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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c231
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c318
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h55
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/flask.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netlabel.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c142
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c4
14 files changed, 467 insertions, 330 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b2ab6085983..1ed0f076aad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
* @tclass: target security class
* @av: access vector
*/
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
{
const char **common_pts = NULL;
u32 common_base = 0;
@@ -492,23 +492,35 @@ out:
return node;
}
-static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
- struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
- char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
- if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
- if (port)
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+ struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
+ ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+ avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
}
-static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
- __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
- if (addr)
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
- if (port)
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+ struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+ avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
}
/**
@@ -532,13 +544,10 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
*/
void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+ struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ struct common_audit_data stack_data;
u32 denied, audited;
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
if (denied) {
audited = denied;
@@ -551,144 +560,20 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
return;
}
-
- ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
- if (!ab)
- return; /* audit_panic has been called */
- audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
- avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited);
- audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
- if (a && a->tsk)
- tsk = a->tsk;
- if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
- }
- if (a) {
- switch (a->type) {
- case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id);
- break;
- case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
- audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
- break;
- case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
- if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
- struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
- if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
- &a->u.fs.path);
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
- }
- inode = dentry->d_inode;
- } else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
- struct dentry *dentry;
- inode = a->u.fs.inode;
- dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
- if (dentry) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
- dput(dentry);
- }
- }
- if (inode)
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
- inode->i_sb->s_id,
- inode->i_ino);
- break;
- case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
- if (a->u.net.sk) {
- struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
- struct unix_sock *u;
- int len = 0;
- char *p = NULL;
-
- switch (sk->sk_family) {
- case AF_INET: {
- struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-
- avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
- inet->sport,
- "laddr", "lport");
- avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
- inet->dport,
- "faddr", "fport");
- break;
- }
- case AF_INET6: {
- struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
- struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
-
- avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
- inet->sport,
- "laddr", "lport");
- avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
- inet->dport,
- "faddr", "fport");
- break;
- }
- case AF_UNIX:
- u = unix_sk(sk);
- if (u->dentry) {
- struct path path = {
- .dentry = u->dentry,
- .mnt = u->mnt
- };
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
- &path);
- break;
- }
- if (!u->addr)
- break;
- len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
- p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
- audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
- if (*p)
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
- else
- audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- switch (a->u.net.family) {
- case AF_INET:
- avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
- a->u.net.sport,
- "saddr", "src");
- avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
- a->u.net.dport,
- "daddr", "dest");
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
- a->u.net.sport,
- "saddr", "src");
- avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
- a->u.net.dport,
- "daddr", "dest");
- break;
- }
- if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
- struct net_device *dev;
-
- /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
- dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
- a->u.net.netif);
- if (dev) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
- dev->name);
- dev_put(dev);
- }
- }
- break;
- }
+ if (!a) {
+ a = &stack_data;
+ memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+ a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " ");
- avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
+ a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
+ a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
+ a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
+ a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
+ a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+ a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
+ a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
+ common_lsm_audit(a);
}
/**
@@ -824,18 +709,16 @@ out:
}
/**
- * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
- * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ * avc_flush - Flush the cache
*/
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+static void avc_flush(void)
{
- struct avc_callback_node *c;
- int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
- unsigned long flag;
- struct avc_node *node;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *next;
+ struct avc_node *node;
spinlock_t *lock;
+ unsigned long flag;
+ int i;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
@@ -852,6 +735,18 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+{
+ struct avc_callback_node *c;
+ int rc = 0, tmprc;
+
+ avc_flush();
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
@@ -956,7 +851,7 @@ out:
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+ u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc;
@@ -970,3 +865,11 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
{
return avc_cache.latest_notif;
}
+
+void avc_disable(void)
+{
+ avc_flush();
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ if (avc_node_cachep)
+ kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index c73aeaa008e..c0a454aee1e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -63,3 +63,9 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
+bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
+{
+ return selinux_enabled;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8d8b69c5664..417f7c99452 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
* Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
* Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
*
@@ -448,6 +448,10 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+ /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+ if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
/* Initialize the root inode. */
rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -1479,14 +1483,14 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
int rc;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.tsk = tsk;
ad.u.cap = cap;
@@ -1525,12 +1529,14 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct inode *inode,
u32 perms,
- struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+ struct common_audit_data *adp)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid;
+ validate_creds(cred);
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
@@ -1539,7 +1545,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
if (!adp) {
adp = &ad;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
}
@@ -1555,9 +1561,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
u32 av)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
@@ -1577,11 +1583,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -1612,7 +1618,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
int rc;
dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1621,7 +1627,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1665,7 +1671,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
{
struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int rc;
@@ -1673,7 +1679,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
dsec = dir->i_security;
isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
av = DIR__SEARCH;
@@ -1708,7 +1714,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1719,7 +1725,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1761,7 +1767,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct super_block *sb,
u32 perms,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1855,12 +1861,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
/* Hook functions begin here. */
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
@@ -2139,7 +2145,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return rc;
}
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2232,7 +2238,7 @@ extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
struct files_struct *files)
{
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
struct tty_struct *tty;
struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2266,7 +2272,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
for (;;) {
@@ -2515,7 +2521,7 @@ out:
static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
int rc;
rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2526,7 +2532,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
return 0;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
@@ -2534,9 +2540,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
@@ -2711,12 +2717,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+
+ /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+ ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+ ATTR_FORCE);
+ if (!ia_valid)
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
- return 0;
-
- if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
- ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+ if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+ ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
@@ -2756,7 +2768,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
int rc = 0;
@@ -2770,7 +2782,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
return -EPERM;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2915,6 +2927,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
return rc;
isec->sid = newsid;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -2939,11 +2952,6 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- if (!mask) {
- /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
- return 0;
- }
-
/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
mask |= MAY_APPEND;
@@ -2954,10 +2962,20 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
if (!mask)
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
return 0;
+ if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+ fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+ /* No change since dentry_open check. */
+ return 0;
+
return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
}
@@ -3220,12 +3238,29 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
}
/*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+ if (!tsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cred->security = tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
*/
static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
- cred->security = NULL;
+
+ BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+ cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
kfree(tsec);
}
@@ -3249,6 +3284,17 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
}
/*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+ *tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
@@ -3292,6 +3338,11 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+ return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3409,7 +3460,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
{
int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -3490,7 +3541,7 @@ out:
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
{
u8 nexthdr;
int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -3561,7 +3612,7 @@ out:
#endif /* IPV6 */
-static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
{
char *addrp;
@@ -3643,7 +3694,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
u32 perms)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid;
int err = 0;
@@ -3653,7 +3704,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
goto out;
sid = task_sid(task);
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -3740,7 +3791,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
char *addrp;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
unsigned short snum;
@@ -3769,7 +3820,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
snum, &sid);
if (err)
goto out;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
@@ -3802,7 +3853,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
if (err)
goto out;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -3836,7 +3887,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
unsigned short snum;
@@ -3861,7 +3912,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -3951,13 +4002,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
int err;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3983,13 +4034,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
int err;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -4002,7 +4053,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
u32 peer_sid,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int err;
u32 if_sid;
@@ -4030,10 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u32 peer_sid;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4071,7 +4122,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
u8 secmark_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4095,7 +4146,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
return 0;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4309,6 +4360,59 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
fl->secid = req->secid;
}
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+ * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+ * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+ * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+ * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+ * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+ * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+ * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+ * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+ * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+ * protocols were being used */
+
+ /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
+ * the sockcreate SID here */
+
+ sksec->sid = current_sid();
+ sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int err;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ sksec->sid = sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err = 0;
@@ -4353,7 +4457,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
int err;
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u8 secmark_active;
u8 netlbl_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4370,7 +4474,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4458,7 +4562,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
u8 proto;
@@ -4466,7 +4570,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
sksec = sk->sk_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4490,7 +4594,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
u32 secmark_perm;
u32 peer_sid;
struct sock *sk;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
u8 secmark_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4549,7 +4653,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4619,13 +4723,13 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
{
int err;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
if (err)
return err;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.u.cap = capability;
return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
@@ -4684,12 +4788,12 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 perms)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = ipc_perms->security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4709,7 +4813,7 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4719,7 +4823,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4739,12 +4843,12 @@ static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4783,7 +4887,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4804,7 +4908,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
return rc;
}
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4828,14 +4932,14 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
msec = msg->security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4850,7 +4954,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4860,7 +4964,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4880,12 +4984,12 @@ static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4942,7 +5046,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4952,7 +5056,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -4972,12 +5076,12 @@ static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5195,7 +5299,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
error = -EPERM;
- if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+ if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
if (error)
goto abort_change;
@@ -5252,6 +5356,32 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
kfree(secdata);
}
+/*
+ * called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+ ctx, true);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return len;
+ *ctxlen = len;
+ return 0;
+}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
@@ -5323,7 +5453,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.name = "selinux",
- .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset = selinux_capset,
@@ -5396,10 +5526,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
+ .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
.cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
.cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
+ .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
.kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
.kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
+ .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
@@ -5448,6 +5581,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
.secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
.release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
+ .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
+ .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
+ .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
.unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
.unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
@@ -5477,6 +5613,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
.inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
.req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
+ .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
+ .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
+ .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
@@ -5691,6 +5830,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
selinux_disabled = 1;
selinux_enabled = 0;
+ /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+ avc_disable();
+
/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
security_ops = secondary_ops;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index 8377a4ba3b9..abedcd704da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+ S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7c1ae..2b683ad83d2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+ S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request")
S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192ee95..0546d616cca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,6 +423,28 @@
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define PROCESS__FORK 0x00000001UL
#define PROCESS__TRANSITION 0x00000002UL
#define PROCESS__SIGCHLD 0x00000004UL
@@ -508,6 +530,7 @@
#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ 0x00000002UL
#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD 0x00000004UL
#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE 0x00000008UL
+#define SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST 0x00000010UL
#define CAPABILITY__CHOWN 0x00000001UL
#define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE 0x00000002UL
#define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH 0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index d12ff1a9c0a..e94e82f7381 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
@@ -36,48 +37,6 @@ struct inode;
struct sock;
struct sk_buff;
-/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
-struct avc_audit_data {
- char type;
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS 1
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET 2
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP 3
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC 4
- struct task_struct *tsk;
- union {
- struct {
- struct path path;
- struct inode *inode;
- } fs;
- struct {
- int netif;
- struct sock *sk;
- u16 family;
- __be16 dport;
- __be16 sport;
- union {
- struct {
- __be32 daddr;
- __be32 saddr;
- } v4;
- struct {
- struct in6_addr daddr;
- struct in6_addr saddr;
- } v6;
- } fam;
- } net;
- int cap;
- int ipc_id;
- } u;
-};
-
-#define v4info fam.v4
-#define v6info fam.v6
-
-/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
- { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
-
/*
* AVC statistics
*/
@@ -98,7 +57,9 @@ void __init avc_init(void);
void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *a);
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -108,7 +69,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
@@ -127,13 +88,13 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms);
-/* Shows permission in human readable form */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av);
-
/* Exported to selinuxfs */
int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
+void avc_disable(void);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 21ec786611d..7ab9299bfb6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -77,3 +77,4 @@
S_(NULL)
S_(NULL)
S_("kernel_service")
+ S_("tun_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 882f27d66fa..f248500a1e3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#define SECCLASS_PEER 68
#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 69
#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE 74
+#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET 75
/*
* Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index b4b5b9b2f0b..8d7384280a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+ struct common_audit_data *ad);
int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int level,
int optname);
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 289e24b39e3..13128f9a3e5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
}
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+ struct common_audit_data *ad);
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
}
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2e984413c7b..e68823741ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int rc;
u32 nlbl_sid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 500e6f78e11..ff17820d35e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
*
* Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
*
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
* Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
@@ -279,6 +284,95 @@ mls_ops:
}
/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+ char **permission_names = args;
+
+ BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+ permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 permissions,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ struct common_datum *common_dat;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *tclass_name;
+ char *scontext_name = NULL;
+ char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+ char *permission_names[32];
+ int index, length;
+ bool need_comma = false;
+
+ if (!permissions)
+ return;
+
+ tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+ tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+ /* init permission_names */
+ if (common_dat &&
+ hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+ if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+ &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+ &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* audit a message */
+ ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+ reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+ for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+ if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+ need_comma ? "," : "",
+ permission_names[index]
+ ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+ need_comma = true;
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ /* release scontext/tcontext */
+ kfree(tcontext_name);
+ kfree(scontext_name);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
* security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
* on boundary constraint.
*/
@@ -347,28 +441,12 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
}
if (masked) {
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
- char *stype_name
- = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[source->value - 1];
- char *ttype_name
- = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[target->value - 1];
- char *tclass_name
- = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
-
/* mask violated permissions */
avd->allowed &= ~masked;
- /* notice to userspace via audit message */
- ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
- GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
- if (!ab)
- return;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, "av boundary violation: "
- "source=%s target=%s tclass=%s",
- stype_name, ttype_name, tclass_name);
- avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, masked);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
}
}
@@ -480,7 +558,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
!constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
constraint->expr)) {
- avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+ avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
}
constraint = constraint->next;
}
@@ -499,8 +577,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
break;
}
if (!ra)
- avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
- PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+ avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
}
/*
@@ -687,6 +765,26 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
}
index = type->bounds;
}
+
+ if (rc) {
+ char *old_name = NULL;
+ char *new_name = NULL;
+ int length;
+
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+ &old_name, &length) &&
+ !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+ &new_name, &length)) {
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_bounded_transition "
+ "result=denied "
+ "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+ old_name, new_name);
+ }
+ kfree(new_name);
+ kfree(old_name);
+ }
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 72b18452e1a..f3cb9ed731a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
* gone thru the IPSec process.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct sec_path *sp;
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
* checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;