Blen + 14', and + * using the 14 bytes of @a to fill up + * b1.{mac_header,e0,security_reserved,padding}. + * + * NOTE: The definiton of l(a) in WUSB1.0[6.5] vs the definition of + * l(m) is orthogonal, they bear no relationship, so it is not + * in conflict with the parameter's relation that + * WUSB1.0[6.4.2]) defines. + * + * NOTE: WUSB1.0[A.1]: Host Nonce is missing a nibble? (1e); fixed in + * first errata released on 2005/07. + * + * NOTE: we need to clean IV to zero at each invocation to make sure + * we start with a fresh empty Initial Vector, so that the CBC + * works ok. + * + * NOTE: blen is not aligned to a block size, we'll pad zeros, that's + * what sg[4] is for. Maybe there is a smarter way to do this. + */ +static int wusb_ccm_mac(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_cbc, + struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, void *mic, + const struct aes_ccm_nonce *n, + const struct aes_ccm_label *a, const void *b, + size_t blen) +{ + int result = 0; + struct blkcipher_desc desc; + struct aes_ccm_b0 b0; + struct aes_ccm_b1 b1; + struct aes_ccm_a ax; + struct scatterlist sg[4], sg_dst; + void *iv, *dst_buf; + size_t ivsize, dst_size; + const u8 bzero[16] = { 0 }; + size_t zero_padding; + + d_fnstart(3, NULL, "(tfm_cbc %p, tfm_aes %p, mic %p, " + "n %p, a %p, b %p, blen %zu)\n", + tfm_cbc, tfm_aes, mic, n, a, b, blen); + /* + * These checks should be compile time optimized out + * ensure @a fills b1's mac_header and following fields + */ + WARN_ON(sizeof(*a) != sizeof(b1) - sizeof(b1.la)); + WARN_ON(sizeof(b0) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); + WARN_ON(sizeof(b1) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); + WARN_ON(sizeof(ax) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); + + result = -ENOMEM; + zero_padding = sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block) + - blen % sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block); + zero_padding = blen % sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block); + if (zero_padding) + zero_padding = sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block) - zero_padding; + dst_size = blen + sizeof(b0) + sizeof(b1) + zero_padding; + dst_buf = kzalloc(dst_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (dst_buf == NULL) { + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't alloc destination buffer\n"); + goto error_dst_buf; + } + + iv = crypto_blkcipher_crt(tfm_cbc)->iv; + ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm_cbc); + memset(iv, 0, ivsize); + + /* Setup B0 */ + b0.flags = 0x59; /* Format B0 */ + b0.ccm_nonce = *n; + b0.lm = cpu_to_be16(0); /* WUSB1.0[6.5] sez l(m) is 0 */ + + /* Setup B1 + * + * The WUSB spec is anything but clear! WUSB1.0[6.5] + * says that to initialize B1 from A with 'l(a) = blen + + * 14'--after clarification, it means to use A's contents + * for MAC Header, EO, sec reserved and padding. + */ + b1.la = cpu_to_be16(blen + 14); + memcpy(&b1.mac_header, a, sizeof(*a)); + + d_printf(4, NULL, "I: B0 (%zu bytes)\n", sizeof(b0)); + d_dump(4, NULL, &b0, sizeof(b0)); + d_printf(4, NULL, "I: B1 (%zu bytes)\n", sizeof(b1)); + d_dump(4, NULL, &b1, sizeof(b1)); + d_printf(4, NULL, "I: B (%zu bytes)\n", blen); + d_dump(4, NULL, b, blen); + d_printf(4, NULL, "I: B 0-padding (%zu bytes)\n", zero_padding); + d_printf(4, NULL, "D: IV before crypto (%zu)\n", ivsize); + d_dump(4, NULL, iv, ivsize); + + sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &b0, sizeof(b0)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[1], &b1, sizeof(b1)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[2], b, blen); + /* 0 if well behaved :) */ + sg_set_buf(&sg[3], bzero, zero_padding); + sg_init_one(&sg_dst, dst_buf, dst_size); + + desc.tfm = tfm_cbc; + desc.flags = 0; + result = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg_dst, sg, dst_size); + if (result < 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't compute CBC-MAC tag (MIC): %d\n", + result); + goto error_cbc_crypt; + } + d_printf(4, NULL, "D: MIC tag\n"); + d_dump(4, NULL, iv, ivsize); + + /* Now we crypt the MIC Tag (*iv) with Ax -- values per WUSB1.0[6.5] + * The procedure is to AES crypt the A0 block and XOR the MIC + * Tag agains it; we only do the first 8 bytes and place it + * directly in the destination buffer. + * + * POS Crypto API: size is assumed to be AES's block size. + * Thanks for documenting it -- tip taken from airo.c + */ + ax.flags = 0x01; /* as per WUSB 1.0 spec */ + ax.ccm_nonce = *n; + ax.counter = 0; + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm_aes, (void *)&ax, (void *)&ax); + bytewise_xor(mic, &ax, iv, 8); + d_printf(4, NULL, "D: CTR[MIC]\n"); + d_dump(4, NULL, &ax, 8); + d_printf(4, NULL, "D: CCM-MIC tag\n"); + d_dump(4, NULL, mic, 8); + result = 8; +error_cbc_crypt: + kfree(dst_buf); +error_dst_buf: + d_fnend(3, NULL, "(tfm_cbc %p, tfm_aes %p, mic %p, " + "n %p, a %p, b %p, blen %zu)\n", + tfm_cbc, tfm_aes, mic, n, a, b, blen); + return result; +} + +/* + * WUSB Pseudo Random Function (WUSB1.0[6.5]) + * + * @b: buffer to the source data; cannot be a global or const local + * (will confuse the scatterlists) + */ +ssize_t wusb_prf(void *out, size_t out_size, + const u8 key[16], const struct aes_ccm_nonce *_n, + const struct aes_ccm_label *a, + const void *b, size_t blen, size_t len) +{ + ssize_t result, bytes = 0, bitr; + struct aes_ccm_nonce n = *_n; + struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_cbc; + struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes; + u64 sfn = 0; + __le64 sfn_le; + + d_fnstart(3, NULL, "(out %p, out_size %zu, key %p, _n %p, " + "a %p, b %p, blen %zu, len %zu)\n", out, out_size, + key, _n, a, b, blen, len); + + tfm_cbc = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("cbc(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm_cbc)) { + result = PTR_ERR(tfm_cbc); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't load CBC(AES): %d\n", (int)result); + goto error_alloc_cbc; + } + result = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm_cbc, key, 16); + if (result < 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't set CBC key: %d\n", (int)result); + goto error_setkey_cbc; + } + + tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { + result = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't load AES: %d\n", (int)result); + goto error_alloc_aes; + } + result = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm_aes, key, 16); + if (result < 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't set AES key: %d\n", (int)result); + goto error_setkey_aes; + } + + for (bitr = 0; bitr < (len + 63) / 64; bitr++) { + sfn_le = cpu_to_le64(sfn++); + memcpy(&n.sfn, &sfn_le, sizeof(n.sfn)); /* n.sfn++... */ + result = wusb_ccm_mac(tfm_cbc, tfm_aes, out + bytes, + &n, a, b, blen); + if (result < 0) + goto error_ccm_mac; + bytes += result; + } + result = bytes; +error_ccm_mac: +error_setkey_aes: + crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes); +error_alloc_aes: +error_setkey_cbc: + crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_cbc); +error_alloc_cbc: + d_fnend(3, NULL, "(out %p, out_size %zu, key %p, _n %p, " + "a %p, b %p, blen %zu, len %zu) = %d\n", out, out_size, + key, _n, a, b, blen, len, (int)bytes); + return result; +} + +/* WUSB1.0[A.2] test vectors */ +static const u8 stv_hsmic_key[16] = { + 0x4b, 0x79, 0xa3, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x23, 0x9d, + 0xd7, 0xc1, 0x6d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0xab, 0x6d, 0x3f +}; + +static const struct aes_ccm_nonce stv_hsmic_n = { + .sfn = { 0 }, + .tkid = { 0x76, 0x98, 0x01, }, + .dest_addr = { .data = { 0xbe, 0x00 } }, + .src_addr = { .data = { 0x76, 0x98 } }, +}; + +/* + * Out-of-band MIC Generation verification code + * + */ +static int wusb_oob_mic_verify(void) +{ + int result; + u8 mic[8]; + /* WUSB1.0[A.2] test vectors + * + * Need to keep it in the local stack as GCC 4.1.3something + * messes up and generates noise. + */ + struct usb_handshake stv_hsmic_hs = { + .bMessageNumber = 2, + .bStatus = 00, + .tTKID = { 0x76, 0x98, 0x01 }, + .bReserved = 00, + .CDID = { 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, + 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, + 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f }, + .nonce = { 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, + 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, + 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f }, + .MIC = { 0x75, 0x6a, 0x97, 0x51, 0x0c, 0x8c, + 0x14, 0x7b } , + }; + size_t hs_size; + + result = wusb_oob_mic(mic, stv_hsmic_key, &stv_hsmic_n, &stv_hsmic_hs); + if (result < 0) + printk(KERN_ERR "E: WUSB OOB MIC test: failed: %d\n", result); + else if (memcmp(stv_hsmic_hs.MIC, mic, sizeof(mic))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "E: OOB MIC test: " + "mismatch between MIC result and WUSB1.0[A2]\n"); + hs_size = sizeof(stv_hsmic_hs) - sizeof(stv_hsmic_hs.MIC); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: Handshake2 in: (%zu bytes)\n", hs_size); + dump_bytes(NULL, &stv_hsmic_hs, hs_size); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: CCM Nonce in: (%zu bytes)\n", + sizeof(stv_hsmic_n)); + dump_bytes(NULL, &stv_hsmic_n, sizeof(stv_hsmic_n)); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: MIC out:\n"); + dump_bytes(NULL, mic, sizeof(mic)); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: MIC out (from WUSB1.0[A.2]):\n"); + dump_bytes(NULL, stv_hsmic_hs.MIC, sizeof(stv_hsmic_hs.MIC)); + result = -EINVAL; + } else + result = 0; + return result; +} + +/* + * Test vectors for Key derivation + * + * These come from WUSB1.0[6.5.1], the vectors in WUSB1.0[A.1] + * (errata corrected in 2005/07). + */ +static const u8 stv_key_a1[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(4))) = { + 0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87, + 0x78, 0x69, 0x5a, 0x4b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x0f +}; + +static const struct aes_ccm_nonce stv_keydvt_n_a1 = { + .sfn = { 0 }, + .tkid = { 0x76, 0x98, 0x01, }, + .dest_addr = { .data = { 0xbe, 0x00 } }, + .src_addr = { .data = { 0x76, 0x98 } }, +}; + +static const struct wusb_keydvt_out stv_keydvt_out_a1 = { + .kck = { + 0x4b, 0x79, 0xa3, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x23, 0x9d, + 0xd7, 0xc1, 0x6d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0xab, 0x6d, 0x3f + }, + .ptk = { + 0xc8, 0x70, 0x62, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x7c, 0xe9, 0x06, + 0x7b, 0xc5, 0x25, 0x69, 0xf2, 0x36, 0x61, 0x2d + } +}; + +/* + * Performa a test to make sure we match the vectors defined in + * WUSB1.0[A.1](Errata2006/12) + */ +static int wusb_key_derive_verify(void) +{ + int result = 0; + struct wusb_keydvt_out keydvt_out; + /* These come from WUSB1.0[A.1] + 2006/12 errata + * NOTE: can't make this const or global -- somehow it seems + * the scatterlists for crypto get confused and we get + * bad data. There is no doc on this... */ + struct wusb_keydvt_in stv_keydvt_in_a1 = { + .hnonce = { + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f + }, + .dnonce = { + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, + 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f + } + }; + + result = wusb_key_derive(&keydvt_out, stv_key_a1, &stv_keydvt_n_a1, + &stv_keydvt_in_a1); + if (result < 0) + printk(KERN_ERR "E: WUSB key derivation test: " + "derivation failed: %d\n", result); + if (memcmp(&stv_keydvt_out_a1, &keydvt_out, sizeof(keydvt_out))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "E: WUSB key derivation test: " + "mismatch between key derivation result " + "and WUSB1.0[A1] Errata 2006/12\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: keydvt in: key (%zu bytes)\n", + sizeof(stv_key_a1)); + dump_bytes(NULL, stv_key_a1, sizeof(stv_key_a1)); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: keydvt in: nonce (%zu bytes)\n", + sizeof(stv_keydvt_n_a1)); + dump_bytes(NULL, &stv_keydvt_n_a1, sizeof(stv_keydvt_n_a1)); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: keydvt in: hnonce & dnonce (%zu bytes)\n", + sizeof(stv_keydvt_in_a1)); + dump_bytes(NULL, &stv_keydvt_in_a1, sizeof(stv_keydvt_in_a1)); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: keydvt out: KCK\n"); + dump_bytes(NULL, &keydvt_out.kck, sizeof(keydvt_out.kck)); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: keydvt out: PTK\n"); + dump_bytes(NULL, &keydvt_out.ptk, sizeof(keydvt_out.ptk)); + result = -EINVAL; + } else + result = 0; + return result; +} + +/* + * Initialize crypto system + * + * FIXME: we do nothing now, other than verifying. Later on we'll + * cache the encryption stuff, so that's why we have a separate init. + */ +int wusb_crypto_init(void) +{ + int result; + + result = wusb_key_derive_verify(); + if (result < 0) + return result; + return wusb_oob_mic_verify(); +} + +void wusb_crypto_exit(void) +{ + /* FIXME: free cached crypto transforms */ +} diff --git a/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a101cad6a8d --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c @@ -0,0 +1,642 @@ +/* + * Wireless USB Host Controller + * Security support: encryption enablement, etc + * + * Copyright (C) 2006 Intel Corporation + * Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky.perez-gonzalez@intel.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version + * 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA + * 02110-1301, USA. + * + * + * FIXME: docs + */ +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/usb/ch9.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include "wusbhc.h" + +/* + * DEBUG & SECURITY WARNING!!!! + * + * If you enable this past 1, the debug code will weaken the + * cryptographic safety of the system (on purpose, for debugging). + * + * Weaken means: + * we print secret keys and intermediate values all the way, + */ +#undef D_LOCAL +#define D_LOCAL 2 +#include <linux/uwb/debug.h> + +static void wusbhc_set_gtk_callback(struct urb *urb); +static void wusbhc_gtk_rekey_done_work(struct work_struct *work); + +int wusbhc_sec_create(struct wusbhc *wusbhc) +{ + wusbhc->gtk.descr.bLength = sizeof(wusbhc->gtk.descr) + sizeof(wusbhc->gtk.data); + wusbhc->gtk.descr.bDescriptorType = USB_DT_KEY; + wusbhc->gtk.descr.bReserved = 0; + + wusbhc->gtk_index = wusb_key_index(0, WUSB_KEY_INDEX_TYPE_GTK, + WUSB_KEY_INDEX_ORIGINATOR_HOST); + + INIT_WORK(&wusbhc->gtk_rekey_done_work, wusbhc_gtk_rekey_done_work); + + return 0; +} + + +/* Called when the HC is destroyed */ +void wusbhc_sec_destroy(struct wusbhc *wusbhc) +{ +} + + +/** + * wusbhc_next_tkid - generate a new, currently unused, TKID + * @wusbhc: the WUSB host controller + * @wusb_dev: the device whose PTK the TKID is for + * (or NULL for a TKID for a GTK) + * + * The generated TKID consist of two parts: the device's authenicated + * address (or 0 or a GTK); and an incrementing number. This ensures + * that TKIDs cannot be shared between devices and by the time the + * incrementing number wraps around the older TKIDs will no longer be + * in use (a maximum of two keys may be active at any one time). + */ +static u32 wusbhc_next_tkid(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev) +{ + u32 *tkid; + u32 addr; + + if (wusb_dev == NULL) { + tkid = &wusbhc->gtk_tkid; + addr = 0; + } else { + tkid = &wusb_port_by_idx(wusbhc, wusb_dev->port_idx)->ptk_tkid; + addr = wusb_dev->addr & 0x7f; + } + + *tkid = (addr << 8) | ((*tkid + 1) & 0xff); + + return *tkid; +} + +static void wusbhc_generate_gtk(struct wusbhc *wusbhc) +{ + const size_t key_size = sizeof(wusbhc->gtk.data); + u32 tkid; + + tkid = wusbhc_next_tkid(wusbhc, NULL); + + wusbhc->gtk.descr.tTKID[0] = (tkid >> 0) & 0xff; + wusbhc->gtk.descr.tTKID[1] = (tkid >> 8) & 0xff; + wusbhc->gtk.descr.tTKID[2] = (tkid >> 16) & 0xff; + + get_random_bytes(wusbhc->gtk.descr.bKeyData, key_size); +} + +/** + * wusbhc_sec_start - start the security management process + * @wusbhc: the WUSB host controller + * + * Generate and set an initial GTK on the host controller. + * + * Called when the HC is started. + */ +int wusbhc_sec_start(struct wusbhc *wusbhc) +{ + const size_t key_size = sizeof(wusbhc->gtk.data); + int result; + + wusbhc_generate_gtk(wusbhc); + + result = wusbhc->set_gtk(wusbhc, wusbhc->gtk_tkid, + &wusbhc->gtk.descr.bKeyData, key_size); + if (result < 0) + dev_err(wusbhc->dev, "cannot set GTK for the host: %d\n", + result); + + return result; +} + +/** + * wusbhc_sec_stop - stop the security management process + * @wusbhc: the WUSB host controller + * + * Wait for any pending GTK rekeys to stop. + */ +void wusbhc_sec_stop(struct wusbhc *wusbhc) +{ + cancel_work_sync(&wusbhc->gtk_rekey_done_work); +} + + +/** @returns encryption type name */ +const char *wusb_et_name(u8 x) +{ + switch (x) { + case USB_ENC_TYPE_UNSECURE: return "unsecure"; + case USB_ENC_TYPE_WIRED: return "wired"; + case USB_ENC_TYPE_CCM_1: return "CCM-1"; + case USB_ENC_TYPE_RSA_1: return "RSA-1"; + default: return "unknown"; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wusb_et_name); + +/* + * Set the device encryption method + * + * We tell the device which encryption method to use; we do this when + * setting up the device's security. + */ +static int wusb_dev_set_encryption(struct usb_device *usb_dev, int value) +{ + int result; + struct device *dev = &usb_dev->dev; + struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev = usb_dev->wusb_dev; + + if (value) { + value = wusb_dev->ccm1_etd.bEncryptionValue; + } else { + /* FIXME: should be wusb_dev->etd[UNSECURE].bEncryptionValue */ + value = 0; + } + /* Set device's */ + result = usb_control_msg(usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_SET_ENCRYPTION, + USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_DEVICE, + value, 0, NULL, 0, 1000 /* FIXME: arbitrary */); + if (result < 0) + dev_err(dev, "Can't set device's WUSB encryption to " + "%s (value %d): %d\n", + wusb_et_name(wusb_dev->ccm1_etd.bEncryptionType), + wusb_dev->ccm1_etd.bEncryptionValue, result); + return result; +} + +/* + * Set the GTK to be used by a device. + * + * The device must be authenticated. + */ +static int wusb_dev_set_gtk(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev) +{ + struct usb_device *usb_dev = wusb_dev->usb_dev; + + return usb_control_msg( + usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_SET_DESCRIPTOR, + USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_DEVICE, + USB_DT_KEY << 8 | wusbhc->gtk_index, 0, + &wusbhc->gtk.descr, wusbhc->gtk.descr.bLength, + 1000); +} + + +/* FIXME: prototype for adding security */ +int wusb_dev_sec_add(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, + struct usb_device *usb_dev, struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev) +{ + int result, bytes, secd_size; + struct device *dev = &usb_dev->dev; + struct usb_security_descriptor secd; + const struct usb_encryption_descriptor *etd, *ccm1_etd = NULL; + void *secd_buf; + const void *itr, *top; + char buf[64]; + + d_fnstart(3, dev, "(usb_dev %p, wusb_dev %p)\n", usb_dev, wusb_dev); + result = usb_get_descriptor(usb_dev, USB_DT_SECURITY, + 0, &secd, sizeof(secd)); + if (result < sizeof(secd)) { + dev_err(dev, "Can't read security descriptor or " + "not enough data: %d\n", result); + goto error_secd; + } + secd_size = le16_to_cpu(secd.wTotalLength); + d_printf(5, dev, "got %d bytes of sec descriptor, total is %d\n", + result, secd_size); + secd_buf = kmalloc(secd_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (secd_buf == NULL) { + dev_err(dev, "Can't allocate space for security descriptors\n"); + goto error_secd_alloc; + } + result = usb_get_descriptor(usb_dev, USB_DT_SECURITY, + 0, secd_buf, secd_size); + if (result < secd_size) { + dev_err(dev, "Can't read security descriptor or " + "not enough data: %d\n", result); + goto error_secd_all; + } + d_printf(5, dev, "got %d bytes of sec descriptors\n", result); + bytes = 0; + itr = secd_buf + sizeof(secd); + top = secd_buf + result; + while (itr < top) { + etd = itr; + if (top - itr < sizeof(*etd)) { + dev_err(dev, "BUG: bad device security descriptor; " + "not enough data (%zu vs %zu bytes left)\n", + top - itr, sizeof(*etd)); + break; + } + if (etd->bLength < sizeof(*etd)) { + dev_err(dev, "BUG: bad device encryption descriptor; " + "descriptor is too short " + "(%u vs %zu needed)\n", + etd->bLength, sizeof(*etd)); + break; + } + itr += etd->bLength; + bytes += snprintf(buf + bytes, sizeof(buf) - bytes, + "%s (0x%02x/%02x) ", + wusb_et_name(etd->bEncryptionType), + etd->bEncryptionValue, etd->bAuthKeyIndex); + if (etd->bEncryptionType == USB_ENC_TYPE_CCM_1) + ccm1_etd = etd; + } + /* This code only supports CCM1 as of now. */ + /* FIXME: user has to choose which sec mode to use? + * In theory we want CCM */ + if (ccm1_etd == NULL) { + dev_err(dev, "WUSB device doesn't support CCM1 encryption, " + "can't use!\n"); + result = -EINVAL; + goto error_no_ccm1; + } + wusb_dev->ccm1_etd = *ccm1_etd; + dev_info(dev, "supported encryption: %s; using %s (0x%02x/%02x)\n", + buf, wusb_et_name(ccm1_etd->bEncryptionType), + ccm1_etd->bEncryptionValue, ccm1_etd->bAuthKeyIndex); + result = 0; + kfree(secd_buf); +out: + d_fnend(3, dev, "(usb_dev %p, wusb_dev %p) = %d\n", + usb_dev, wusb_dev, result); + return result; + + +error_no_ccm1: +error_secd_all: + kfree(secd_buf); +error_secd_alloc: +error_secd: + goto out; +} + +void wusb_dev_sec_rm(struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev) +{ + /* Nothing so far */ +} + +static void hs_printk(unsigned level, struct device *dev, + struct usb_handshake *hs) +{ + d_printf(level, dev, + " bMessageNumber: %u\n" + " bStatus: %u\n" + " tTKID: %02x %02x %02x\n" + " CDID: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x\n" + " %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x\n" + " nonce: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x\n" + " %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x\n" + " MIC: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x\n", + hs->bMessageNumber, hs->bStatus, + hs->tTKID[2], hs->tTKID[1], hs->tTKID[0], + hs->CDID[0], hs->CDID[1], hs->CDID[2], hs->CDID[3], + hs->CDID[4], hs->CDID[5], hs->CDID[6], hs->CDID[7], + hs->CDID[8], hs->CDID[9], hs->CDID[10], hs->CDID[11], + hs->CDID[12], hs->CDID[13], hs->CDID[14], hs->CDID[15], + hs->nonce[0], hs->nonce[1], hs->nonce[2], hs->nonce[3], + hs->nonce[4], hs->nonce[5], hs->nonce[6], hs->nonce[7], + hs->nonce[8], hs->nonce[9], hs->nonce[10], hs->nonce[11], + hs->nonce[12], hs->nonce[13], hs->nonce[14], hs->nonce[15], + hs->MIC[0], hs->MIC[1], hs->MIC[2], hs->MIC[3], + hs->MIC[4], hs->MIC[5], hs->MIC[6], hs->MIC[7]); +} + +/** + * Update the address of an unauthenticated WUSB device + * + * Once we have successfully authenticated, we take it to addr0 state + * and then to a normal address. + * + * Before the device's address (as known by it) was usb_dev->devnum | + * 0x80 (unauthenticated address). With this we update it to usb_dev->devnum. + */ +static int wusb_dev_update_address(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, + struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev) +{ + int result = -ENOMEM; + struct usb_device *usb_dev = wusb_dev->usb_dev; + struct device *dev = &usb_dev->dev; + u8 new_address = wusb_dev->addr & 0x7F; + + /* Set address 0 */ + result = usb_control_msg(usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_SET_ADDRESS, 0, + 0, 0, NULL, 0, 1000 /* FIXME: arbitrary */); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "auth failed: can't set address 0: %d\n", + result); + goto error_addr0; + } + result = wusb_set_dev_addr(wusbhc, wusb_dev, 0); + if (result < 0) + goto error_addr0; + usb_ep0_reinit(usb_dev); + + /* Set new (authenticated) address. */ + result = usb_control_msg(usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_SET_ADDRESS, 0, + new_address, 0, NULL, 0, + 1000 /* FIXME: arbitrary */); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "auth failed: can't set address %u: %d\n", + new_address, result); + goto error_addr; + } + result = wusb_set_dev_addr(wusbhc, wusb_dev, new_address); + if (result < 0) + goto error_addr; + usb_ep0_reinit(usb_dev); + usb_dev->authenticated = 1; +error_addr: +error_addr0: + return result; +} + +/* + * + * + */ +/* FIXME: split and cleanup */ +int wusb_dev_4way_handshake(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev, + struct wusb_ckhdid *ck) +{ + int result = -ENOMEM; + struct usb_device *usb_dev = wusb_dev->usb_dev; + struct device *dev = &usb_dev->dev; + u32 tkid; + __le32 tkid_le; + struct usb_handshake *hs; + struct aes_ccm_nonce ccm_n; + u8 mic[8]; + struct wusb_keydvt_in keydvt_in; + struct wusb_keydvt_out keydvt_out; + + hs = kzalloc(3*sizeof(hs[0]), GFP_KERNEL); + if (hs == NULL) { + dev_err(dev, "can't allocate handshake data\n"); + goto error_kzalloc; + } + + /* We need to turn encryption before beginning the 4way + * hshake (WUSB1.0[.3.2.2]) */ + result = wusb_dev_set_encryption(usb_dev, 1); + if (result < 0) + goto error_dev_set_encryption; + + tkid = wusbhc_next_tkid(wusbhc, wusb_dev); + tkid_le = cpu_to_le32(tkid); + + hs[0].bMessageNumber = 1; + hs[0].bStatus = 0; + memcpy(hs[0].tTKID, &tkid_le, sizeof(hs[0].tTKID)); + hs[0].bReserved = 0; + memcpy(hs[0].CDID, &wusb_dev->cdid, sizeof(hs[0].CDID)); + get_random_bytes(&hs[0].nonce, sizeof(hs[0].nonce)); + memset(hs[0].MIC, 0, sizeof(hs[0].MIC)); /* Per WUSB1.0[T7-22] */ + + d_printf(1, dev, "I: sending hs1:\n"); + hs_printk(2, dev, &hs[0]); + + result = usb_control_msg( + usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_SET_HANDSHAKE, + USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_DEVICE, + 1, 0, &hs[0], sizeof(hs[0]), 1000 /* FIXME: arbitrary */); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake1: request failed: %d\n", result); + goto error_hs1; + } + + /* Handshake 2, from the device -- need to verify fields */ + result = usb_control_msg( + usb_dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_GET_HANDSHAKE, + USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_DEVICE, + 2, 0, &hs[1], sizeof(hs[1]), 1000 /* FIXME: arbitrary */); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2: request failed: %d\n", result); + goto error_hs2; + } + d_printf(1, dev, "got HS2:\n"); + hs_printk(2, dev, &hs[1]); + + result = -EINVAL; + if (hs[1].bMessageNumber != 2) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: bad message number %u\n", + hs[1].bMessageNumber); + goto error_hs2; + } + if (hs[1].bStatus != 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: bad status %u\n", + hs[1].bStatus); + goto error_hs2; + } + if (memcmp(hs[0].tTKID, hs[1].tTKID, sizeof(hs[0].tTKID))) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: TKID mismatch " + "(#1 0x%02x%02x%02x vs #2 0x%02x%02x%02x)\n", + hs[0].tTKID[0], hs[0].tTKID[1], hs[0].tTKID[2], + hs[1].tTKID[0], hs[1].tTKID[1], hs[1].tTKID[2]); + goto error_hs2; + } + if (memcmp(hs[0].CDID, hs[1].CDID, sizeof(hs[0].CDID))) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: CDID mismatch\n"); + goto error_hs2; + } + + /* Setup the CCM nonce */ + memset(&ccm_n.sfn, 0, sizeof(ccm_n.sfn)); /* Per WUSB1.0[6.5.2] */ + memcpy(ccm_n.tkid, &tkid_le, sizeof(ccm_n.tkid)); + ccm_n.src_addr = wusbhc->uwb_rc->uwb_dev.dev_addr; + ccm_n.dest_addr.data[0] = wusb_dev->addr; + ccm_n.dest_addr.data[1] = 0; + + /* Derive the KCK and PTK from CK, the CCM, H and D nonces */ + memcpy(keydvt_in.hnonce, hs[0].nonce, sizeof(keydvt_in.hnonce)); + memcpy(keydvt_in.dnonce, hs[1].nonce, sizeof(keydvt_in.dnonce)); + result = wusb_key_derive(&keydvt_out, ck->data, &ccm_n, &keydvt_in); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: cannot derive keys: %d\n", + result); + goto error_hs2; + } + d_printf(2, dev, "KCK:\n"); + d_dump(2, dev, keydvt_out.kck, sizeof(keydvt_out.kck)); + d_printf(2, dev, "PTK:\n"); + d_dump(2, dev, keydvt_out.ptk, sizeof(keydvt_out.ptk)); + + /* Compute MIC and verify it */ + result = wusb_oob_mic(mic, keydvt_out.kck, &ccm_n, &hs[1]); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: cannot compute MIC: %d\n", + result); + goto error_hs2; + } + + d_printf(2, dev, "MIC:\n"); + d_dump(2, dev, mic, sizeof(mic)); + if (memcmp(hs[1].MIC, mic, sizeof(hs[1].MIC))) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake2 failed: MIC mismatch\n"); + goto error_hs2; + } + + /* Send Handshake3 */ + hs[2].bMessageNumber = 3; + hs[2].bStatus = 0; + memcpy(hs[2].tTKID, &tkid_le, sizeof(hs[2].tTKID)); + hs[2].bReserved = 0; + memcpy(hs[2].CDID, &wusb_dev->cdid, sizeof(hs[2].CDID)); + memcpy(hs[2].nonce, hs[0].nonce, sizeof(hs[2].nonce)); + result = wusb_oob_mic(hs[2].MIC, keydvt_out.kck, &ccm_n, &hs[2]); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake3 failed: cannot compute MIC: %d\n", + result); + goto error_hs2; + } + + d_printf(1, dev, "I: sending hs3:\n"); + hs_printk(2, dev, &hs[2]); + + result = usb_control_msg( + usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), + USB_REQ_SET_HANDSHAKE, + USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_DEVICE, + 3, 0, &hs[2], sizeof(hs[2]), 1000 /* FIXME: arbitrary */); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Handshake3: request failed: %d\n", result); + goto error_hs3; + } + + d_printf(1, dev, "I: turning on encryption on host for device\n"); + d_dump(2, dev, keydvt_out.ptk, sizeof(keydvt_out.ptk)); + result = wusbhc->set_ptk(wusbhc, wusb_dev->port_idx, tkid, + keydvt_out.ptk, sizeof(keydvt_out.ptk)); + if (result < 0) + goto error_wusbhc_set_ptk; + + d_printf(1, dev, "I: setting a GTK\n"); + result = wusb_dev_set_gtk(wusbhc, wusb_dev); + if (result < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Set GTK for device: request failed: %d\n", + result); + goto error_wusbhc_set_gtk; + } + + /* Update the device's address from unauth to auth */ + if (usb_dev->authenticated == 0) { + d_printf(1, dev, "I: updating addres to auth from non-auth\n"); + result = wusb_dev_update_address(wusbhc, wusb_dev); + if (result < 0) + goto error_dev_update_address; + } + result = 0; + d_printf(1, dev, "I: 4way handshke done, device authenticated\n"); + +error_dev_update_address: +error_wusbhc_set_gtk: +error_wusbhc_set_ptk: +error_hs3: +error_hs2: +error_hs1: + memset(hs, 0, 3*sizeof(hs[0])); + memset(&keydvt_out, 0, sizeof(keydvt_out)); + memset(&keydvt_in, 0, sizeof(keydvt_in)); + memset(&ccm_n, 0, sizeof(ccm_n)); + memset(mic, 0, sizeof(mic)); + if (result < 0) { + /* error path */ + wusb_dev_set_encryption(usb_dev, 0); + } +error_dev_set_encryption: + kfree(hs); +error_kzalloc: + return result; +} + +/* + * Once all connected and authenticated devices have received the new + * GTK, switch the host to using it. + */ +static void wusbhc_gtk_rekey_done_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct wusbhc *wusbhc = container_of(work, struct wusbhc, gtk_rekey_done_work); + size_t key_size = sizeof(wusbhc->gtk.data); + + mutex_lock(&wusbhc->mutex); + + if (--wusbhc->pending_set_gtks == 0) + wusbhc->set_gtk(wusbhc, wusbhc->gtk_tkid, &wusbhc->gtk.descr.bKeyData, key_size); + + mutex_unlock(&wusbhc->mutex); +} + +static void wusbhc_set_gtk_callback(struct urb *urb) +{ + struct wusbhc *wusbhc = urb->context; + + queue_work(wusbd, &wusbhc->gtk_rekey_done_work); +} + +/** + * wusbhc_gtk_rekey - generate and distribute a new GTK + * @wusbhc: the WUSB host controller + * + * Generate a new GTK and distribute it to all connected and + * authenticated devices. When all devices have the new GTK, the host + * starts using it. + * + * This must be called after every device disconnect (see [WUSB] + * section 6.2.11.2). + */ +void wusbhc_gtk_rekey(struct wusbhc *wusbhc) +{ + static const size_t key_size = sizeof(wusbhc->gtk.data); + int p; + + wusbhc_generate_gtk(wusbhc); + + for (p = 0; p < wusbhc->ports_max; p++) { + struct wusb_dev *wusb_dev; + + wusb_dev = wusbhc->port[p].wusb_dev; + if (!wusb_dev || !wusb_dev->usb_dev | !wusb_dev->usb_dev->authenticated) + continue; + + usb_fill_control_urb(wusb_dev->set_gtk_urb, wusb_dev->usb_dev, + usb_sndctrlpipe(wusb_dev->usb_dev, 0), + (void *)wusb_dev->set_gtk_req, + &wusbhc->gtk.descr, wusbhc->gtk.descr.bLength, + wusbhc_set_gtk_callback, wusbhc); + if (usb_submit_urb(wusb_dev->set_gtk_urb, GFP_KERNEL) == 0) + wusbhc->pending_set_gtks++; + } + if (wusbhc->pending_set_gtks == 0) + wusbhc->set_gtk(wusbhc, wusbhc->gtk_tkid, &wusbhc->gtk.descr.bKeyData, key_size); +} |